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Aviation History
1943
1943 - 0372.PDF
148 FLIGHT FEBRUARY IITH, 1943 s Wanted "— An Air Charter Some Thoughts on the Planning of Postwar Aviation : The Need for a Qovernment Lead: Bringing Operators and Manufacturers Together WITH so many sections of the community nowtaking a keen • interest in the subject of post-warcivil aviation, including the formation by tHe Association of British Chambers of Commerce, the Federa- tion of British Industries, and the London Chamber of Commerce of a joint committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Oliver E. Simmonds, as announced in Flight last week, and a Government Departmental Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Brabazon, it appears more than ever necessary that at least the broad outlines of British policy should be established. Before any headway can be made it is absolutely essential that the Government should give a lead as to the basic policy, and we therefore welcome the support given by the Simmonds Committee to the sug- gestion which we made some months ago that a Parlia- mentary standing committee should be formed. While discussions are still in an early stage, it appears desirable to note certain fundamental considerations which must be taken into account if our planning is to proceed along the right lines. During informal discussions we have had with people in many walks of life, we have had many opinions expressed to us. Among those with whom we have talked about this very complicated question of post- war civil aviation are the leading people of the De Havil- land Aircraft Company, Ltd., who have had greater experi- ence in designing and building civil aircraft than any firm in the country. From our talks certain considerations and conclusions have emerged, which may serve as a useful basis for further discussions. First of all it must be realised that only the War Cabinet and, to a more limited degree, the Air Staff can know to what extent the country can afford to deflect productive capacity from bomber to transport aircraft. Largely owing to her geographical conditions, America is already in large-scale production with military transport aircraft, and we in this country can scarcely hope to emulate her example in the circumstances "in which we rind ourselves. Interim Period The conclusion appears inevitable that when fighting ceases there will be an interim period in which converted bombers and military transport types will have to be used extensively. Obviously, American aircraft will be in the majority on the world routes during that period. That, however, is no valid argument against beginning now with the planning of the more permanent airline organisation which must in time replace the interim arrangements. At this point it appears worth while to look back and to try to draw from past experience certain lessons which might usefully be applied to future planning. There appears to be an almost unanimous demand for airline competition. Not the sort of wasteful competition which did so much harm in the early days of commercial flying, but at least sufficient competition to ensure effi- ciency. If there is one thing which the first two decades of commercial aviation (1919-1939) has taught us it is that monopolies are basically unsound, whether they are held by commercial enterprise or by the State. It should be possible right away to decide on two or three main transport types of aircraft which would, with relatively minor modifications, be fairly suitable for certain routes, the operation of which is inevitable in any post- war scheme. It is undoubtedly a fact that for any long- term policy it will be absolutely essential to use aircraft types specially designed for and fully suited to the par- ticular route. Such types cannot be designed to any. "ger>eral " specification, but must be the outcome of close and direct collaboration between the practical operating companies and the practical aircraft manufacturers. The task of the Government will be to create a demand for aircraft, not a number of aircraft that are not wanted. Given a clear-cut issue, the British aircraft industry can be relied upon to turn out aircraft of the right quality. Early Start The great thing will be to get British air transport started as early as possible, and on a large scale, so that the operating organisations can be built up, the personnel welded into efficient teams, and practical experience accumulated. There -need be no misgivings about using American aircraft at first, should that be necessary. Ex- perience is what counts, and there will be available, for example, British aircrews and ground personnel with the very finest training. Our large shipping companies have an accumulated experience of transport which, applied to air transport, should prove invaluable. And radio develop- ments which owe their existence to the war will become available for application to commercial flying. They should make an invaluable contribution to safe and effi- cient air transport. With these principles established and accepted, the question that arises is how far we can go to-day towards laying the foundations for British air transport. If we could decide at once who is to operate the routes, and on what terms, the chosen companies could begin to col laborate with manufacturers in evolving suitable aircraft types. But we have not at present the answers to certain questions which must precede such detail planning. For example, is commercial aviation to be internationalised? Thus again the conclusion is reached that the Govern- ment must declare our basic air transport policy. This might be done on the following lines: — (a) Declare our intention to operate, over stated routes,British air services second to none. (b) Declare our preference for unsubsidised development, butour determination that British air services (possibly linked with British shipping services) shall not suffer inefficiency by reason of any other nation adopting a sub- sidy policy. (c) Indicate the zones of operation which are to be-servedby different British companies. It is obvious that the network needed, and the geographic and climatic condi-tions, will be so vast and varied that a number of operating organisations will be necessary. (d) Declare that all mails which leave Britain shall be flown. (e) Lay down the principles upon which individual operatinglicences are to be granted (i.e., whether by tender and for what period). This would enable the interests quali-fied to run these services to prepare their own policies. (f) Define who shall be responsible for weather reporting andforecasts, radio, traffic control and all ground services. (g) State .the broad policy for the replacement of the aircrafttypes used during the interim period. For instance, the Government might insist that after a certain period, say,four years from the signing of Armistice, all British air- lines must operate British aircraft only. There will probably be plenty of war transport aircraft (mainly American) for the interim period, and some British types could be quickly put into production if needed. Meanwhile, bearing in mind that it will take at least three years to get into full production, a start should be made now on the.design of the " permanent " types. There are certain routes (the North Atlantic, for instance) which will obviously have to be operated, and the length of stages and volume of traffic are pretty well known already. The best hope for an immediate start would appear to lie in finding a type, or types, sufficiently alike in their requirements to serve with but minor modifications for wartime military transport and post-war civil transport.
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