FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1945
1945 - 1616.PDF
AUGUST I6TH, 1945 FLIGHT 175 It Must Not Happen Again Control Problems of Qerman Aviation : Secret Preparations After Last Defeat : Lessons from the Past By V. L. GRUBERG . N the Fuhlsbiittel airfield near Hamburg there stands (orstood) a significant little memorial: a broken Daimler- Mercedes aircraft engine chained to a stone and mountedon a pedestal. Briefly and pungently the inscription said " Versailles 1919." This was not a memorial to the fallenflyers of Germany. It was meant to be a reminder of the make- believe '' stab-in-the-back '' sustained by German, militaryaviation, a challenge to the passer-by to cast the chains off— a signpost to Germany's future. No such reminder was in fact ever necessary. For as soonas World War No. 1 was over, the Germans were at it again. While in other countries stormy battles were fought for everypenny spent on military aviation, no effort was spared in Ger- many to revive military aviation in preparation for Der Tag.Although these German preparations are no longer a secret (a substantial literature exists to testify to these efforts), evenserious studies of the German problem often credit the Nazi party with the exclusive responsibility for the reconstructionof Germany's air power. Partially this must be attributed to Nazi official propaganda designed to secure for the party aparticle of that aureole of militarism which is so much appre- ciated by the German rank and file. Yet this story, whichwas produced in Goebbels' laboratory, is wide of the mark of reality. The drive to rearm Germany in the air had started yearsbefore the Nazis came to power. Although it gathered momen- tum and scope with their advance to power, culminating in theofficial appearance of the Luftwaffe, the foundations of the military edifice were laid in the pre-Nazi period. Withoutthese foundations the arrival of the Nazi-built superstructure would have been, to say the least, considerably delayed. So far as the responsibility for air rearmament is concerned,it reduces the Nazis and the pre-Nazi Reichswehr leaders, the politicians, the captains of industry and the scientists to acommon, very common, denominator. This historical fact is well worth remembering, for it may enable us to view the post-war problem in the right perspective and help to prevent a repetition of mistakes made after the last war. The problem of the regulatory control of German aviation,which is but a part of the larger issue of " what to do with Germany," must therefore necessarily be attempted in the lightof past experience. This experience is still relatively fresh and, thanks to the repetition of German aggression within the span 300 IS 16 77 -18 19 20 21 22 23 2<* 25 26 -27 -28 •r-i~ 1—1—1—1—r AIRCRAFT TYPES IN PRODUCTION 1 \Z |41 7 I 8 l1Ol13l16Uffl|19fc0[?1[34|30|35l3El3H48l50l3fll RECOVERY FROM WAR FATIGUE : The rising curve ofdifferent types of Junkers production. SIGNPOST TO FUTURE : A chained Mercedes engine placed on the Hamburg airport to symbolise the "cruel treatment " meted out to Germany's aviation after her 1918 defeat. of one generation, there is no need to rummage in historicalrecords for facts. Air Clauses The chained Mercedes commemorates the following stipula- tions of the Versailles Treaty: Art. rg8. The Armed Forces of Germany must not include anymilitary or naval air force. Germany may during a period not extending beyond a definitedate maintain a maximum number of 100 seaplanes or flying boats which shall be exclusively employed in searching for sub-marines mines, shall be furnished with the necessary equipment for this purpose, and shall in no case carry arms, munitions orbombs of any nature whatever. In addition to the engines installed in the seaplanes or flyingboats above mentioned, one spare engine may be provided for each of these craft.No dirigible shall be kept. Art. 199 Within two months from the coming into force ofthe present treaty, the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the German land anrt sea forces shall be demobilised up toOctober iut, 1919; however, Germany may keep and maintain a total number of 1,000 men, including officers, for the wholeof the cadres and personnel, flying and non-flying, of all formations and establishments. Art. 200 Until the complete evacuation of German territoryby the Allied and Associated tioops, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Germany freedom of passagethrough the air, freedom of transport and of landing. Art. 201. During the sis months following the coming into forceof the present treaty, the manufacture and importation of air- craft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft and parts of enginesfor aircraft shall be foi bidden in all German territory. Art. 202. On the coming into force of the present treaty, allmilitary and naval aeronautical material, except the machines mentioned in 2nd and 3rd pars, of Art. 198, must be deliveredto the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Delivery must be effected to such places as the Allied Govern-ments may select, and must be completed within three months. Art. 314. Provided that Allied aircraft in transit over Germanyshould be subject to regulations " which shall be applicable equally to the aircraft of Gem. any and to those of the Allied and Asso-ciated countries." Almost as soon as the armistice was concluded there was ageneral conspiracy to avoid and counteract the provisions of the armistice regulations. Although the initiative came fromthe Reich Ministry of Transport and the Reichswehr, prac- tically everyone concerned in aviation took part. "Managers, designers, workers made common cause in de-ceiving the Inter-Allied Control Commission. Models that should not have been built were built and hidden in woods,on meadows, in stables—till the Control Commissions had left. Everybody concerned felt that this was only right. The Com-missions—why, they were the enemy." ("The Luftwaffe"— by Hauptmann Hermann.) On January 10th, 1920, the treaty came into force. Althoughthousands of aircraft were being destroyed or surrendered, there was a constant effort to evade Allied control regulations.
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
