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Aviation History
1943
1943 - 2108.PDF
234 FLIGHT AUGUST 26TH, 1943 Theories of Air Power An American Analysis By MAJOR F. A. de V. ROBERTSON, V.D. "AIR power revolutionises in many respects, but does not necessarily outmode, older concepts of war- fare. It lengthens our reach . . . but does not change the basic principles of warfare." Gen. E. ?. Sorensen, Assistant Chief of Staff, US.A.A.F. Intelligence. AFEW weeks ago an article in these columns triedto set forth American ideas on the use of airpower as expounded by Maj, Gen. Eaker, the officer commanding the U.S. Army Eighth Air Force inthe United Kingdom. There has now come to hand an analysis of the theories of air power by Gen. E. P.Sorensen, Assistant Chief of Army Air Force Intelligence, contained in an address which he delivered in June to the'Society of Mechanical Engineers at Los Angeles. It is an extremely thoughtful address, going deeply into thesubject, and it is a gratification to find that Gen. Sorensen is, in the main, in agreement with the ideas setforth in Flight both before and during the present war. Only on a few comparatively minor points must we displaythe temerity to disagree with him. There were probably not a few of his hearers, and per-haps still more readers, of his address who were surprised at the principles which he laid down. Air power is loom-ing so large in this war, and it is filling so many columns in the newspapers, that not a few superficial thinkers haveconcluded that the air is the only thing that matters. Gen. Sorensen laid it down at the outset that "Airpower revolutionises in many respects, but does not neces- sarily outmode, older concepts of warfare. It lengthensOUf reach . . . but it does not change the basic principles of warfare." In other words, aircraft provide a newweapon, just as in past centuries the domestication of the horse and the invention of gunpowder introduced newforms of tactics. Long-range Artillery The General went on to give instances of how aircrafthave aided armies in the course of the present war. He admitted that part of then: functions resembled that ofartillery, but emphasised the longer range of the former. That point is surely obvious to everybody, and it is a veryimportant point. But in the development of weapons, as in other spheres of technical advance, an advantage hasusually to be paid for. It would" do no good service to this newest of all weapons not to recognise its limitations aswell as its capabilities. Any given target within the range of guns of suitable calibre can be most effectively dealtwith bv the artillery. Once a battery has got the range, probably by means of aerial observation, it can open rapidfire from each gun or howitzer until the target is destroyed. The bomber, on the other hand, has to go through aseparate sighting operation on each bombing run, and that operation is complicated. The R.AF. Bomber Command,in fact, working by preference by night, has abandoned the idea of precision bombing and gone in for areabombing. There have been occasions especially in the East Africancampaigns, when the artillery could not keep pace with the infantry in the mountains, and then it was legitimateto use light bombers as field artillery. It is a sound rule, however, to shell everything within range, and reservebombing for targets which the guns cannot reach. Gen. Sorensen proceeds to single out the long-rangebomber '' as the weapon which enables air power to serve as a primary instead of an auxiliary arm. . . . Airforce reaches its peak expression in the heavy long-range bombers, which are the only weapons capable of hittingthe real sources of mechanised military power." That is very true, and one almost wonders whether Gen.Sorensen does not in his heart of hearts advocate an inde- pendent Air Force for the United States, not necessarilyon the same lines as the Royal Air Force, but at least comprising the whole body of heavy long-range bombers. He certainly does not deprecate the utility of an airarm working with an army, but he points out that air superiority over a battlefield is not always enough. Herelates how during Gen. Auchinleck's campaign in Libya the R.A.F. maintained superiority over theLuftwaffe, but, none the less, the British were driven back to the edge of Alexandria. He says there was somethingmissing, and concludes that the piece that was missing was strategic bombing. Rommel was able to get in histanks and supplies, and Gen. Sorensen suggests that they ought to have been sunk while on their way on board ship. Balanced Forces That theory raises many queries. One thing that certainly missing to the British forces was heavy arm^ The light tanks that they possessed were no match foi those of-the Germans, and when Sherman tanks appeared on the scene the enemy was defeated' in the ground fighting. But Gen. Sorensen would probably reply that that is no answer, as the German tanks ought never <to have arrived. One is also impelled to ask if the British (including Dominion) Air Force was correctly used during that cam- paign. Did it really recognise that it ought to be an arm of the Army or was it too independent ? We do not know the answer, but certainly the Prime Minister announced to Parliament after his return from that front that thence- forward the whole Air Force there was to take its orders from the Army authorities, and thereafter the Army, with Generals Alexander and Montgomery to lead, with Sherman tanks to out-gun the Germans, and with a strengthened Air Force at work, went straight ahead to final victory. Whether the change was due chiefly to the Generals and their novel tactics, to the better tanks, to the increased numbers of aircraft, or to the new subordination of tbqL e "Air Force to the Army—or to a combination of all thosfactors—'is again a question which only future historians will be able to decide. Bombing Supplies Let us revert to Gen. Sorensen's theory that what was missing during the Auchinleck campaign was strategic bombing. We will not quarrel with his use of the word " strategic," for it has come to be accepted whenever heavy bombers are used independently of other arms, though, strictly speaking, attempts to interfere with lines of com- munication, whether by sea or by land, behind the enemy's front would seem properly to be of a tactical nature. In the first instance, the movement of Rommel and his Africa Korps from Europe to Libya does seem to have taken place without much interference from the British, whose eyes were turned towards Greece and Crete. Later on very heavy toll was taken of the ships which set out from the mainland to keep Rommel supplied, though the number which got through was always greater than the number sunk. The attacks on these ships were made by both.the Royal Navy (chiefly by submarines) and by torpedo-bombers (some of which were naval Albacores and Swordfish). It is almost certain that the greater part of the sinkings was due to the submarines ; but in such an operation Navy and Air Force must work closely together, and no doubt many submarines received the information on which they acted from patrolling aircraft. It was no part of Gen. Sorensen's text to discourse on naval opera- tions. But the stretch of sea between Italy and Sicily on the one hand and the ports of Libya on the other was too great for a blockade to be established by the available
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