FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1948
1948 - 0262.PDF
22(5 FLIGHT FEBRUARY 26TH, 1948 Strategic Bomber Offensive Sir Norman Bottomley Discusses Features of European Campaign Before R.U.S.L DAY bombing compared with night bombing; areabombing versus precision bombing; the choice oftarget systems ; the extent to which strategic bombers were able to support the armies and navies; control of the strategic air forces at various stages ; the difficulty of main- taining strategic aims in the face of all defensive claims ; the expenditure of effffrt and achievement; and, finally, the lessons learnt—all these questions were dealt with by Air Marshal Sir Norman H. Bottomley, K.C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., in a lecture before the R.U.S.I. last Wednesday week. Of the points made by the Air Marshal, one of the mostsignificant was that, of the tonnage of bombs dropped by the Allied Air Forces in Europe in six years of war, half wasput down in the last year after D-Day, and of the tonnage dropped on Germany itself, three-quarters was dropped afterD-Day. This, he pointed out, gave some idea of the short period during which the bomber offensive was delivering areally effective weight of effort. Early Limitations ""'..,' Concerning day bombing, he said that this was impracticablein the R.A.F. during the early part of the war because of the inferior performance and armament of our bombers as com-pared with enemy fighters, and because of our lack of long- range escort fighters. It was impossible to convert our fightersfor long-range work and our resources did not allow produc- tion of two classes of fighter. The question arose as to whether our heavy scale of attackagainst industrial areas was justified at the time. There was, said the Air Marshal, no question that these attacks had aconsiderable effect on the Germans' war effort, but recent investigations had shown that the effect in itself was nevercritical. In the first place, the forces available in Bomber Command were inadequate, especially in view of the calls whichwere made on them at a later date for the support of the Invasion. In the second place, contrary to general belief atthe time, German war production was never really stretched until late in the war. Up to that time, there was always someslack in the economic machine and the enemy was able to call on this in the emergencies. The question of area bombingas opposed to the attack of precise targets or target systems would prove, said the Air Marshal, a most interesting questionwhen studied in relation to new forms of warfare. It was difficult to assess the real value of direct supportby heavy bombers—such as was given by Bomber Command at Caen. 01 by the U.S. Eighth Air Force at St. Lo-Perrier.Generally speaking, examination of the ground immediately after an advance failed to show that such attacks had suc-ceeded in destroying large numbers of personnel, guns or armour. Moreover, in many cases, heavy bombardment ofup to ten tons per acre resulted in such cratering and demolition that the advance of our leading ground formations, and par-ticularly tanks, was seriously hindered. The use of fragmenta- tion bombs, had these been available in sufficient quantity, "would have avoided that disadvantage. Measured in terms ol ultimate results achieved, the two mostimportant target systems which were systematically attacked were oil and transportation. A recent lecture by Lord Tedderwas quoted The C.A S. had said that these two factors were " the"one common den«minator of Germany's.war effort—fromthe political control at the top down to the supply of the troops in the front line." Air-Sea War Air Marshal Bottomley was afraid that he might be underfire from the Navy if he failed to mention something about the use of the Strategic Air Forces in support of the war at sea.The greatest menace which faced us at sea was that of U-boats. Criticism has been ?nade that the Strategic Air Forces hadnot played a sufficient role in countering this menace. He thought this criticism was ill-founded; indeed, some hundredthousand tons of borrbs were dropped—the bulk of them in area attacks—on targets connected with the construction ofTJ-boats Examination after the war had shown that it was the offensive against transportation which ultimately broughtthe U-boat industry to a standstill. Of nineteen new squadrons formed in Bomber Command in J94 2, thirteen were transferredeither to Coastal Command to help in the Battle of the Atlantic, or to the Mediterranean or Indian theatres to co-operate with the armies. The main contribution made by the Strategic Air For^sto the conduct of sea warfare was the mine-laying camptrji by Bomber Command. During the war, the Command lafil47,000 mines, which were responsible for sinking or damaging over nine hundred enemy ships, and the Command was, infact, responsible for over 30 per cent of sinkings inflicted on enemy shipping in the north-western waters. This was addi-tional to their attacks on the German main Naval units, of which ten, including the Tirpitz, Lutzom, and Scheer weresunk. Great pressure was brought to bear on the Air Staff tocounter the V-i and V-2 attacks by heavy bombing raids on the sites and objectives connected with development and pro-duction. About 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped in a thirteen-month campaign, representing nine per cent of thetotal tonnage dropped by the Allied Air Forces during that period "The most we can say for our defensive bombingattacks," said the Air Marshal, " is that they forced the Germans into a large amount of repair and construction ofV-i sites and they probably delayed the beginning of launch- ing by three or four months. In the case of the V-2 offensive,they neither delayed it nor reduced it to any extent." He went on to point out that the campaign clearly showed howdifficult it was to avoid demands for diversions from a planned and agreed military aim where public morale was so seriouslyaffected and where there was available such a flexible force as a heavy bombing force. Importance of Intelligence Quite outside the question as to whether we were right inchoosing certain target systems as our main objectives, or whether we ought to have attacked these systems at an earlieror different phase of the war, one of the outstanding lessons appeared to be the need for a first-class comprehensive intel-ligence organization on which to base our strategic decisions in the future. In the last war, the most important short-comings of our intelligence system was in respect of economic, industrial and social intelligence of our enemy The machinerywhich existed between the military and other Government Departments and certain individual authorities which werecapable of giving first-class advice was not really satisfactory. We had not utilized to the full the wealth of specialist tecnical knowledge we had—certainly not in the early stagi This was a matter which needed most careful and periolreview in order to meet changing conditions of the future. Another direction in which we suffered was in the scientificfield. In the early and even the middle stages of the war, we lacked scientific advice, scientific guidance and scientificinspiration. Of the three Services, the Air Marshal thought the R.A.F. was the first to recognize this weakness, and onceit was recognized, rapid progress was made. Finally, if there was one outstanding lesson to be learnt fromthe last war, Air Marshal Bottomley thought, it was that a strong and well-equipped strategic air force remained a primaryneed for the British Commonwealth of Nations. It was, the essence of peace and of our future defence, and it was to theadvantage of our people, and the Navy, Army and Air Force alike, that we should maintain this force at the highest possiblestandard of readiness. HELICOPTER LECTUREM EMBERS and friends of the Helicopter Association ofGreat Britain are reminded that on Saturday next, February 28th Mr. Raoul Hafner will describe the Bristol 171.As the designer of the machine, he will probably add some- thing to the details given in our description in Flight ofOctober 30th, 1947. As usual, the meeting will be held at Manson House, 26, Portland Place, London, W.i, startingat 2.30 p.m.
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
