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Aviation History
1945
1945 - 1617.PDF
I7t3 FLIGHT AUGUST IGTH, 1945 IT MUST NOT HAPPEN AGAIN In the words of Air Commodore Masterman, whose report sup-plemented that of Marshal Foeh, the Germans since the begin- ning of December, 1919, had displayed "systematic indica-tions of opposing and resisting the claims of the Allies, and have shown a firm determination, by continually employingtactics that will involve delay to fulfil the Peace Treaty." (Flight, January 20th, 1921.) For this and similar reasons the Conference at Boulogne onJune 22nd, 1920, decided that Germany could not beerin to build any aeronautical material at all tillthree months after the day all material to be delivered or destroyed had been deliveredor destroyed. Not that this helped much. Infringements of the stipulations laid downby the Boulogne conference included the production of aircraft by Junkers, Fokkerand others, the development of a new type of seaplane, etc., etc. Here are a number of typical evasioncases picked up at random from contem- porary issues of Flight :—"Another 'find' of German aerial material has been made and confiscated bythe Fleet in Stettin; this was concealed in the grounds of Major von Fuchs and con-sisted of secret army stores . . . in large cases, 1,907 which contained aircraftmotors." (January 6th, 1921.) '' Aviation stores to the value of amillion marks were discovered on Decem- ber 15th in a wood near Bad Salzoflen,. . . including eight large crates contain- ing aeroplane motors, propellers, parts,etc. . . . The Allied Control Commission . . . has discovered important stocks ofi'.'rial material, including 7,930 aeroplane niotors and 281 aeroplanes and hydro-planes. The German Government itself, according to the Marshal (Foch), hasrecognised the existence of hidden material, and declares that it is ready tovote a new law rendering its declarations obligatory." (January 20th, 1921.) These and similar efforts of evasion werewell organised. And while some were the work of individuals or groups, the Germangovernment privately encouraged them, officially tolerated them, secretly largelysponsored and organised them, and pub- licly disclaimed them. Within three years further restrictions had to be imposedto curb Germany's evasive actions. The Conference of Ambas- sadors (April 14th, 1922) sot up Nine Rules imposing limita-tions in size and performance on German civil aircraft with EXPANSION AFTER DEFEAT : Built-up area (in solid black) of the Junkers plant in 1918 : 109 sq. m. In 1928 : 244 sq. m. LLOYD" JUNKERS AIR TRANSPORT-ILAG F-Y IN RUSSIA F-Y IN SWEDEN 2000 lOOO IQI4 CONTROLS AND EVASIONS : Graph shows the labour force in Germany's aeronautical industry. (F-y — factory ; white=airframe and solid black = engine production ; cross- hatched = sub-contractors. the object of keeping them within the strict non-military class. Under the definition of civil types, maximum speed was limited to 105 m.p.h., ceiling to 13,000ft., useful load to 1,300 lb., etc. The Nine Rules misfired completely. First, German air- craft manufacturers migrated to Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Russia and Turkey; Danzig, being a Free State, could be used without any restriction. "Foreign enterprises," admits a Dornier Company prospectus, "enabled the construction and development of types prohibited to be built in Germany." Among them the Dornier Company alone operated the Costruzioni Meccaniche Ae.ro- tiautiche S.A. in Marina di Pisa, Italy; the Kawasaki works at Kobe, Japan; the Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. in Madrid and Cadiz, and the Aviolanda in Papendrecht (Holland), and later also at Altenrhein, on the Swiss side of the Bodensee. Already in 1921 the Dornier firm de- veloped outside Germany the " Falke," a cantilever high-wing fighter, in 1927 a re- connaissance machine the Do-C; a torpedo seaplane the Do-D, a reconnaissance Do-E, and in 1925-6 the heavy bomber Do-N with two 500-500 h.p. BMW engines. But this alone would not have sustained German aviation. There was a more basic reason. Throughout these years the vic- tors displayed a lack of consistent and co- ordinated policy and far too much hesita- tion and willingness to negotiate. Conse- quently, the Germans were quick enough to exploit it and manoeuvre themselves into a bargaining position. Indeed, the whole process of control of German avia- tion was marked by a peculiar rhythm : — two drastic steps forward—and a slide back. Finally, the German Government, using for their authority Arts, 314, 198 (and 170), prohibited Allied aircraft in excess, of the Nine Rules definitions to enter Ger- many and impounded those which had to force-land. The lesults were serious. The British route to Scandinavia and Russia could not be established, and the French Paris-Strasburg-Prague service had to be transferred from Southern Germany to a route across Switzerland. Germany was applying sanctions to her conquerors, and reversing the process of controls. Not only was this game tolerated but it led again to a new modification of controls. On May 22nd, 1926, the Paris agreement virtually ended the Allied supervision of German aviation. A small number of army, navy and police officers were even allowed to take up flying instruction " as private individuals" paying for themselves; subsidies fostering avia- tion were strictly tabu. . . . Finances Eight years later, on November 28th, 1934, Mr. Churchillsaid in the House of Commons that '' Germany already at this moment has a military air force—that is to say, militarysquadrons, with the necessary ground services, with the neces- sary reserves of trained personnel and material—which onlyawait an order to assemble in full open combination—and this illegal air force is rapidly approaching equality with our own." The financing system developed was rather subtle. As shownon the graph, for years before the official appearance of the Luftwaffe Germany, through the Reich Ministry of Transport,had been spending increasing sums ostensibly on civil avia- tion. Although in 1921 the total amount of subsidies forair transport was supposed not to exceed 1 r million marks (about ^540,000), actual figures were much higher. By 1930,total direct subsidies paid by the German Government for air transport were almost six times the amount paid by the BritishGovernment, and expenditure other than direct subsidies about three times as great. Research institutions such as Adlershof, Gottingen and Lin-denburg were being generously fed with grants, not only by the central government but also by various regional author-ities outside the Reich budget, such as the Prussian Ministry for Culture and Education, etc.
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