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Aviation History
1947
1947 - 0053.PDF
JANUARY 194? FLIGHT 49 A.E.A.F. OPERATIONS IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE tion for the invasion. Photographiccoverage of the entire coastline from Holland to the Spanish frontier was ob-tained to gather full details of the coastal defences. Verticals and obliqueswere taken of beach gradients, obstacles and defences. This very large coverageserved to hide our special interest in the selected assault beaches. Obliques were taken at wave-topheight, three to four miles out from the coast, to provide the assault coxswainswith a '' landing craft view '' of the par- ticular area to be assaulted. Then ob-liques were secured 1,500 yards from the pjast at "zero feet," to provide platoonIfcsault commanders with recognition mnding points. Further obliques weretaken again at 1,500 yards from the shore, but from 2,000 feet to provide, forthose who were planning the infantry assault, views of the immediate hinter-land. Inland strips were photographed be-hind the assault areas, looking south- wards, so that infantry commanderscould pinpoint themselves after they had advanced. Again, it was necessary tophotograph hidden land behind assault areas so that infantry commanders wouldknow the type of terrain behind obstruc- tions. River bridges were photographed andspecial attention was paid to the river banks to enable the engineers to plan thetype of construction necessary to supply tenfporary bridges in the event of theenemy blowing up the regular bridges. It was also necessary to cover all thelikely dropping areas for the use of the airborne divisions, and to pay specialattention to each area for concealed traps such as spikes, etc. These traps wereobserved on photographs of many sites chosen and it was necessary to makeother plans. Flooding areas, too, were all photographed at different periods.In the two weeks prior to D-Day, one R.A.F. Mobile Field Photographic Sec-tion alone made for the Army more than 120,000 prints. Many small-scale sortieswere flown for Combined Operations, enabling them to make landings at,selected spots long before the real offensive was launched and to bring backvital information. Allied landing craft, equipment and stores in the UnitedKingdom were photographed to facili- tate experiments with camouflage. Medium-Low P.R. There was an urgent need for amedium-low altitude P.R. aircraft to supplement the high-altitude types, andsome Mustang fighters were converted for ^tactical and strategical medium-low alti-photography with oblique cameras, altitude recce., however, was atles a hazardous business in view of j the risk of being jumped by enemyfighters. None the less, early results achieved were very encouraging andeventually a number of reconnaissance squadrons were partly re-equipped withconverted Mustangs. Their work proved invaluable, and the development of thisaircraft for photographic reconnaissance work is mentioned as one of the out-standing lessons of the air war. The value of Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory's summary of "Crossbow" op- erations is limited, because of his lackof complete information on the enemy's plans at the time of writing. He recordsthat it was not appreciated before D- Day that in addition to the speciallyconstructed flying bomb "ski sites" (so called because of the shape of the supplybuilding) there were modified sites with all the facilities of the originals exceptfor the distinctive ski buildings and the water supply system. After D4-7, theday on which the enemy first launched flying bombs, photographic reconnais-sance, revealed the .existence of 74 of these modified sites. No fewer than26,869 sorties against ski sites were made by the A.E.A.F. and U.S. VHIthAir Force prior to D-Day and 21,483 tons of bombs were dropped. Another2,479 sorties were flown against rocket sites (8,291 tons of bombs) and 1,018against supply sites and dumps. The total number of sorties flown onmissions of all kinds between April 1st and June 5th, 1944, (*^e period ofpreparatory operations) was 200,639, of which 195,255 were flown by theA.E.A.F., R.A.F. Bomber Command and the U.S. VHIth Air Force, the re-mainder being flown by Coastal Com- mand. Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory dis-cusses the actual assault on the European fortress in some detail and sets out theorder of battle of the A.E.A.F. in the following table: Type Medium Bombers light Bombers... Fighter and F/Bs. Transports Recce. Aircraft Art. Obs. Aircraft A.S.R. (Miscellaneous) Powered A/C Total . Gliders Grand Total U.S.Forces 532 194 1,811 1,160 158 3,361 1,619 4,080 R.A.F. 88 160 2,172 462 178 102 96 3,258 972 4,230 Grand Total 620 354 3,483 1,628 836 102 90 •6,619 2,591 9,210 The task of assisting the naval forcesto protect the passage of the assault armies from surface and U-boat attack,was undertaken chiefly by R.A.F. Coastal Command though aircraft ofA.E.A.F. assisted. A line of patrols was provided at either end of the Channeland the protection thus afforded con- tributed much to the safety of the Alliedshipping from both surface and under- water attack by enemy naval forces. Fifteen squadrons of fighters were de-tailed to protect the shipping lanes. These flew 2,015 sorties during D-Dayand D-f 1, the cover being maintained at six-squadron strength throughout theperiod. Owing to the lack of enemy" reaction, the cover was reduced to a two-squadron force. R.A.F. Bomber Command commencedthe bombardment of ten heavy coastal batteries in the assault area, and as thebombers left the area U.S. VIHth Air Force heavies took over the bombard-ment. In the thirty minutes immedi- ately preceding the touch-down hour,1,365 heavy bombers attacked selected areas in the coastal defences, dropping2,796 tons of bombs. The result of these operations added to the previous airbombardment and combined with the naval shelling, neutralized almost all ofthe shore batteries and the opposition to the landings was very much less thanwas expected. Medium, light and fighter bombersthen took a hand in the attacks on the enemy defensive system by attacking ar-tillery positions further inland and other targets in the coastal defences. TheVHIth Air Force flew 2,627 heavy bomber and 1,347 escort and offensivefighter sorties during the day. In the naval bombardment, aircraft ofA.E.A.F. played an important role. The Fleet Air Arm had stated early in theplanning that it would be unable to find from its own resources enough aircraftto provide for spotting for the guns of all the capital ships it was-planned touse. Accordingly, despite the unfortun- ate diversion of effort from air resourcesthat were far from inexhaustible, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory had agreedthat two squadrons of Spitfires from A.D.G.B. and two wings of Mustangsfrom R.A.F. Second T.A.F. should be trained for this task. Thus on D-Dayand subsequently, we were just able to meet the heavy calls for gunneryspotting. Beach Patrol Nine fighter squadrons for low coverand three for high cover continuously patrolled over the beaches and a reserveof six squadrons was kept in readiness. Night fighters patrolled during darkness,six squadrons of Mosquitos being avail- able. Air operations to dislocate enemycontrol of operations were begun on the day before the assault. This went evenfurther than the previous attacks on the Radar chain and was intended to impedeand disrupt in advance any possible enemy moves to make good the initialstage of the assault, to break up the machinery of control and signals com-munications and to make as difficult as possible the co-ordination of counter-attacks. Chateaux known to house German Corps and Divisional Head-quarters and also German Army tele- phone exchanges were attacked on theevening of June 5th and through D-Day by fighters with bombs and R.Ps. Theseoperations seriously embarrassed the enemy, both during the assault and later,when many H.Q.s were knocked out. Airlift for airborne operations was pro-vided by the U.S. IXth Troop Carrier Command and Nos. 38 and 46 Groups,R.A.F. A few S.A.S. troops were dropped by 38 Group in selected areasbefore and after D-Day for special duties. All airborne forces and re-supply mis-sions which were flown in daylight were given adequate fighter cover. An elaborate table sets out the num-bers of sorties made by all classes of aircraft. On D-Day these totalled10,743 and on D+i, 11,833. Operations subsequent to D-Day canbe summarized as embracing attacks on communications, close support, attackson coastal garrisons, fighter cover for the assault and shipping lanes, defenceagainst flying bombs, attacks on " Cross- bow " targets, defence against enemy' air reaction, attacks on G.A.F. bases, operations of the First Allied AirborneArmy, attacks on Naval targets, and strategical bombing. To be continued)
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