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Aviation History
1944
1944 - 2362.PDF
524 FLIGHT NOVEMBER I6TH, 1944 Developments in Coastal Command From Defensive to Offensive Policy A N outline of the war history of Coastal Command was r\ given to the Royal United Service Institution by •*••*• Air Vice-Marshal A. B. Elwood, C.B., D.S.C., on November 8th. The lecturer said that he had only time to touch on salient points of his subject, and could only spare a few words for such units as the Photographic Reconnaissance, Meteorology, and the Air-Sea Rescue Service, all of which worked for the whole Air Force, but were administered by Coastal Command, He selected as his main subjects the anti-U-boat campaign and the anti-shipping operations. At the beginning of the war, said the Air Vice-Marshal, we had no clear idea about the difference between defen sive and offensive policy ; so we stuck to defence and kept our aircraft close to the convoys. At the end of 1940 it had to be admitted that the air had made little or no con tribution to the defeat of the U-boat. In May, 1941, there were two notable advances, one in the types used and the other in the method of using air craft. The chief bases of the U-boats were on the Bay of Biscay, and we began to attack the boats on their way out to their hunting grounds. When submerged the U-boat can only travel at three or four knots, and it must come to the surface at intervals to charge batteries and ventilate the vessel. Therefore, to keep them submerged all day- handicapped them severely. To cover all the area called for many aircraft; so the escort machines were reduced to a minimum and all the rest were sent hunting. This produced results. Kills were still rare* but sightings became more frequent, and the boats were kept submerged. Gradually we drove them farther away from our bases. In the Bay they remained submerged all day. During the latter part of 1941 they operated mainly in the Caribbean Sea, where prizes were numerous; and the Americans had not yet got into their stride. In May, 1942, the introduction of the aircraft search light produced great results. The U-boats found that when suddenly illuminated they had not time to submerge before the attack developed. So they took to surfacing by day, with the result that there were more sightings. Gur offensive in the Bay grew in strength. The landings took place in N.W. Africa, and the interference by U-boats was negligible. The year 1943 was a disastrous one for the German sub marines. In the early months there was still the "gap" of 600 miles in the middle of the Atlantic, and the rate of building new merchant ships- had not yet caught up the rate of sinkings. At the Casablanca Conference the defeat of the U-boat was given first priority by the com bined Chiefs of Staff. From January to May that year the mass attacks on convoys were in full swing. In March BOMBER Continued from previous page.) bomber stream has proved as important as the casualties they inflict on the enemy. Throughout this year the enemy fighter pilot has never known whether he will suddenly become the hunted instead of the hunter. German night fighters are not particularly fast, and there is-no need for them to be if their only task is to intercept four-engined bombers, but the Mosquitoes which attack them are among the fastest and most manoeuvrable aircraft in the world. Other Mosquitoes go from the Group to the points where the night-fighter pack may be expected to assemble and catch the enemy there. In fact, by all these forms of intrud ing, as well as by accompanying the bomber stream, the Mosquitoes give the bombers both high and low-level sup port. Tiny also operate on nights when there are no bombers over Germany, constantly harassing the night- we established a base in Iceland for long-range Liberators, and the Royal Canadian Air Force set up another in New foundland. Escort carriers appeared, and went a long way to bridge "the gap." Between May and August of 1943 the Germans mounted A.A. guns on the U-boats, and the boats stayed on the surface and fought it out with the aircraft. This proved very expensive to them and resulted in heavy losses, as many as 30 boats a month. The third phase lasted from then up till D-Day. The Germans again changed their tactics, and only surfaced by night. The Luftwaffe sent fighters out into the Bay of Biscay to shoot down our Coastal aircraft. There were two special bursts of activity in October, consisting of two mass attacks by the same pack of boats. They were roughly handled. Then the permission granted by Por-> tugal for us to use the Azores greatly eased our difficulties*' Lately we have developed the close co-operation of air craft and surface hunters. That has proved the best method of killing the U-boats. Before D-Day the diminution of attacks in many usual areas told our authorities that the U-boats were massing to attack our invasion fleet. But the approaches are not wide, and we were able to bar them. Now, having lost the Biscay coast, the Germans are working from Norway. It is much less convenient, but, said the lecturer, "the U-boat is very much alive." The Anti-shipping Campaign In our campaign to destroy enemy shipping Coastal Com mand, said the Air Vice-Marshal, has two main types ol aircraft, the Beaufighter and the Mosquito, and two main weapons, the torpedo and the rocket. The torpedo is much the more deadly of the two, and is the only weapon with which aircraft could hope to destroy a capital ship. Damage below the water line is much more dangerous than anything a bomb through the deck can do. But the torpedo has disadvantages, such as inability to work in shallow water. Coastal Command's early operations against shipping took the form of low-level attacks. To meet them the Germans used escort ships, which put a stop to that form of attack. Our next move was to use cannon against the flak ships. Also we sent out larger forces, up to 50 ' machines, of which the majority were meant to attack the flak ships. There might also be a top cover of fighters, ** bringing the total of aircraft up to about 70. This method has been so successful that now the Ger mans mostly sail by night. The lecturer ended with a tribute to the courage and skill of the aircrews and to the work of the maintenance men. fighter force at times when it would otherwise have a chance to recuperate and rest. Another equally important task of the Group is to dis organise the enemy's defence system of signals, early warn ing, and communications, by various means. Dropping strips of metal foil and in other ways exploiting the weak ness of radiolocation is used by the tacticians of Bomber Command to present a false picture to the enemy. The night war in the air of 1944 is fought at speeds of well over 400ft. per sec. If only a short delay, or even a moment's indecision, can be forced on the enemy, then the difficulties of interception, which are always acute, are quickly doubled. It only needs an enemy commander to take his eye off the ball (we provide the distractions) for a few minutes, and,another German city is smashed for the loss of perhaps one per cent, of the attacking bomber force. SIPPOHT
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