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Aviation History
1947
1947 - 1508.PDF
26a FLIGHT SEPTEMBER 4TH, CORRESPONDENCE The Editor does not hold himself responsible for the views expressed by correspondents. The names and addresses of the writers, not necessarily for publication, must in all cases accompany letters. HELICOPTER PRICES Comparison of American and British CostsI N the issue of July 17th an excellent review is given ofhelicopter topics. This article quotes the price of the Sikorsky S.51 helicopter as being ^12,000, approximately, inU.S.A., and also assumes the cost in this country to be in the region ol ^20,000. The American cost of the S.51 helicopter has not been aslow as the figure mentioned, and has risen substantially, and in fact the last figure we had was $75,000, which is ^18,750.With the continuous increase of costs in America it may be that this figure will go up. The original lower prices inAmerica were influenced by reason of the fact that surplus war material was used extensively, and there are also other causeswith which we will not burden this letter. It is frequently said that the cost of manufacture in thiscountry should be lower than it is in America, 'although there is plenty of evidence to the contrary. The cost of manufacturein the two countries depends on a number of items, amongst others being the volume of production, and it will be agreedby most manufacturing engineers that, other things being equal, this country can be competitive. In the case of the helicopter, it remains to be determinedwhat will be the scale of production in this country, and with the present difficulties the scale of production will depend asmuch, if not more, on the possibility of obtaining supplies as it will on sales. It is reasonable, however, to assume that the cost of manu-facture during the next few years, bearing in mind the great difficulties which exist, are not likely to be less than they arein America, this applying to helicopters as well as other engi- neering products. A. H. WILLIAMS, Commercial Manager, Westland Aircraft, Ltd. Front Sir Alan J. Cobham, K.B.E., A.F.C. FLIGHT REFUELLING A Statement on the London-Bermuda Trials THE paragraph in "Outlook," 'Flight, August 21st, pre-sented a fair assessment of the objects of the flight refuel- ling proving trials just completed on the London-Bermuda run.I have been developing and actively promoting the principles and practice of flight refuelling for over fifteen years, and, asthe Editor remarked, I am more than pleased with the results of the trials. We set out to prove three contentions. (1) Thata scheduled airliner route could be flight-refuelled efficiently with no delay in the schedule. (2) That long-distance non-stopflights, that were impossible for any existing type of airliner, could be made possible—and profitable—by flight refuelling.(3) That it was possible to develop a foolproof and weather- proof method of interception. In the early stages certain novelties were introduced in themethods of interception, bat in the later stages the system had been adapted to requirements and perfected in application.In fact, the senior radio officer of B.S.A.A. could suggest no further improvements. His report on the last flight west statedthat "Radio troubles first encountered just don't exist." In all, twenty-two flights were made. The only occasion onwhich the flight refuelling operation was not carried out with complete ease and success was on the fifth trip eastwards, whenthe receiver aircraft was forced to land at Santa Maria owing to engine trouble The fact that the aircraft concerned were converted militaryaircraft operating on flights of thousands oi miles over the sea, makes even more creditable the servicing carried out throughthe whole series by Flight Refuelling Limited, and the degree of reliability experienced shows that this servicing was up to thehigh standards demanded by B.S.A.A. The converted Lan- casters used as tankers and based at Santa Maria were alsoserviced by us, and the base itself was installed, manned and operated solely by personnel of the firm. The base was estab-lished at short notice and in quick time and an efficient system has now been created for the rapid establishment of a tankerbase as well as developing a completely efficient system of refuelling in flight. As pointed out in the Flight editorial, the proving trials onthe London-Montreal run with B.O.A.C. will present us with all the problems of maintaining the service under the worstpossible weather conditions. We have demonstrated in many trials during the last two years, that the operation can becarried out in any weather conditions in which an airliner can be flown. I am confident that with the co-operation ofB.O.AC., we shall be able to overcome any difficulties which may arise. There is no reason to believe that this series willbe less successful than the series just completed, and the results should finally establish both the efficiency and efficacy of thesystem of flight refuelling. ALAN J. COBHAM. ELEMENTARY TRAINERS Starting at First BaseI AM glad to see that at least one correspondent, DonaldMcKay, agrees with me to some extent on the subject of elementary trainers. His mention of the reduction of accidentproneness in later life resulting from learning to fly on a relatively complicated aircraft brings up a new point. I maysay at once that I believe such a theory to be rot, and that assuming a pilot has reasonable training on any aircraft, acci-dent proneness later is entirely a matter of the man rather than the machine. During the war the Reid and Sigrist trainer, nicknamed the" Snargasher," was tried out as a combined elementary and intermediate trainer in the hopes of reducing the time takento get a pilot recruit to O.T.U. stage, and although nothing came of the experiment I believe it was regarded as fairly suc-cessful. However, I think at that period expense was of little importance while time counted for everything. If one unit andone type of aircraft could do the job of two of each it was a case of " damn the expense—give the cat another goldfish!"Even now I understand that R.C.A.F. pupils are being taught to fly on Harvards, but this is probably because there are verylarge numbers- of Harvards immediately available to train a comparatively small number of recruits, and it is cheaper touse these than to buy expensive new trainers of a more ele- mentary character. I hold nothing personal against the Prentice but I am still hoping somebody will tell me what considerations led to the new elementary trainer specification. ONE-TIME A.2. PRELUDE TO GLORY The Real Reason for the Arnhem Failure /~*ROUP CAPT. NEWNHAM would seem to think that the^J failure of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem was because the paratroops were dropped by day. I don't agreewith this. Even if the landings had been made on the blackest of nights the final outcome of the Battle of Arnhemwould have been the same. No paratroops could have dropped with the necessary aids for a night landing by gliders (oh yes,there were a few gliders there), as a landing in the close country around Arnhem needed second sight even by day. The real reasons for the Division's failure were the obviousones. (1) The failure of the 2nd Army to fight through to Arnhem. (2) The failure to withdraw the entire Division(or what was left of it) on the Thursday when it would have been possible to fight back to the 2nd Army. It was obvious,even to the dimmest intelligence, that the 2nd Army wouldj^ fight through to us. (3) Bad intelligence and worse brk^JrWe were told that there was no enemy armour in the area— when actually they had a Panzer Division and lashings of S.P.88 mm guns. We were briefed to go in at under 1,500ft because " There is no light flak in the area." No light flak!Ye Gods! (4) No air support once the Division was "in." To the oft-repeated excuse of bad weather I can only say" phooey ! " The weather was almost as good as the present heatwave—it only rained once during the whole engagement—and it was certainly good enough for the Luftwaffe. In fact, had the second lift been ten minutes earlier or half anhour later the gliders would have been caught over the DZs by a mixed bag of F.W.190S and Meiogs who, incidentally, carriedout several repeat performances. While we are on the air side, 1 would like to say that we gottar more of the two " resupply drops" than has ever b?en admitted, even containers stuffed with red Airborne berets. In closing there is one question to which I have never beenable to get an answer. Why were two divisions sent to Nijmegen, which was an obvious "piece of cake" (roni thestart, and only one division sent to Arnhem, 50 miles farther on into enemy held territory ? GEOFFREY MOSS
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