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Aviation History
1945
1945 - 1231.PDF
JUNE 2IST, 1945 FLIGHT 671 Bomber Command's Offensive Full Official Story, Qiving Facts and Figures, of Five-and'aJialf-years' of Night Bombing I High Explosive758,685 tons. MANY details of the air battles fought in darknessover Germany by the strategic bombing force ofR.A.F. Bomber Command have so far had to •.remain secret to avoid helping the enemy. Often the Ger- "• mans were ignorant about tactical developments, but now •: it is possible to give some account of the five-and-a-half- years' struggle. At the same time, with the occupation of * Germany it has also become possible to understand more i. clearly than before the full scope of Bomber Command's - achievement. The tactics of night bombing are different in almost every particular from those of day-bombing, though the strategy of both is essenti- , ally the same. It was just ^ as essential to gain and ex- -ploit air superiority by night as by day, in order ; that German war industry should be crippled, German communications destroyed, and the way prepared for the Allied armies to land on the Continent and invade Germany. But no pitched battle has ever been fought between the bomber force and the German defences; it has . always been a matter of single combat between bomber ; and fighter, with all the advantage, once the combat had , begun, on the side of the fighter. For Bomber pommand the main object of bomber tactics was therefore to gain air superiority by preventing the fighter from joining battle with the bomber; to outmanoeuvre the German Air Force rather than to destroy its defensive aircraft outright in the air. It was inevitable that the enemy should end the war with a powerful night force still intact. He had maintained a front-line strength at some 800 night fighters for a long time and the force was still there at the end of the war, though latterly it had been unable to operate with full effect because of lack of petrol. But this did not mean that the battle had not been completely won. On the contrary, the night fighter force had persistently failed in its object and at the same time had been prevented from fulfilling any other function than defence against niAt bombing— and this had very grave consequences^*.Iu" -*"* * the German Air Force as a whole. That was achieved by a constant use of the j latest scientific devices, but the u£e o •- sound tactics and, above all, by\ the courage and skill of the bomber dews who were always ready to engagK a faster, more manoeuvrable and mot^ powerfully armed fighter aircraft when the enemy did succeed in making contact. At the beginning of the war, in iQ39 and 1940, Germany had no night fighter force. The defence of Germany, against a bomber force which the enemy knew to be weak, was entrusted to anti-aircraft .- suns and searchlights. This was reason- fkfble on the hypothesis that Germany would expect to win the war outright long befoie the Allies in the West could build up any considerable bomber force. In the early summer of 1941, when the Battle of Britain had deprived Germany of the hope of final conquest in the West and the invasion of Russia was pro- jected, some better defence had to be annniiiiiiiHiiiiiiiiHiiiinnninniiHiiiinHiinininniiiiiiiiiiiiiinniniiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiniiiNniiiHiiniiiiiiiiC: i Bomber Command dropped 955,040 tons of bombs in 392,137 sorties. Of these 657,674 tons fell on Germany and 297,366 elsewhere. Incendiary 196,355 tons. ^iiiiiiiitiiuiiiiiiuiiiiHiuiiiuiiiuiiiiiniiiiiiiiinuiiiiiiiiiiiiiii Hiiiiiiiitiiiiiiuniiiiuiiniiiiiiiuiiiiiinuuniiiiiiiuis Air Chief Marshal Sir ArthurTravers Harris, A.O.C.-in-C. Bomber Command. organised against the increasing threat of bombing Irotnbases in England. A force of some 250 Messerschmitt 110s was formed. As with almost ail German nightfighters, and all German twin-engined night fighters, these were modified bombers, but at that time a rather unsuccessful type of bomber was chosen; later it became necessary to convert to night fighting more successful typesof bomber, the Junkers 88 and the Dornier 217. So began a course of action which profoundly modifiedthe whole strategy of the Luftwaffe. At this time, in June, 1941, Germany had a force of 1,500 bombers, largely designed for co-operationwith the German army, though used in the previouswinter to bomb London and other British towns. Thenext year, in June of 1942, the enemy still had a forceof 1,500 bombers. By June, 1943, however, the enemy'stwin-engined fighter force had risen to 530, and therewas a corresponding de- crease in bomber strength. which stood at 1,300 aircraft. By Septembei of 1044the enemy's strength in night fighters and bombers was roughly equal, about 800 of each. But in actual production of aircraft there had been a much greater shift than the figures would suggest from bomber production to nightfighter production. Bomber strength remained at a high figure because the aircraft were seldom used in operationsafter 1942, and the front line strength was maintained by a policy of conservation. Night Bombers Defeat Bombers It is a paradox of the war that the night bombing of Germany defeated the German bomber force even beiore the enemy's aircraft industries had been reduced by air attack. The strategic importance of the German army's loss of all bomber support can hardly be exaggerated ; the weapon which made the blitzkrieg possible, from 1939 to ISUJ*. was struck from the enemy's hands. The enemy raffi have been fully justified in exchanging an offensive a defensive weapon if this had in fact made the night jpomriing of permany impossible. And at first il ieemed to the enemy that he had a fair chance 0/ succeeding in the policy of attrition 'gainst Bomber Command. In 1941 lomber Command's casualty rate was 2.5 per cent, of all sorties; in 1942 it had risen to 4 per cent., and the night fighter strength was due to be more than doubled by 1943. During 1943 the great expansion of Bomber Command's force was to occur, but if the night fighters could shoot down a larger percentage, and not a very much larger one, than in 1942, the result would be either that the expansion would never occur or that operations against German industry would have to be infrequently carried out. Two to three hundred four- engined bombers were being produced every month, and if 40 bombers could be destroyed in each major operation, and if there were to be six major operations a month, any great access of strength would be unlikely. Such a result was by no means improbable ; the Battle of the
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