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Aviation History
1947
1947 - 0050.PDF
FLIGHT JANUARY Q.TH, IO.47 A.E.A.F. Operations in North-West Europe Air Chief Marshal Sir Traftord Leigh-Mallory*'s Despatch THE forces of A.E.A.F. comprisedthe R.A.F. 2nd Tactical AirForce, the United States NinthAir Force, and the Forces of the Air Defence of Great Britain. The Britishformations passed to Leigh-Mallory's command on November 15th, 1943.but though the U.S. Ninth Air Force came under his operational command onDecember 15th it was not released from its commitment to assist the U.S. Strate-gic Air Forces in " Pointblank " opera- tions until March 10th, 1944. ("Point-blank '' was the name given to the com- bined bomber plan of the strategic bomb-ing forces which aimed at the reduction of the Germantighter forces and war poten- tial and the weakening of thewill of the Germans to con- tinue their struggle.) Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Ma 11 o r y relates how, to achieve the most economicaland effective employment of his forces, he established asmall operational organiza- tion known as AdvancedAllied Expeditionary Air Force. Air Marshal Sir* Arthur Coningham, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., D.F.C., A.F.C.,was appointed to command it. Throughout the preparatoryand assault periods, control of the fighter-bombers and thelight and medium bombers of the two tactical air forces wasexercised through a Combined Operations Room at Ux-bridge. Likewise under the direction of the CommanderA.A.E.A.F., a Combined Control Centre was estab-lished and was operated by the A.O.C. No. II Group, R.A.F., with thecollaboration of the Commanding General, U.S. IXth Fighter Commandand with authoritative representation of the U.S. Army VIHth Fighter Command.A Combined Reconnaissance Centre co- ordinated and directed visual and photo-graphic reconnaissance by British and U.S. forces. Plans The second part of the despatch con-cerns policy and planning. Operation '' Overlord'' is described as part of alarge strategic plan designed to bring about the defeat of Germany by con-certed assaults on German-occupied Europe from the U.K., the Medi-terranean, and Russia. Operation ''Nep- tune" provided for the launching of anassault, across the English Channel, designed to secure a lodgment area onthe Continent from which wider offensive operations could be developed. Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory wasconfident that the German Air Force would constitute no serious threat toland, sea and air operations, but could not dismiss the possibility that the enemy was conserving his air forces for a maxi-mum effort against the Allied assault. A bombing plan was therefore prepared todrive the G.A.F. fighters back 130 miles to bases as far from the battle as werethe Allied fighter forces. Enemy bomber bases even farther inland were alsoscheduled for attack. It was considered possible that an intense air battle mightlast for up to a week following the assault, and it was necessary to have onhand a strong enough force of fighters to ensure that the enemy would be com-pletely mastered. Throughout the whole of th^, pre- A fifty-six page Supplement to f^ the London Gazette is devoted to a despatch by the late Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh- Mallory, K.C.B., D.S.O. describing air operations by the Allied Expedi- tionary Air Force in N.W. Europe from November 15th, 1943, to September 30th, 1944. Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory was Air Commander-in-Chief of A.E.A.F. and his despatch, submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander in November 1944, is one of the most eagerly awaited of last war docu- ments.- The value of the paper is necessarily limited because of the incompleteness of Allied intelligence at the time of its compilation ; thus various figures are unconfirmed estimates. This, however, does not detract from its value as a record covering ten and a half months of the most heavy and concentrated air war in history, or as an outline of the policy and planning which governed the The late Air ChiefMarshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. liminary and preparatory phases of theoperation Air Chief Marshal Leigh- Mallory had to take into account the needto maintain bombing attacks on '' No- ball " targets. ("Noball" was the codeword used to designate the sites being prepared by the enemy for attacks onEngland with flying bombs and rockets.) Operations against these sites, carried outunder the title of " Crossbow," began as early as December 5th, 1943, and con-stituted a considerable diversion of bomber effort. This bombing did not initself succeed in completely eliminating the menace of the flying bomb, but wasfully justified because the original scheme had to be abandoned by the Germans^The bombing of " Noball" targets, " moreover, was not wholly unprofitable,even judged from the point of view of "Neptune" alone, for medium and lightbomber crews gained experience in find- ing and attacking small, well-concealedtargets and improved bombing accuracy. The third part of the despatch is anarrative of operations. This Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory introduces byaffirming that air superiority was the principal prerequisite for the successfulassar.lt of Europe from the West. He was confident that the necessary ascen-dancy had been gained some time before D-Day, and advised the Supreme AlliedCommander to this effect. "In the event," he states, "the German AirForce was more impotent than I ex- pected." He then sets out some cRT^tefforts of the strategical bomber for > #directed to secure air superiority dui'r fithe preliminary period, throughout which the medium and light bomber forces ofthe A.E.A.F. were engaged in support of the strategical bomber programme andin meeting " Noball " commitments. In- telligence indicated that German aircraftproduction had been crippled. Further heavy blows were in-flicted in attacks on airfields and in combat, and a cam-paign of day and night intruding was designed tohamper training schedules as well as to destroy the enemyin the air. It became evident duringthe .^period November, 1943, to May, 1944, that the G.A.F.was conserving its air forces for the defence of vital tar-gets. Even large-scale fighter sweeps failed to produceserious reaction. Nevertheless, from November 15th, 1943.to the eve of D-Day the Allied forces accounted, inthe air alone, for 5,238 air- craft destroyed, 1,060 prob-ably destroyed, and 2,551 damaged. Dealing with what he callsthe preparatory period, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallorygives as the strength of the A.E.A.F. at April 1st, 1944,the following numbers of operationally available aircraft:— Medium Bombers Light Bombers Fighters and Fighter Bombers Transport Aircraft Gliders Reconnaissance Aircraft ... Artillery Observation Aircraft Ninlh Air Force 496 96 607 865 782 63 2,909 Ron! Air Force 70 1,784 225 351 164 2.76S Next to the winning of air superiority,the dislocation of the enemy's lines ol i communication was the most importanltask. There were two broad plans for doing this; one was a short-term policyinvolving attacks on certain rail centres during the period immediately beforeD-Day; the other was a longer term plan of destroying the potential of the railwaysystem in N.W. Europe. In March, 1944, the longer term plan was accepted by theSupreme Allied Commander. By D-Day, of the eighty targets allocated (18 toA.E.A.F. ; 39 to R.A.F. Bomber Com mand; and 23 to U.S. Eighth Aii
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