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Aviation History
1945
1945 - 0665.PDF
APRIL 5TH, 1945 FLIGHT 373 B.O.A.C. WARTIME SERVICES ties provided along the routes have altered—increased or de- creased, as the case may be. The factor of operational in- tensity (miles flown / route mileage) was 196.1 in 1942, 232.8 in 1943 and 342 in 1944. Between 1942 and 1943 this increase corresponds to the in- creased route mileage, and if plotted on a curve would run almost parallel to it. The 1944 factor, however, higher than that in the preceding year, rises steeper than the,curve of route mileage, thus approxi- mately illustrating the in- creased frequency of service on the routes. The traffic intensity factor indicating the relationship be- tween freight actually carried and miles flown (ton-miles/ miles flown) is remarkably con- stant, being about 1.7 for each of the three years, 1942, 1943 and 1944. Viewed against the background of operational in- tensity, this would indicate that the^legree of utilisation of services provided remained almost the same throughout those years, despite increased frequency of operations. In sheer traffic volume figures, these results are no doubt impressive. But.it would be wrong to conjecture from them a picture of an air transport enterprise which would stand up to the merciless examination customary with com- mercial enterprises. Costs of operation and intensity of traffic on separate services and routes are the .'' to be or not to be" in competitive enterprise. Without analysing them it is impossible to gauge the economic efficiency and the raison d'etre of an airline. A Wartime Enterprise The important fact that the B.O.A.C. is not a com- mercial enterprise should not be overlooked, however. Standards compared with normal air transport services are indeed not applicable to the B.O.A.C. Neither its ' .chievement nor deficiencies can be gauged by commercial standards. Were it possible to compare results of the pre-war period with those reflecting wartime facts, one might have arrived at some interesting conclusions. But the B.O.A.C. is a wartime baby, almost born into an abnormal world, THE UPWARD TREND : The graph shows the volume of capacity ton-miles flown by the B.O.A.C. raised under emergency con- ditions and fed on an emer- gency diet of converted aircraft and " left-overs." Irrespective of what one might think of chosen instruments, it would be unreasonable to try to evaluate B.O.A.C. efforts by purely economic standards. The B.O.A.C. as operated during the war is entirely a Government affair: except for the internal organisational and technical sides, the Secretary of State determines which routes are to be operated and who is to travel or what is to be transported. In view of the impending changes in the constitution of British aviation, the B.O.A.C. is^also likely to be subjected to major readjustments. One might therefore recall that the financial basis of the Corpora- tion was set up by the British Overseas Airways Act, 1939, providing for a yearly subsidy up to ^4,000,000 for 15 years if the Corporation expenditure exceeds its revenues. The B.O.A.C. receives for the duration, free of charge from the Government, sup- plies, equipment, etc., against which all its resources are at the Government's disposal and all services rendered free of charge. The Corporation's accounts for the year ending March 31st, 1944, submitted to the House of Commons reveal that if these services were deducted at current rates for passenger, freight and mail carriage from the total Government expenditure on the Corporation, the net debit balance would be only ^600,000. The taxpayer might still be interested to know how much the job does cost him since the Government's free supplies*, offset against services rendered, are also paid for with his money. He might as wrell ask how much he invested in each bomb dropped on Germany. It is, of course, unreason- able to measure war services in terms of £ s. d. What he might justifiably enquire is whether the cost of operating emergency air transport could not have been lower had it been based on a different footing. He might (if he is very inquisitive) even try to compare the cost of similar civilian war-conscripted air transport enterprises working for our Ally across the ocean. But this is left to the post- war research worker. GERMAN AIRLINESL ORD SWINTON said in an interview at Capetown that "Germany would not be allowed after this war to make, own or operate aircraft. She has proved she cannot be trusted with them." "An international organisation will have to be formed to operate her internal civilian air seivices," he added. EXPANSION HPHE U.S. has concluded an agreement with Spain under •*• which it will build near Madrid an airfield to be used by aircraft supplying liberated European cities. The airfield will be built at Barajas, near Madrid. After the war it will be converted into a general traffic field, to work in conjunction with the present Barajas airfield. U.S. SHIPOWNERS' VIEWS '"THE British White Paper on post-war aviation policy has J- posed '' a serious problem for the American Government and the American merchant marine," said a statement issued by the National Federation of American Shipping. Mr. Almon.E. Roth, president of the Federation, said it would be to the best interests of the U.S. to permit American steamship lines to engage in air transport. "It is especially noteworthy that the British Government, after experimenting with a single air monopoly, is now firmly convinced that it is not only advisable but necessary that the steamship companies be permitted to engage in air transport," he said. A different view was expressed by Mr. II. Q. Brown, of the International Association of Machinists, who expressed his Union's support for a unified American airline to operate abroad.
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