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Aviation History
1946
1946 - 0215.PDF
JANUARY 31ST, 1946 FLIGHT 123 Coastal Command's Own War Part I—From First to Last on Active Operations : How the U*Boats Were Hunted By MAJOR F. A. de V. ROBERTSON, V.D. FROM September 3rd, 1939, t9 May 10th, 1940, thesecond world war was known to the wags as a"phoney war." The Air Ministry held regular Press conferences during that time, and the distinguished officer _, who used to preside would explain, almost apologetically, *-to the assembled journalists that Bomber Command was dropping leaflets, that Fighter Command was ramping up and down the coasts in a state of frustrated irritation, and that only Coastal Command could really provide the news- paper men with any stories. Likewise after VE day Bomber and Fighter Command ceased to slay their opponents, but Coastal Command had to carry on its work until it was certain that every U-boat had received the orders of Admiral Donitz to stop fighting. No losses are so tragic as those incurred after a war is over. In between those two memorable dates Coastal Command rather faded out of the news, and the Air Ministry spokes- man grew almost apologetic that he could find so little to say about its doings, compared with the exploits of the bombers and fighters. The fact that it was the first and also the last R.A.F. Command to be engaged in active opera- tions is sufficient proof that its activities in between the outbreak of war and the victorious conclusion were not wholly devoid of interest. Probably the majority of sorties had nothing to report, but when an enemy was sighted there was plenty of excitement. It must be obvious to everyone that, quite apart from the possibilities connected with the atomic bomb, air war- fare had not reached its ultimate possible stage by 1945. There have been many developments during the six years of warfare, and there are bound to be more in the future. But there has always been (and presumably will always be) one duty which aircraft will have to undertake, and that is reconnaissance. That was the first duty allotted to them in 1914, and it is equally important to-day. So from the moment that war came upon the world in 1939, the air- craft of Coastal Command had to start scouring the seas round the coasts of the British Isles to see that the ships of the Merchant Navy could proceed on their lawful occa- sions without interference. Later on the Command devel- oped into a formidable striking force; but its first business was to look and see. When it became aggressive its duties fell into two parts, strike;? against U-boats and strikes against enemy shipping. Each of these two roles makes a thrilling story, and it is best to tell them separately. We will take the campaign against U-boats first. A Handicapped Start By the end of the war Coastal Command could boast the possession of more aircraft and more men than the whole R.A.F. owned in 1939; but at the outbreak of hostilities X the Command was far from being adequately equipped for its exacting tasks. It had five squadrons of flying boats, equipped with obsolescent Londons and Straiuraers and a few Sunderlan'ds. The Sunderland, by the way, never was regarded as obsolete or obsolescent during the war, even .though its top speed was not more than 210 m.p.h. It was not until March, 1941, that the Command received its first Catalina. At the beginning it also had eight squadrons of Ansons, a typ'e which had a range of 600 miles and could rarry two 1,000 lb. bombs. There was one squadron of Hudsons. In course of time all the Anson squadrons were re-equipped with Hudsons. There were also two squadrons of torpedo-bombers, but the Vildebeests, though good load- carriers, had not the range to make them very useful. Next year the Command received Beaufighters, and then the torpedo began to shine as a very useful weapon. Aircraft used the 18-inch toipedo. Altogether Coastal Command started the war with only 171 aircraft. In the early days it sometimes used little Tiger Moth trainers to help out the exiguous supply of first-line aircraft. They could not strike, but they could look and see. Despite all its shortcomings in the way of equipment, the Command did very well even in the earliest days of the war. The U-boat commanders were inexperienced in attacking in the face of air and surface escorts, and by the end of 1939 there had been 64 sightings and 49 .attacks. It was often impossible to decide whether an attack with bombs had actually resulted in the destruction of a U-boat. In 1940, when France had been overrun by the Germans, the U-boats made their chief bases in the ports of the Bay of Biscay, and that meant that the Battle of the Atlantic had begun in earnest. As Mr. Churchill constantly re- minded the country, this was the most crucial oi all our struggles, at least after the Battle of Britain was over. In 1917 the Germans, by means of their U-boats, had nearly starved us into surrender. In 1940 they tried again to do so. Had they been able to sink enough of our shipping they might have succeeded. It was for the Royal Navy and Coastal Command to see that they did not succeed. Sir Frederick's "Secret Weapon" Before we pass on to the second chapter in the history of the Command we should pay due respects to the gallant protagonists. Every day a patrol had to be flown from north Scotland to the lknits of Norwegian waters—Norway was then a neutral. The object was to see if either U-boats or surface ships were trying to break out from the North Sea into the Atlantic. Often .the weather was too foul for the observers to see anything, and it was probably due to that circumstance that H.M.S. Rawalpindi was sunk, probably by the Scharnhorst. Most of these northern patrols were carried out by Ansons. But bad weather was often a protection to the Ansons, which could hide in the clouds. Nevertheless they were not infrequently attacked by Me 109s. The Anson was certainly never designed as a fighter (originally it was a civil transport machine) but it could, of course, "turn inside" the German fighter and it did not always come off worst in these encounters. In fact, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill once jokingly called the fighting Anson his "secret weapon." By the winter of 1940-41 the resources of Coastal Com- mand had grown. There were more Sunderlands—and the heavily armed Sunderland proved a very prickly customer for German fighters to tackle. Hudsons were by then in general use, and there were some squadrons of Whitleys and Wellingtons. By August, 1940, there were squadrons in Iceland and a new Group was formed at Liverpool. Radar, though in rather elementary form, was by then in use on aircraft, and depth charges we-re adapted for carriage by air. The Amatol depth charge which was used at first was found to be not powerful enough. It was more prone to damage than to kill; but a more powerful explo- sive, Torpex, was presently substituted. Aircraft were recognised as an offensive weapon. It was no longer merely a reconnaissance scout. New tactics were then adopted. Though air escort was provided when a convoy appeared to be in danger, routine defensive escorts were left to surface craft of the Royal Navy. The story of the corvettes and frigates is a romance by itself; but here we are concerned with the tactics of Coastal Command Its aircraft now concentrated on attack- ing the U-boats in their transit areas, as they were called. The Bay of Biscay was one of the most important, and another was called the Northern Transit Area, namely, the seas between Norway and Iceland. A regular air offensive
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