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Aviation History
1944
1944 - 0242.PDF
I24 FLIGHT FEBRUARY 3RD, 1944 AIR OBSERVATION POSTS immediate vicinity, a small meadow, or even a reasonably smooth cart-track will do, for with trailing-edge flaps and light wing-loading it can climb steeply from a short take off run, and land in a steep, slow glide to come to a stand still in very few yards. Equally important for an aircraft which must be used, housed and maintained under primitive and often '' tough conditions, its construction is sturdy enough to withstand rough handling, constant exposure to all weathers, and servicing facilities that resemble '' roadside repairs'' (to use a familiar motoring phrase) rather than the accepted R.A.F. standard of aircraft maintenance that goes with well-equipped hangars and workshops. This sturdiness, moreover, is allied to simplicity—an equally important factor in quick and easy maintenance. The fuselage is a straightforward structure of welded steel tubes with fabric covering which can easily be patched and which, experience has shown, stands up to all-weather exposure remarkably well. The same simplicity is seen in the wings in which the main spars are merely spruce planks placed "on edge," and in the undercarriage, which is of simple tripod type, employing a rubber cord shock absorber. An A.O.P. pilot receives hisjfinal instructions before taking off to direct the artillery fire. •tr Heavy Bombers a»d Pathfinder* Britain's Conquest of the Weather By MAJOR F. A. de V. ROBERTSON, V.D. WHEN Zeppelins and Schiitte-Lanz airships were raiding Great Britain during the first World war, people in this country used to dread fine clear nights. Cloud and murk were welcomed as a protection, for they could checkmate the air raider. One of the most remarkable,developments of the present war is the absolute reversal of the former attitudes of air attack and air defence towards the weather. Now all elements of the defence, the searchlights, the A.A. guns, and particularly the night- fighters, like bright clear nights. The night-fighter pilots -ire always praying for light, more light. On the other rrand, British developments have enabled the night- bombers to master the impediments of cloud, murk and general invisibility. Clouds provide them with cover against fighter attacks, and in these days great care is taken in timing the attack to avoid those hours of the night when the moo'n is up. This ability to overcome the handicap of bad weather is one of the greatest triumphs of the R.A.F. in the present war. To see it in its proper perspective it will be well to look back and contrast the different objects with which the Royai Air Force and the Luftwaffe prepared for war. Foresight Between the signing of the treaty of Versailles and the year 1935 the R.A.F. was pitifully weak in numbers. None the less, Britain, while disarming to the danger point, did not entirely neglect all planning for war. It was recog nised that the first necessity was to keep the sea lanes open. If ships could not sail to and from the British Isles, then Britain was beaten, and no power at all by land or air could save her. The part which would ultimately be played by Coastal Command in helping to keep the sea lanes open was not then foreseen ; but the principle was sound, although there was (quite naturally) miscalculation of the means to be used to attain the object. The second necessity in the British outlook was the air defence of Great Britain. At one time the Command known by tne initials A.DG.B. (the first Command to be given an Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief) included both bombers and fighters ; but logic finally had its way and Fighter Command was formed. The third necessity laid down in this planning was an air offensive against any enemy, which resulted in the for mation of Bomber Command. To have allotted only third place among the priorities to this necessity seems an in fringement of the maxim that attack is the best form of defence. So it was, but an even more competing maxim of war is the necessity of making one's base secure before attempting other operations. Allies Share War plans before 1935 were rightly based on an alliance with France, but the view taken was more or less a remAfe tion of that held in 1913. France, in each case, hflPa powerful Army; Britain only a tiny one. The collapse of the French Army in 1940 was never foreseen. The British Navy, though much reduced, would provide Britain's main contribution to the alliance. It seemed to the planners of those days that the best additional help to be given in the land campaign would be an air striking force. This ultimately took shape in the Advanced Air Striking Force, which, however, never really struck. In fact, the needs of the British Expeditionary Force in France postponed the day when a real beginning could be made in building up Bomber Command to what it has since become. Other factors also intervened to postpone that day. One was the German invasion of Norway, which prevented the Royal Navy from laying mines in the Baltic; so that task had to be shouldered by Bomber Command. Now let us turn to the German outlook on air war. The Luftwaffe was built up in 1935. Though it was made an independent Service (rightly including the flak and the searchlight fprmations), it was intended to act as one powerful arm of the German Army, and, to a lesser extent, of the German Navy. Strategic bombing was not en visaged. The Stuka was an aircraft designed to take part in land battles, and in the campaigns in Poland, Norway and France it justified the hopes placed upon it. The twin-
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