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Aviation History
1945
1945 - 1125.PDF
JUNE 7TH, 1945 position existed that in Ger- many and Russia the air force was extravagantly army-minded, while in Britain it was hardly army- minded at all. Russia, per- haps, was justified by results ; it is rather hard to say. Germany and Britain, in turn, had to pay dearly for concentrating to excess on one or two aspects of air power and for failing to realise that in these days the air enters into every sort of military operation, and that to forget or neglect air power is asking for trouble. Britain's first bitter lesson was when her Army was driven out of *^T France and the Low Coun- tries. Germany had to swallow her first dose of medicine in the Battle of Britain. In that decisive struggle it was air attack versus air defence, and the Luftwaffe was like a lost sheep. Mention has been made of the four squadrons which for a number of years constituted the whole permanent pro- vision made by the Air Ministry for the needs of the Army. When rearmament began at the time of the tension with Germany over Czechoslovakia, the number was increased. In fact, if we remember right, it was actually doubled. These units were called Army Co-operation Squadrons, and it is not improbable that this high-sounding name mis- led even Members of Parliament and Treasury officials into thinking that they provided for all the needs of the Arrnv. Actually they were only tactical reconnaissance squadrons, trained and equipped to reconnoitre up to 50 miles behind tjie enemy's lines, and to spot for the artillery. They were very highly trained in these forms of work, but they could not be expected to hold their own against fighters, or to do anything but the mildest bombing. When Army manoeuvres were held it was the custom for squadrons of fighters and day-bombers to be lent to each side by the Command known as Air Defence of Great Britain. It was also laid down that when an expeditionary force went over- seas it should contain an Air Component of fighter and bomber squadrons in addition to the Army Co-operation Squadrons, and that the General Officer Commanding should have operational control over this Component. Lord Gort took an Air Component with him when he led his Army into France in 1939. It was pitifully small, I • the squadrons of fighters and • bombers had not been specially trained to work with the Army. We need not recount the melancholy story which ended at Dunkerque. It is enough to say that it was obvious to everyone that air support for an Army was a subject on which British authorities were lamentably ignorant; while the Germans, by using dive bombers and tanks in unison had worked oat av technique which at first was highly successful, and iaad taken Poles and Frenchmen by surprise. ftMor need we spend time on the short-lived Army Co-operation Com- mand which the R.A.F. formed after Dunkerque. The Scene Changes The. scene changes to the Middle East. There at first General (now Lord) Wavell commanded the Army and Air Chief Marshal Longmore was A.O.C.-in-C. of the Air Force. We have been told that they lived in the same house in Cairo and worked together in the closest co-operation. The R.A.F. fighters, mostly Gladiators at first, speedily estab- lished a superiority over the Italians. 'All went well with the first year's campaign, until the decision to help Greece against the Geimans robbed us of our strength in Africa. The Air Force was presently reinforced, but then the Ger- mans superseded tlie Italians. Again the R.A.F. got on top and beat the Luftwaffe. But we had no air weapon whi^h was effective against tanks, and the German tanks 617 Rocket-armed fighter-dive bombers, typifiedin the Hawker Typhoon, proved to be the best close-support aircraft. They werecalled up on the radio as required. were superior to ours. So, in spite of our air superiority.General Auchinleck was driven back to Alamein. The Prime Minister visited the Middle East, and on hisreturn he told the House of Commons that he had directed .the Air Force to carry out the intentions of the Army Com-manders, even if it meant abandoning some tempting tar- gets. From that order dates the 1st Tactical Air Force,and from that moment all went well. No doubt Sir Arthur Coningham had a stronger and better-equipped fofce athis disposal than his predecessors had had ; but the sudden change in our fortunes makes it almost certain that not *only new methods had come into vogue but a new spirit of co-operation. Our aircraft began to intervene effectivelyin land battles, and sometimes to blast a way open in front of our troops. Britain had at last learnt how to combineland power and air power with effect. Command of 2nd T.A.F. If further proof were needed of the change which had come over the scene and of its appreciation in the highest circles in London, it would be found in the abolition of the Army Co-operation Command, the formation in ite place of the 2nd Tactical Air Force in Great Britain, and the transference of Air Marshal Coningham from command of the 1st to command of the 2nd Tactical Air Force. As usual in all British successes during the war, it was Mr. Winston Churchill who first saw what ought to be done, and ordered that it should be done. In this case it was Sir Arthur Coningham who put the orders into effect, and made a brilliant success of the business. Credit must also be given to those whose brains conceived the idea of arming Beaufighters with rockets, and to those who made those formidable weapons available. The list of those who contributed in one way or another to the success of 2nd T.A.F. must be a long one. But special mention must be made of those who planned the sequence of operations before and after the landing in Normandy. The basis of air power is the fighter; and so a whole series of attacks was made on German fighter fac- tories. Then came the concentrated attacks on German oil supplies, and overlapping them were the destructive blows on German communications. Bomber Command shared largely in these operations, and it is a proof of a true real- isation of air-army work that the offensive against produc- tion was slackened off when every possible "bit of air assist- ance was needed by the Army. It did not matter whether the factories were producing weapons or not, so long as those weapons could not be transported up to the battle fronts. Without intelligent and effective air assistance, the Allied Armies could never have made good their landing in Nor- mandy. With that assistance they broke the German forces in the WTest in eleven months at comparatively light cost. The lesson fot the future needs no further stressing.
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