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Aviation History
1942
1942 - 1442.PDF
44 FLIGHT JULY gin, 1942 THE DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT Dive Bombers Under the Microscope : Air Superiority in Libya THE great debate in Parliament on the central direction of the war has ended in the motion of cen sure being defeated by the crushing majority of 475 votes to 25. On the P.rst day the debate concluded by the House being counted out. On the second day leave was obtained to put the motion a second time. Sir John Watdlaw-Milne moved: "That this House, while paying tribute to the heroism and endurance of the Armed Forces of the Cro*n in circum stances of exceptional difficulty, has no <. onfidence in the central direction of the war." The motion was seconded by Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes, who re turned to his old complaint that if the Navy had been allowed to develop naval aviation and the torpedoplane, the Ger man ships would never have got through the Channel and home. He said the Admiralty's failure to provide the Fleet with the naval aircraft it needed was absolutely inexcusable after three years of war. Dive Bombers Mr. Lyttelton, the Minister of Produc tion, dealt with the question of dive bombers. He said: Before leaving the subject of equipment, I think I must say something about the air situation. It has not been suggested that any justified criticism has been directed at our machines and the efficiency of our air craft, except in one respect, and that is the lack of dive-bombers. The present Government have always attached im portance to this weapon, and, in fact, a few weeks after the Government were formed orders were placed for dive- bombers in the United States. They were placed by Lord Beaverbrook in June, 1940. [Hon. Members: "How many? "] A large number. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air said in his speech on the Air Esti mates, on March 4th, that it was com pletely mistaken to suppose that the Air Staff have discarded dive-bombers. In 1940, we were desperately short of air craft, and we needed less specialised types of fighters and bombers even more than we needed dive-bombers. Now the situation is changed. Now, with suf ficient fighters and bombers, we have gained air superiority in more than one theatre of war, and this ascendency, which is a prerequisite of the use of dive- bombers, means that we can now turn dive-bombers to good account, and we are sure we can employ them effectively at sea. At the time when Lord Beaver brook acted, there was nothing to be gained in placing orders in this country, and. indeed, there was much to be lost, because to develop a new type of dive- bomber would have interfered very seriously with the output of vital air craft which we had to have: it would have reduced the output of those air craft which afterwards proved our sal vation. The House will know how long it takes for a new type of aircraft to get into production, and, although there have been delays in the production and modifications in the design, we are to day receiving deliveries under the con tract which was then placed. Some dive- bombers have already reached one theatre of war, and others are on their way. Mr. A. Devan: This is a very im portant matter, because it may be re garded, to use a vulgarism, as passing the buck to America. It has been said that the Americans did not supply the machines because they would not give priority to our orders for dive- bombers, but were the Americans told that we were prepared to waive priority in other materials to get priority in dive- bombers? Mr. Molsvn: Is it the case that the British Air Commission in America was never allowed to give to these dive-* bombers any form of priority, which was a statement made by Mr. Westbrook, of the Ministry of Aircraft Production ? Mr. Lyttelton: My hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) asked whether a lack of priority led to slow deliveries in dive-bombers. I would say "No." There is no evidence at all that the delivery of dive-bombers would have been guaranteed by any system of priority. Mr. Bevan: There was no priority? Mr. Lyttelton: It does not apply, be cause dive-bombers were not made in the same factories as the ether machines. There is no evidence to show that supply of materials or labour were made scarce in those factories by other orders for more wanted machines being placed at that time. The two types of aircraft were not competitive with each other as far as production is concerned, and, therefore, it is idle to talk about priority having stopped the production of the one for the sake of accelerating the pro duction of the other. Miss Ward (Wallsend): Is it not a fact that the Army were asking for dive- bombers in the spring of 1941, and what' was the reason for their requirements being overruled? Sir William Davison (Kensington South): What was the reason for the great delay in delivering these dive- bombers from America? The American Orders Mr. Lyttelton: The order for delivery of bombers was placed in June, 1940, in the United States—nothing would have been gained by placing the order in this country—and we have at this moment begun to take delivery of machines before any new production in this coun try could, in any circumstances, have been brought about. There have been delays, which are by no means all the fault of the United States, in the pro duction of this particular machine. That is an inevitable thing which occurred. The Secretary of State for War yester day, in saying that the means by which air support can most effectively be given to the troops is constantly under review, was, f think, misunderstood. The House seemed to infer from his state ment that there was some difference be tween him and the Secretary of State for Air on the use of dive-bombers. That is not the case. As soon as the aircraft are obtained in larger quantities from the United States—and that is now begin ning—they will be handed . over to the Royal Air Force and will be available for use with the Army and also at sea. Sir H. Williams: The right hon. Gen tleman said yesterday that a decision had not yet been arrived at. Will he clear up that point? Mr. Lyttelton: These are discussions which I do not think will ever be finished, and they never should be finished except in the best way, by per fecting the arrangements for tactical support of one arm by the other. That is quite different from saying that there is a controversy as to whether dive- bombers are desirable or not. Air Superiority There is much misapprehension about air action in the Western Desert. I have heard the question frequently asked why, when so many victories of the enemy are ascribed to superiority irr the air, we have not won victories in the desert when we continually claim, and rightly claim, that we have superiority in the air. I have always been quite sure, and indeed have told Members of this House on many occasions, that the value ©f ajj^ superiority in so far as it affects support of infantry and armoured formations in the desert, is nothing like that which it is in enclosed country. You do not cash- in your air superiority in the desert in the way in which you do in other theatres of war. AH the experience of the battles of November and those of the present campaign shows that thefco- operation between the Air Force and the Army has reached a high level of effici ency, and the Commander-in-Chief has continually referred in his situation reports to this fact. But time and again it is impossible to put down heavy bomb ing as a tactical weapon on the enemy's tanks when the battle is joined, because of the difficulty of identification. An armoured battle in the desert raises a great dust, and movements are very quick. For five or ten minutes the whole direction of the battle changes. It is the opinion of commanders that a force of dive-bombers could not have affected the course of the battle and that the dive< *v bombers of the enemy were largely in effective in the desert for the reason I have given. [Interruption.] There is no evidence to support the view that dive- bombers were responsible for the fall of Bir Hacheim. I said they have proved largely ineffective. Of course, when troops are in a perimeter dive-bombers are more effective than in open country, but during the campaign it is true to say, and the commanders agree, that a force of dive-bombers would not have made any difference and that the enemy dive- bombers were largely ineffective. Mr. Gam Jones: Is it not the case that large forces of enemy dive-bombers heavily bombed Bir Hacbeim and Tobruk during the decisive period ? Mr. Lyttelton : There were never more than 20 to 30 at any time. I do not think there is any evidence to show that the fall of Bir Hacheim was due to the action of dive-bombers. The forces which attacked that place had extremely heavy casualties, and the Free French sent a message of congratulation to the Royal
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