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Aviation History
1943
1943 - 1947.PDF
AUGUST 5TH, I943 FLIGHT Democratic Document Truman Report Reviewed : Frontal Attack on Production Weaknesses, but Credit Where Due SOME details of the findings of the Truman Committeewere published in Flight of July 22nd. We are nowable to give our readers a more comprehensive review of this remarkable document, the full,text of which lia* now reached this country. "The Additional Report of the Special Committee Investigating the National Defence Program," or better known as the Truman Report, after its chairman. Senator Harry S. Truman, of Missouri, is the result of exhausting investigation into the different aspects of American aircraft production. What strikes one immediately is the extraordinary frank- ness with which the mass of intricate problems is tackled. In fact, it is a frontal attack on delays and inefficiency, ruthlessly attempting to show up the bottlenecks in which some sectors ot the war effort are being strangled. And with the object of increasing even further the U.S. pro- duction, the questions of prestige and interests are ignored, * d the disclosure of deficiencies limited only by considera- tions of national eecurity. The advantage so far gained by the Allies in the accretion of air power is summed up in the following opening state- ment of the report: — " We have succeeded in building an air industry in the U.S. which our foes cannot hope to equal. England has a splendid aircraft industry, and Russia, about which little is known, is producing large numbers of planes. The German aircraft industry has suffered heavily from the bombing of Germany and is limited as to certain vital supplies, both for the construction and the operation of planes. The Japanese aircraft industry never had a capa- city comparable to ours. To reach a production remotely comparable with our own it would be necessary for Japan to expand her industrial resources from the ores to the finished products. . . . Consequently we can be certain that we will be able to oppose Japan with incomparably ^ugerior air power. Our difficulties will be those of obtain- ing bases from which to operate against the Japanese and in overcoming the tremendous advantage which they have gained by acquiring numerous such bases in the islands of the Pacific." Annual Output The figures quoted by the report justify the view taken onAmerican production capacity: "During the calendar year 1942, approximately 48,000 airplanes were produced in theU.S. During the twelve months ending June 30th, 1943, we have produced 64,000 planes. The present enormous rate ofproduction will be vastly increased." At the same time it is emphasised that " there is, and ofnecessity must be, an extended time lag between the produc- tion of a plane at the factory and the actual use of the planeat the front." 5 To avoid the serious drop in production which usuallyaccompanies a rapid expansion of plants during the transition period, special "modification centres" have been established. In these, aircraft are being made suitable for use at the front^ until such time as the aircraft plant has had an opportunity * to make orderly plans to incorporate the modifications intoits production lines. A feature of this policy was the large variety of aircraft. types produced since the established companies were encour- .;* aged to produce whatever they could in order to get quantity. : production with minimum delay. The Committee believes that a great mistake was made in adopting such a policy and that• the number of models should be reduced and production con- , centrated on types which have proved their worth. At thesame time "experimentation should continue for the purpose ol developing and proving new models, but we should notattempt mass-production of an entirely new model incorporat- ing at whole series of major improvements until after it hasbeen tested and proved." The labour problem, which many aircraft plants had diffi-culty in solving, is described by the Committee as being due either to unco-ordinated call-ups, balancing a grading of wages according to responsibility, or to competition in the labourmarket by offering higher wages in the neighbouring industries. On the other hand, cases are recorded where there was enor-mous waste of manpower, due to a variety of reasons; but with a better flow of materials and improvements in produc-tion organisation this waste has decreased and will decrease further. Jwo conclusions are mosl significant and noteworthy :while enforced idleness (it is said) led the workers to suspect sabotage and decreased their efficiency, in plants producing air-craft with a good fighting record the workers were more effi- cient than in those which were pioducing inferior types. Comments on Types The comments of the report cover almost the entire range ofaircraft in production. In Flight of July 22 the Committee's views on the Martin B-26 Marauder were reported. Of theother twin-engined bombers the Douglas A-20 Havoc is described as " one of the best liked planes that has been built,"while the Martin A-30 is " a less satisfactory but usable plane which has been in production since early in the programme." The twin-engined fighter or the Army, the Lockheed P-38Lightning, is described as " a very fine plane in large numbers." while the production of the Northrop P-61, intended for nightfighting, is said to be far behind schedule. Discussing the single-engined fighters, the report states thatArmy Air Force authorities were slow in recognising the value of high-altitude fighters such as the Republic P-47 Thunder-bolt, and they had a definite predilection for*the fighters em- ployable at low altitudes in co-operation with large land armieslocked in combat. For this reason the Curtiss P-40, which it is admitted has performed valuable work, in «the Committee'sopinion '' was relatively obsolete when we entered the war and of more limited value than other fighters producedby other American companies and by the British." Another argument in favour of the continued mass produc-tion of the P-40 was that a change-over would reduce output at a time when aircraft were vitally needed by the Russians.While the Committee agrees that this decision was necessary, it '' regrets that earlier decisions which concenti-ated so largea portion of our production on a plane which, although usable, is regarded by the Russian, English and American forces as atbest second choice." Major modifications since introduced on the P-40 are said toproduce an aircraft which would compare with the North American P-51 Mustang, "which is regarded aerodynamicallyas one of the finest, if not the finest, plane of its type in the world." The Mustang is credited with being superior to theBell Airacobra, or the P-40, and equipped with an Allison engine is a good low-altitude reconnaissance fighter and.fighter-bomber ; powered with a Rolls-Royce two-stage engine, it is a good medium-altitude fighter. Perhaps the most interesting facts emerge from the TrumanCommittee's review of the position of the dive bomber. As previously reported, for tafctical reasons the Army decided toreduce its future production while the Navy goes on with the building programme. It is stated that '' the Douglas SBD Dauntless has to datebeen the only dive bomber which has been successfully used in large quantities by the Navy." The improved version, theSB2D, is expected by the Navy to have an excellent perform- ance. Despite this, the Committee finds that large contractswere placed with Curtiss-Wright for an experimental type, the SB2C Helldiver. A new plant, costing $27,000,000, was builtfor Curtiss-Wright for that purpose. Large numbers of this type were also to be produced by the Fairchfld Engine and Air-plane Corp. and Canadian Car and Foundry, and an Army ver- sion of the dive bomber (A-25) was to be built at the Curtissplant at St. Louis. "Production of such dive bombers was to have been com-menced by Curtiss-Wright in December, 1041. It did not actually commence until September, 1942. It has been hope-lessly behind schedule and, to date, Curtiss-Wright has not succeeded in producing a single SB2C which the Navy con-siders to be usable as a combat airplane." It is stated, however, that in the opinion of the Navy diffi-culties will be overcome within two or three months. Because, as stated by Curtiss, there was no suitable turret available inthe country and the Emerson Electric Co., which originally
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