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Aviation History
1944
1944 - 1680.PDF
170 FLIGHT AUGUST 17TH, 1944 RELATION OF AIR TO WAR remain for many years as a classic and be discussed and quoted in every staff college -the world over. The employment of heavy bombers to attack pin-point targets on the battlefield was Sir Trafford's own idea and responsibility. It has enabled the hard crust of modern defence to be pierced on each occasion 00 which it has been used. The following is Sir Trafford Leigh- Mallory's address, hi planning this great enterprise there were two main factors from the air point of view which were agreed between the Army Commander-in-Chief and myself as being essential preliminaries to the battle. They ware: (i) First, that we must have absolute air superiority with a view not only to protecting our own Forces from enemy air attack, but also to enable our own Air Forces to have freedom of action against the enemy, (ji) Secondly, that we should deal with the enemy's com munications in so effective a manner as to impose great delay in his build-up in the lodgment area. It is no exaggeration to say that if there had been no Air I'orce on either side, that although the question of air superiority would not then have come into the calculations during the planning of the battle, the invasion would not have been on because the Germans, with the magnificent communi cations of Northern Europe, would have been able to build up their forces in the lodgment area at a speed which would have made it impossible for us to embark on the operation with any hope of success. It is, therefore, evident that the Allied Air Forces have had a most important role to fulfil. In order to implement the air plans to ensure that the greatest weight of air power was brought to bear in the battle, the Allied Expeditionary Air Force was formed, and operations commenced on November 15th. This Force was composed of the Ninth U.S. Air Force—which is a very powerful force com prising medium bombers, light bombers and a very large number of fighters; and the Second British Tactical Air Force, which also included a light bomber force and fighters of all descriptions. Apart from these, which were directly under the command of the Air Commander-in-Chief, such effort from the Strategical Air Forces as was allotted to take part in the battle also operated under the direction of the A.E.A.F. Reducing the Luftwaffe I do not want to say more than is necessary about the war in the air as it was waged before D-Day, though, of course, it is true that for us the battle began long ago before the land ing on the Normandy beaches. But there is one fad worth remembering, and that is that it was the Allied air superiority which wade the landing possible. The G.A.F. could have prevented us making a successful landing. The steady reduc tion of the German Air Force has always been one of the chief objectives of the Allied Air Forces, especially the U.S. Eighth Air Force and the R.A.F. Bomber Command, who have waged a tremendous offensive (which is still going on) against the German aircraft industryy The deep penetration raids of the Eighth Air Force by fleets of heavy bombers, escorted by long- range fighters, not 'only destroy aircraft production in the factory and aircraft on the ground, but challenge the German fighters to combat in the air, and in all these ways the British and U.S. Bomber Commands have succeeded in reducing the once formidable G.A.P. to a parlous state. Between November 15th, 1943 (on which date the A.E.A.F. was formed), and D-Day, A.E.A.F. aircraft alone destroyed 878 enemy aircraft in aerial combat. In the preparatory phase of the invasion, which may be taken as April 1st to D-Day, Allied Air forces operating from the U.K. destroyed in air combat alone no less than 2,655 German aircraft. Since D-Day some 1,828 enemy aircraft have been destroyed in the battle area. Actually we are enjoying not only an air superiority, but what can only be called an air supremacy. In these tactical opera tions we have been able to do in the air pretty well what we like. Let me illustrate this by two examples: In the months before the assault when we were building up our forces in the south of England, when all the south coast ports were crammed with shipping, and all the towns and fields along the coast were full of our troops and their equipment, these tempting targets remained secure from G.A.F. bombers under the shield of the A.E.A.F. In the six weeks prior to D-Day, less than 400 enemy- bombers operated on south coast targets, achieving absolutely negligible results, and of these 24 were destroyed with a further six probables. Also during the same six weeks period, only 129 enemy reconnaissance sorties were made of the south and east coasts, most of which were fleeting appearances in mid- Channel, and only 11 of these penetrated to the English coast. The meagreness of-this reconnaissance effort and its obviou- k barrenness of results can be gauged when I tell you that we very frequently flew a greater number of photographic recon naissances per day than the enemy total effort for the six weeks, and that does not take into account special visual, shipping and weather reconnaissances. In the period April 1st to D-Day, Allied photographic recon naissance aircraft flew almost 5,000 sorties. The dividend yielded from this effort in knowledge of the enemy defences, troop and train movements and other military information must be seen at first hand to be credited. Since D-Day photo graphic reconnaissance has been carried out ceaselessly over the battle front, and no less than 3,529 sorties have been flown on photographic missions alone. Enemy Driven on to By-roads The other and even more striking example of the air supremacy we have gained would be evident if I could take you on a flight over our beach-head and beyond into the country behind th'e enemy's lines. On our side of the lines you.see the roads congested with military traffic, the beaches, the villages, the fields full of stores and equipment, tents and huts; behind the enemy's lines you see nothing—road-SL. deserted, not a sign of movement on road^or railway. .-?!•'• ground forces can dispose themselves in this open way because they have little to fear from the air, and because they have the assurance of a continuous air protection. Our air superi ority and the strength and constancy of our air attack have driven the enemy to cover up his tracks, to disperse his troops and supplies, to forsake the railways and the main roads, and to move only on by-roads at night. The waste of time and efficiency can be imagined. I said that without Allied air superiority the plan to invade the Continent would not have been entertained. That places upon us the responsibility of giving material assistance to the forces on the ground. How have we given that assistance? First by keeping the enemy out of the sky, and secondly by reducing the opposition to the Allied assault. The notion of the "air canopy" and the terrific bombardment of the coast defences on D-Day are already familiar to the public at large, but this is only half our job, only half of what we were expected to do. The great anxiety in the minds of those who planned the invasion was that the enemy might be able to build up forces to oppose our landing far more quickly than we could land them. The enemy in northern France had an excellent system of roads and railways, while our communications were across a wide stretch of sea, and, in the early stages, over beaches without the unloading facilities of a port. This is where the help of the air forces was required. It was our duty so to disrupt the enemy's lines of communication that he would be worse off than we were witli our precarious Channel crossing and our open beaches. To explain what we have tried to dp. j£ here, I shall have to go back to the months before D-Day, fot the attack on the enemy's lines of communication began early in March. We had to ensure the delay of reinforcements to the enemy's forward troops when they became engaged with our invading forces. We had to slow down his build-up of men and supplies. This task could not be put off until D-Day. To the uninitiated it may appear that you have only got to cut 'a railway track or destroy a bridge, and you have stopped the rail movement of reinforcements. But it isn't as easy as that. We began bombing the railway system of France early in March, and it was none too early. Our aim was to catise a progressive dislocation or paralysis in the transport system, so that when the day came and the battle in Nor mandy was joined, it might be possible to cut specific main routes with more decisive effect. Railway experts agreed that in a railway system so extensive as that of northern France no cutting of routes in the tactical phase could have much effect without carefully planned dislocation and reduction ,of potential in the preparatory phase. A mere cut in a line <fer< be repaired within a few hours. A bridge takes days to repair, but the destruction of bridges by bombing is a difficult task, demanding fine weather, so it would be rash to trust to bridge-cutting alone. We did not, as I have said, promise the impossible; we did not hope or promise entirely to stop the flow of reinforcements. What we hoped to achieve and what we can claim to have achieved is to have delayed the enemy's rate of build-up. We have compelled him to detrairx far from the battle; to expend his petrol and shorten the lif/ of his tanks by travelling long distances by road; to throw his divisions into the battle piecemeal, short of tanks, am munition, guns,, and all kinds of supplies. That was the purpose of the Continuous attacks by the Allied
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