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Aviation History
1945
1945 - 1124.PDF
6i6 FLIGHT JUNE 7TH, 1945 Lessons of the Air War Part IV—Air Power and Land Power By MAJOR FA de V ROBERTSON V.D. THE German war brought home to most of the belli-gerents lessons which they OUgh't.to have learnt forthemselves in the days of preparation, but which had not been grasped in full. Some of them realised the importance of tfiose lessons as the conflict went on and tried to put them into practice. Of these some were TuccessfulT while others found that they had started too late. History nearly always exerts its influence 011 warlike doc- trines, as upon other spheres of human progress—or lack of progress. It was only to be expected that the major tactics of the 1914-1918 war should affect the thoughts of the General Staffs which were, consciously or uncon- sciously, preparing for the struggle which broke out inT 939- The first world war, despite the pressure applied to Germany by the relentless blockade maintained by the British Navy, took the form of a land war. Germany was beaten to her knees by the infantry and artillery of Britain and France, aided in the last two years or so by the British invention of the tank. Throughout the four years of fighting the air arms of both sides acted almost entirely as ancillary arms of the armies. In saying that we do not intend to depreciate the valuable services of the Royal Naval Air Force. It did much useful work, especially in escorting convoys of ships; but it was on the whole an undeveloped Service, and could never play an important part in a major battle. It is true that during the last seven months of the war Britain had formed the Royal Air Force as a separate Ser- vice. The Independent Air Force gave the German indus- trial cities in the Rhineland a foretaste of what strategic bombing might one day come to be; but the period was too short and the bombs were too light to make much impression on military thought. The broad fact remained that the Royal Air Force, like the air arms of France and Germany, existed chiefly to help the armies on the ground. In the inter-war years the High Commands of France, Russia and Germany remained army-minded. It was natural enough that that should be so. All three are continental Powers, accustomed to rely on their armies for defence or aggression. All proceeded to develop their air arms as branches of their armies—even though France, for one. established a separate Air Ministry. All three devoted much thought and experiment to developing the help which the air could give to ground troops, and never seemed to let their thoughts stray beyond that one idea. British thought moved in the opposite direction Only at a few crises in her history has Britain ever been army- minded. After a major war is over, the British tendency always is to reduce the Army to a minimum, just sufficient to deal with frontier wars against savage or semi-civilised The distinctive Westland Lysander which was the standardBritish Army co-operation type at the outbreak. An exten- sive system of slots and flaps gave short take-off and landingcharacteristics. opponents. The public consoles itself by listening to music-hall songs such as '' The little British Army goes a damned long way." In a previous article it has been described how the Air Ministry decided that in a future war the best help which Britain could give to her continental Allies would be to* raise an aggressive force of bombers which could attack the enemy's centres of war production. Experience has shown how. effective this policy became. The one-time famous Junkers Ju 87 dive bomber which theGermans used in the early stages of the war in a close- support role. No Close ^Support It was less creditable to British military thought that the question of using air power to assist land power was scarcely studied at all. One must admit that for many years the Government's policy of economy and disarma- ment prevented the Air Ministry from raising as many air squadrons as it would have liked to do. But this is not an excuse for what can only be called the shelving of the whole question of air support for ground troops. No serious attempt seems to have been made to formulate a air-land doctrine. The blame must be distributed between the War Office and the Air Ministry, and probably the former was most culpable. The Army Estimates were also cut to the bone; and it seems that the Army Council thought it wisest to spend what little money it had on% experiments with tanks, and to accept without demur what' air support the Air Ministry felt able to provide. For several years only four squadrons (Nos. 2, 4, 13 and 16) were allotted for permanent service with the Army. There was also a School of Army Co-operation. The cost of these was borne on the Air Estimates, and the War Office made no appropriation-in-aid, as the Admiralty did in the case of the Fleet Air Arm. Consequently, when war* broke out in 1939, the strange
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