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Aviation History
1944
1944 - 1270.PDF
Air News from the Notebook of Our Correspondent with the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces An A.E.A.F. Mitchell passts over convoys sailing to and from the invasion beaches. invasion Close-up THE first flush of the invasion having died down, it is profitable to pick up some of the threads of pre-invasion work by the air forces and to tell of some of their exploits, the account of which had to be withheld until after D day. The isolation, by road and rail, of the effective area of France will probably remain for a very long while as a classic example of the use of air power. The attack opened on March 7th with a concentrated raid on the railway yards at Le Mans. This was but one of 82 rail centre targets which ultimately received attention. By the day of the "big ahow" 50 of these had been utterly destroyed, a further eight nearly destroyed and another 17 severely damaged. To achieve this result, bombers oi the A.E.A.F., 2nd T.A.F., dropped 5,600 tons of bombs in 8,000 sorties; Bomber Command dropped 20,000 tons in 4,600 sorties, and the U.S. 8th A.A.F. dropped 7,000 tons in 3,000 sorties. The result was a complete rail desert west of Paris. (In passing it is interesting to compare the average bomb load of the British night bombers with the loads carried by the American heavies in daylight.) Not only rail centres, but rail and road bridges received considerable attention. These represent the targets most difficult to hit. Nevertheless in 5,209 sorties by A.E.A.F. and 445 sorties by the Americans, 17 railway bridges were destroyed and two were rendered impassable. Twelve road bridges were also put out completely. For this task 5,737 tons of bombs were used. In the invasion area there were twelve strong points with heavy coastal batteries installed. Mara-unders and Bomber Command between them dropped some 4,400 tons on these targets to put five of them out of action and severely dam age the other seven. The eneifjy's coast radio installations were obviously of vital importance and no fewer than 21 of these difficult targets were destroyed and a further nine damaged. To achieve this, 1,700 sorties were flown, 1,200 500 lb. bombs were dropped and '3,500 rocket projectiles J used. The net result of this attack showed itself on D-day. r* Estimate of Produce All this experience of bombing such a diversity of targets has enabled the High Command to work out what might be termed an " estimate of produce." A particular target at a particular range can now be assessed by the air staff to require x number of x lb. bombs dropped from x height by x type aircraft to ensure destruction. This is much more important than it seems because, as the Germans have found to their cost, nothing is so easily wasted as air power. How the enemy must now yearn for the thousands of aircraft, the thousands of tons of bombs and, most of all, the thousands of trained aircrews he has thrown away in aimlessly destroying little people's homes. It was with the foregoing in mind that I went to a photo graphic reconnaissance wing to see how they checked whether the targets had l>een destroyed or whether another visit was necessary. Although many of the photographs are taken from as high as 30,000ft., the clarity of detail is phenomenal. It speaks very highly for the 36m. focus English lenses which are used. One would, of course, expect to be able to . see whether a bridge has been destroyed, but from these photographs it is possible to see tiny marks in the cement runways on airfields. A more direct employment of the wing in connection
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