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Aviation History
1947
1947 - 0052.PDF
48 FLIGHT JANUARY O/TH, 1947 A.E.A.F. OPERATIONS IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE attacked, in the proportion of two out-side, to one within, the area. Photographic interpretation revealedthat in a great many instances the bomb- ing was more successful than expected,and by D-Day the majority of batteries within the area had been subjected todamaging attack. Between April 10th and June 5th, 1944, there were 8,765sorties against coastal batteries by the A..E.A.F., U.S. VHIth Air Force" andK.A.F. Bomber Command, on which 23>°94 tons of bombs and 495x60 lb R.P.s were expended. During the hours of darkness preced-ing the actual assault, a tremendous air bombardment was directed on to thebatteries which could not be destroyed within the assault area. Anti-Radar Discussing the disruption of radarcover and W/T facilities. Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory explains that theenemy radar cover on the Western Front was complete from Norway to theSpanish border. The scale and variety of equipment in this organization wassuch that to destroy the system by air attack alone would have been a formid-able proposition. This, however, was not necessary—the destruction of certainvital radars and the comprehensive jam- ming of others could so gravely interferewith operation as almost to make it use- less. The Air Chief Marshal thereforedecided to attack radar stations between Ostend and the Channel Islands inaccordance with the following prin- ciples : — (a) Radar installations which couldnot be jammed electronically, or were difficult to jam, should bedestroyed. (b) Radar installations capable of giv-ing good readings on ships and of controlling coastal guns should bedestroyed. (c) Radar installations likely to assistthe enemy in inflicting casualties to airborne forces should bedestroyed. (d) Two targets outside the assaultarea were to be attacked for every one attacked in the area. The attacks had a dual purpose. Theyaided both current air operations and naval operations in the Channel, andthey prepared for the assault by blinding the enemy. On May 10th, 1944, a series of attackswas begun against long-range aircraft reporting stations, and on May 18th, onthe installations used for night-fighter control and the control of coastal guns.On May 25th, forty-two sites were sche- duled for attack. These included 106installations. At D-3 fourteen sites were confirmed destroyed. To conserve effort it was decided,three days before D-Day, to restrict attacks to the twelve most importantsites; six were chosen by the naval authorities and six by the air authorities.These twelve, containing thirty-nine in- stallations, were all attacked in the threedays prior to D-Day. Up to D-Day, 1,668 sorties wereflown by aircraft of A.E.A.F. in attacks on radar installations. Typhoons inlow-level attacks, flew 694 sorties and fired 4,517x60 lb R.P.s. Typhoons andSpitfires made 759 dive-bombing sorties, dropping 1,258x500 lb bombs, and lightand medium bombers dropped 217 tons of bombs.These radar targets were very heavily defended by flak and low-level attacksupon them demanded great skill and daring. Pilots of the R.A.F. SecondT.A.F. were mainly employed and losses among senior and more experiencedpilots were heavy. There is no doubt, however, that the attacks saved thelives oi countless soldiers, sailors and airmen on D-Day. One of the most outstanding army-support types of the war, a Typhoon is seenbeing loaded with 500-lb. bombs to supplement its 4 x 20 mm eun armament. Two radio navigational stations im-portant to the assault area were success- fully attacked and four W/T stations ofthe highest importance were raided by Bomber Command. These last attacksAir Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory de- scribes as triumphs of precision bomb-ing. They were on Boulogne/Mt. Couple, Beaumont Hague/Au Feure,Dieppe/Bernaval le Grand and Cher- bourg/Urville-Hague; they were com-pletely successful. The success of the last attack, on the H.Q. of the G.A.F.Signals Intelligence, must have been a major catastrophe for the enemy, an<L,may well have been an important coi'Jy tributory factor to the lack of enemy ajjjjreaction to the assault. Radio Counter-measures Some interesting details are given ofradio counter-measures. On the night of June 5th-6th, in the opening phaseof the assault, counter-measures against such installations as were still activewere put into operation, covering five separate and distinct tasks: — (a) A combined naval/air diversionagainst Cap d'Antifer; (b) a combined naval/air diversionagainst Boulogne; (c), a jamming barrage to cover theairborne forces; (d) a V.H.F. jamming support for thefirst three counter-measures; (e) feints for the airborne forces.Results may be summarized as fol- lows: the enemy did not obtain theearly warning of our approach that his radar coverage should have madepossible; there was every reason to sup- pose that radar-controlled gunfire wasinterfered with; no fighter aircraft hin- dered our airborne operations; and theenemy was confused and his troop movements delayed. Attacks on ammunition and fueldumps, camps and H.Q.s had consider- able moral effect and inflicted casualties.A number of attacks are referred to, a particularly interesting one being thatby eight Mosquitoes on an ammunition dump at Chateaudun. About thirteentons of bombs caused sympathetic de- tonation and the entire western wing ofthe dump, containing ninety buildings, was completely'destroyed. Attacks on over-land communicationsmade coastal shipping increasingly im- portant to the enemy, and the task ofdealing with this was largely the work of Coastal Command, though Typhoonsof A.E.A.F. operated on occasions. Airfields Raided It became necessary a few weeks be-fore D-Day to neutralize a number of air- fields within a radius of 150 miles ^>*Caen, the primary objectives being air- craft repair, maintenance and servicingfacilities. These attacks began on May nth, 1944, an(i before D-Day, thirty-four of the most important airfields were attacked by 3.915 aircraft, dropping6,717 tons of bombs, the greatest weight being dropped by the U.S. IXth AirForce. This airfield bombing was largely responsible for the lack of enemy airinterference with our landings. Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory creditsthe Photographic Reconnaissance Units of the Allied Air Forces with being thefirst to begin active and direct prepara-
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