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Aviation History
1947
1947 - 0082.PDF
F LIG HI JANUARY I6TH, 1947 A.E.A.F. OPERATIONS IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE these ports were inevitably high, par-ticularly so at Le Havre, and Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory felt that thisbombing effort would have been more profitably directed aga'inst targets insideGermany, particularly as the disorganiza- tion of her retreating army was mostacute at this time. The composition, scale of effort andcontrol of fighter forces is dealt with at some length. During the assault threeFighter Direction Tenders operated as forward controls. One of these was ineach of the U.S. and British sectors and one in the main shipping lane. This shiplater moved to a position off Barfleur, to counter enemy night operations. The operation of our fighter aircraftwas at times rendered difficult by our own anti-aircraft guns. "In fact," saysthe Air Chief Marshal, "I regret to say that engagements of friendly aircraft didoccur with some frequency in the initial stages of the operation." He goes on to praise the manner inwhich fighter forces were transferred to the Continent. A high priority had beenarranged for naval lift of stores and equipment, and the airfield constructionengineers receive due mention for their work. The strength of squadrons based on theContinent was gradually built up in the first fourteen days of the operation; eightSpitfire, three Typhoon and three Austet squadrons moved into, and were operat-ing from, beachhead airfields by the end of this period. During the following weekUnited States forces began to arrive— nine Thunderbolt and three Mustangsquadrons. A further British contingent of one Spitfire, three Typhoon and oneAuster squadrons made a total of thirty- one Allied squadrons operating frombeachhead airfields three weeks after D-Day. Enemy Reaction Dealing with enemy reaction andAllied counter-action, the Air Chief Marshal states that enemy air strength onD-Day was considerably greater than in the same area six weeks before. Bomberstrength had increased by about 200, single-engine fighters by 500 and twin-engine fighters by 125. The enemy scale of effort throughoutthe period from D-Day to September 30th was considerably lower than ex-pected ; in fact, no serious air battle took place during this period.Throughout June the squadrons which showed the. most aggressiveness werebomber units which operated by night, principally on sea mining in the shippinglanes, but also on bombing operations against shipping in the approach lanesand against the beaches. The fighter units operated mainly in a defensive roleagainst Allied bomber attacks and princi- pally in the Paris area and south of theSeine, where they tried to provide cover to the reinforcement assembly areas andto the main airfields. The scale of effort by a few enemy unitswas, however, relatively high. On days when flying conditions were good, manyaircraft flew more than one sortie, and three and four sorties per aircraft werenot unusual. The frequent periods of bad weather gave respite from Allied airattack. Except on isolated occasions, the enemy fighter and fighter bomber forma-tions showed a marked disinclination to engage Allied fighters, and they wereoften deterred with relative ease from carrying out their primary tasks. How-ever, the night fighter activity against. Allied bombers continued to be fairlyheavy and vigorous. Throughout July the enemy air effortcontinued to be sporadic; in the first few days a scale of effort of up to 450 daysorties was observed, but this quickly fell away and was not again reached untilJuly 27th. Most of the day sorties were directed against Allied positions in thebattle area, particularly at the western end of the Allied line. At the beginningof August, with the break-out of the Allied armies accomplished, the G.A.F.day forces became even more committed to ground support and at about this timethe enemy began to use long-range bombers by night against land targetswith occasional attacks on shipping. Another feature was the use of single-engine day fighters by night. Counter-attack During the second week in August,when the enemy launched his strongest counter-attack in the Mortain area,G.A.F. effort rose to about 400 sorties a day, and, to counter this, German air-fields were attacked. Decline in enemy activity was due partly to these attacks,partly to the necessity for moving units to airfields farther east, and partly toshortage of fuel. By mid-August new G.A.F. unitsbegan to appear on the Western Front, but although these pushed up the averagedaily effort to nearly 300 sorties, the fighting value continued to deteriorate.An effort was, however, made through- out the fourth week in August to assistthe land farces trying to scramble back to the Seine by providing cover and relieffrom air attack at the Seine crossings, but on very few occasions were the attackspressed home. Enemy losses mounted steadily all the time. Late in August German fighter units'staged a very spirited revival against strategical bomber attacks, and the U.S.Eighth Air Force suffered fairly heavy losses. At about this time German jet-propelled aircraft began to operate. The landing of airborne troops in theEindhoven-Nijmegen-Arnhem area in mid-September produced a more violentreaction from the G.A.F. than had been encountered for some time in the battleareas, although a tactical surprise was gained and the original landings weremade without opposition. Jet Aircraft Concerning jet aircraft. Air ChiefMarshal Leigh-Mallory wrote as follows: '' Within the limits of our present experi-ence, they appear to have been employed chiefly as fighter bombers for groundattack in a close support role, and for tactical reconnaissance. In both theseroles their very high speed makes them formidable weapons and present prob-lems of defence are not yet solved. As fighters they have so far played a lessdecisive part, though their speed and par- ticularly their rate of climtf would seemto equip them admirably for these duties. " From aerial combats that haveoccurred up to the date of writing be- tween orthodox Allied fighters and thesejet-propelled aircraft it would appear that their lack of manoeuvrability putsthem under some disadvantage in a ' dog fight,' but their qualities of speedand rate of climb make them deadly if they are given the chance to 'jump'the opposition." On September 17th, under the code...name "Operation Market," airborne forces of the First Allied AirborneArmy, comprising United States 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, 1st BritishAirborne Division and a Polish Para- • chute Brigade, were dropped and landedin the Eindhoven - Nijmegen - Arnhem areas of Holland. The operation was*designed to facilitate an advance by the northern group of armies up to and overthe rivers Waal and Lower Rhine. With this end in view, the chief objec-tives of the airborne troops were the bridges at Arnhem and Nijmegen. The initial drops were successful,being carried out accurately and with very few casualties. During the subse-quent nine days, as weather permitted, reinforcements and supplies were flownin to the airborne troops and to the supporting ground troops which hadlinked up with them. It is already his- tory that, despite an heroic struggle bythe troops of the 1st British Airborne Division, the bridge at Arnhem,although secured initially, could not be retained. The bridge at Nijmegen, how-ever, was secured and the operation paved the way for a subsequent advanotup to the river Waal and beyond. Besides the aircraft of the troopcarrier air forces, the aircraft of A.E.A.F., United States Eighth AirForce, R.A.F. Bomber Command and R.A.F. Coastal Command were engagedin support of these operations. The activities of all the air forces concernedin a supporting role were co-ordinated at Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallery'sheadquarters. Throughout the operations the Alliedair forces continued to cover the air- borne forces, to lend direct support tothe ground forces and particularly to attack flak positions. In all, the sup-porting air forces flew over 7,800 sorties in support of "Operation Market." Atotal of 114 aircraft were lost, in addi- tion to the casualties incurred by thetroop carrier forces. Air/Sea Rescue '-. The Air Chief Marshal again paystribute to the Air/Sea Rescue Service which had a string of 17 launches acrossthe North Sea on the northern route and a further string of 10 launches along thejsouthern route. On D + 2 of "Opera- tion Market'' one launch picked up allpersonnel from five ditched gliders and in all 205 personnel were saved. In anticipation of an enemy attemptto move U-boats into the invasion waters, R.A.F. Coastal Command flewanti-submarine patrols from the Scillies to Ushant and from St. Albans Head toCap de la Hague. Through these barriers the enemy had to try to infil-trate. The first U-boats sighted were approaching from the western entranceto the assault area on the night of D-Day. Six of these were attacked, andduring the next day and night a furthii
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