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Aviation History
1944
1944 - 1025.PDF
lWi MAY I8TH, 1944 y*^w *fv\^ 531 Bombing lc^^i Why I Believe in the~Jff^g it Offensive By JAMES^^RLOW THE question of the effectiveness and method oimx air offensive against industrial Germany-ha^tre^— quently raised queries in the minos of MGny of the public. Would it be better to co/tinue>nie night offensive with the bombers rearmed witn .5ioror 20 mm. weapons, switch to daylight bombing wmre retaining the .303m. armament plus great bomb load, or rearm with larger calibre weapons and bomb by day with our Allies? In regard to the latter two questions the same difficulty, that of congestion in the air and on the airfields, arises. Also a good deal of the weight of assault would be- if our aircraft were to be fitted with heavier defensive armament. Although a daylight assault on the same scale as the present night effort could now be protected by fighters, the mentioned difficulty of congestion would *still be present, and the Germans would get a lot of sleep which, it must be admitted, would be a bad thing as the effect on morale and physical strain of a night raid is more considerable than that of one by day. With regard to the defence of night bombers the point is one of range. The night fighter is usually within range of .303 ammunition before either the bomber crew or fighter pilot S^e one another. There are obvious" excep tions to this, of course, such as moonlit nights on which the R.A.F. seems to turn to targets in occupied territories without the enormous defences of German targets. If .5m. or 20 mm. weapons were fitted the advantage would not be so apparent as in the daylight assault, when fighters and bombers can exchange fire at 800 yards. The whole question is, in the writer's opinion, that of the immediate and ultimate objective. The idea of strategic bombing is to grind down the enemy's industry of war so that the liberation of Europe and occupation of Germany can be effected with the minimum of effort and lpa^: Ever since 1942 the R.A.F. has packed a powerful punch, and the whole enormous German war structure -^has suffered terribly. How much more slowly would we have won this amazing war of attrition if we had reduced the bomb load of each aircraft by over 4,000 lb. The bomb load of the almost forgotten Wellingtons, Whitleys, Manchesters and Hampdens, which carried the main weight of the first 1942 assault, would have been negligible had they carried heavy-calibre weapons. Furthermore, before the assault had gained enough impetus to knock out any branch of the enemy's industry the Germans would probably have found the answer to the heavily defended bomber, and the stirring achievements of the early American attack might not, have been able to develop into the major threat they^^fe to-day. Target Allocation Some critics say that the R.A.F. continually attacks the same targets. Sometimes this may appear to be so. Con sider, however, how far the battle has been carried. Places such as Rostock, Lubeck, Remscheid and Peenemunde have their dreadful quota and are not visited again unless repair work is put in hand. For Hamburg, Essen, Cologne, Hanover, Diisseldorf, Dortmund, Duisburg, Kassel and a host of others perhaps up to a dozen major assaults (1,500-3,000 tons) have done the job, while occasional visits to stir the rubble are carried out. The Battle of Berlin may be carried on a little longer, while the battles of several other German cities are still on. These same critics also question the ability of the R.A.F. to aim as accurately by night a* our Allies dojjy-^day. In their publication. Target Germany, the Americans have made it clear that, although good, their Sperry bomb- sight has not the "pickle barrel" accuracy which the Press—particularly their own Press—at one time claimed for it. It-*fould seem that both our own and the Ameri- ib sights are oi about the same value under the same conditions—good but not by any means infallible. Therefore the question of sighting depends on whether it is better to do the job by day or by' night, which brings us round to the method of assault. Day and Night Sighting Naturally, sighting is easier by day, although with thick :loud covering the target or with fighters making furious sallies against them the day bombers have no picnic, while the height at which day bombers have to fly must impair the accuracy, particularly with the permanently misty horizons of Europe. By night the target area is marked out by particularly skilled navigators—the Pathfinders— so that whether there is cloud or not the area within which the bomb load has to be dropped is marked out. The Pathfinders have been introduced as a method of increas ing the speed of delivery of an attack so that the R.A.F. bombers need not " stoodge " around making several indi vidual runs, thus leaving themselves more liable to fighter interception and increasing the risks of collision. The question of bomb load and of bomb type is another answer to the critics of night bombing. Bearing in mind that the R.A.F.'s objective has been ever to increase the weight of assault, so that the enemy's capability of waging war could be diminished the more quickly, the need for more powerful bombs arose. The effect of a 4,000 lb. bomb is probably a good deal more devastating than two 2,000 lb., or even eight 500 lb. missiles, although it is agreed that the possibilities of a hit with eight bombs are greater than those with one. However, this is a question for the daylight precision bombers rather than night area bombing in which the various bomb loads may overlap. If it is agreed that the 4,000 lb., 8,000 lb. and 12,000 lb. bombs are needed to do the area devastating more power fully and quickly, then it must follow that the idea of heavy defence of the night bomber must be sacrificed, at any rate in the existing types of R.A.F. bombers. Admittedly, this does seem hard on the R.A.F. bombers, which cannot have fighter escort, heavy defensive arma ment, or even fly in battle formation. But it is, we hope, only an interim period at present while the German air strength, in the factories and in the air, is worn down to a strength that does not matter. This procedure is in operation, although it must be expected that the enemy will devote all his energy and cunning to solve the problem. It is still not realised how absolutely complementary the assaults of the R.A.F. and Eighth U.S.A.A.F. Bomber Commands are. Although the Americans do occasionally, and particularly in bad weather, indulge in area bombing, their principle has from the start been the precision bomb ing of particular objectives. If it is found that in devas tating an area the R.A.F. have missed a particular plant then the Americans are able to pin-point it. Their idea was always to attack individual targets; several simul taneously now that their strength is great, which has the added attraction of confusing or at least splitting the enemy's fighter resources. Finally, the R.A.F. for two years has been waging a separate war against Germany ; against the plants and the people making submarines, ships, tanks, vehicles, engines of all types, armaments, instruments, and against the whole huge concern which goes to make the war effort of a nation. Our loss of bombers is grievous, but it must be borne in mind that each R.A.F. assault is a battle in the separate war the R.A.F. is waging against Germany.
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