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Aviation History
1943
1943 - 1218.PDF
FLIGHT MAY 13TH, iy4. attack of the war" and "blastejj a path in advance of our ground units." Such superlative terms have never before been used in any headquarters communique from either side in either the last war or in this. During the Somme battles in 1916 the British held undoubted air mastery until the coming of Boelcke on the scene, and in the early stages of the present war the Germans pro- fited much from their ascendancy in the air—but no terms resembling those just quoted have ever been read before in a sober official report. Aircraft VersatilityI T is significant that the report in question was issued before the Allies had made their rapid dash on to the two important cities of Tunisia. It alluded to the first break-through when the fighting was still in the moun- tains. It is a general rule that in mountain warfare neither bombers nor artillery can produce their best results. This time the rule seems hardly to have held good. The aircraft were evidently used as field artillery to hammer the liries of the enemy, and it is equally evi- dent that they did so to great effect. It helped enor- mously that the enemy could put up no air opposition of any account, and bombers and fighter-bombers could concentrate on making good shooting with no thought of hostile air interference to distract them. Once the Allied infantry and armour broke through to the plains, everything became simpler. The bombs from the air became more effective, for near misses could be nearly as destructive as direct hits (which is rarely the case when the target is in the hills), while the armour could spread out and use its speed and fire power to the best advantage. The aircraft then transformed themselves from field artillery into pursuing cavalry, and smashed up long columns on the lines of the enemy's retreat. The phenomenal speed of the Allies' dash from the mountains across the plains to Bizerta and Tunis must go to the credit of the armour, the armoured cars, and the motorised infantry, for in no other way could such distances have been covered in the time. In these two stages of assault and pursuit the Air C O N T E N The Outlook - - - - War in the Air - Hawker's Latest Fighter - Here and There - Turbines and the Flying Wing Bouquets from U.S.A. Behind the Lines - Aircraft Characteristics Notes from a Test Pilot's Diary, Vought-Sikorsky Corsair - A Fighter Mosquito Squadron Sea Fighter Air Cover Correspondence - Service Aviation - T S - - - - 500, No. 6—Fear - - - - - 487 489 493 195 496 499 500 a&b 501 502 504 506 509 5io Forces proved their versatility. But there was an earlier example of that versatility which should not be for- gotten. This was the attack on sea and air communica- tions in the Sicilian Straits before General Alexander struck. Evidence is already to hand that it left the Axis short of various essentials for effective resistance. In the last three weeks of April the Axis lost no fewer than 193 transport aircraft, with a capacity of carrying 636 tons of material or 6,000 fully armed soldiers. In addition to this there were heavy sinkings of ships, in which the R.A.F. was assisted b ' submarines, light naval forces, and the Albacores of the Fleet Air Arm, all of which did magnificent work. It goes without saying that a ship can carry more than a transport air- craft can do, and the loss of tankers and cargo ships was, therefore, a more grievous loss to von Arnim. The enemy's greatest shortage was in aircraft, despite the great concentration of fighters which he had made in Tunisia and Sicily. Large numbers had been des- troyed by Allied bombing of airfields. A commander who is conspicuously short of any one essential arm can hardly hope for victory, whether that arm be aircraft, guns, tanks, or infantry. One report, made after the Allied victory was certain, concluded that von Arnim had actually sent the rem- nants of his Air Forces away, and that was why the Allies met with no resistance in the air. If that be t'ue, it was a policy of despair, im- plying that the German General knew that the game was up and that he had decided to save all that could be saved. The only arm which could be evacu- ated easily was the air arm, while the ground units were left to make what resistance they could with a hostile sea behind them and a hostile sky overhead. NAVAL AIR PROTECTION: Vickers Supermarine Seafires ranged on the deck of one of our aircraft carriers. The problems of air cover for a fleet at sea are discussed in the article Sea Fighter Air Cover, on pages 507-508 in this issue.
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