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Aviation History
1948
1948 - 1185.PDF
JULY 29TH, 1948 FLIGHT 137 on having produced a definite policy, which would give B.O.A.C. a firm basis on which to plan, the first time this had been possible. He only regretted the cost in wasted money, time and energy before a long-term policy was decided upon. He wondered whether we were giving the best possible chance to the aircraft manufacturers. We should not get one new type by the time we expected them unless the present method of order- ing was radically changed. There was no chance of getting '' winners-^' under the present method. Lord Waleran put in a plea for the really large flying boat, the flying ship. He was thinking in terms of boats twice as large as any built hitherto, including the Howard Hughes. He thought we should go first for the really fast high- frequency aircraft, such as the D.H.106, but let us also have our '' slow old lady travelling at 250 knots, crossing the Atlantic in twelve hours." Lord Sempill was glad to hear that the Saunders-Roe SR-45 was not to be scrapped, but he suggested that a number of these boats should be ordered for military purposes, so that instead of only four more being ordered, another six or seven should be ordered, thereby spreading development cost over a larger number and gaining operational experience in the military as well as in the civil field. Lord GifTord also spoke on behalf of the flying boat. He was glad it was to be used on the South American route, but asked what was intended on the Empire routes. Speaking as a travel agent, he had found that nearly all his clients preferred the flying boat. Surely, if passengers wanted flying boats they should have them. With large flying boats it would be possible to give the passenger a small single-berth cabin, a dining saloon, and a comfortable lounge. Viscount Samuel suggested the time had come when there should be a funda- mental enquiry into the right form of ministerial and commercial organization of civil aviation. It might be found that it was not necessary to have a Ministry of Civil Aviation at all. The present plan was extremely complicated, respon- sibility divided, and the working of the system dilatory. Such an inquiry might best be placed in the hands of a Committee of the Privy Council. Viscount Addison replied. The Tudor Story Muddle Without Parallel in British Aviation ONE month after being submitted tothe Minister of Supply, the FinalReport of the Committee of Enquiry into the Tudor Aircraft was published onJuly 20th. The committee, it will be recol- lected, was appointed in September, 1947,under the chairmanship of Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Courtney, the other mem-bers being Mr. James Mould, Mr. J. J. Taylor, and Mr. G. Wansbrough. The latterresigned from the committee in February, 1948, and consequently his signature is notattached to the report. . "?-.".'-.:r~ Specification The report points out that proposals forthe construction of the Tudor II were originally put forward by A. V. Roe andCo., Ltd. (incidentally, it leaves out the "and Co."), in the autumn of 1943.B.O.A.C. and the Ministry of Civil Aviation were concerned in the preliminary discus-sions, and in November, 1944, a draft specifi- cation was drawn up, which was finallyagreed to and issued in December, 1944- It called for a payload of 8,275 lb for a rangeof 2,800 miles, or of 9,675 lb for 2,600 miles, both at 25,000ft. Take-off run was to benot more than 1,200 yards to clear 50ft at sea level against a 5 m.p.h. wind. Thecabin was to be pressurized, and to have accommodation for 41 day passengers or 22sleeping. No all-up weight was specified, so that the designer was free to determinewhat was the most this could be if the performance was to be attained. It wasthought that it might be of the order of 76,000 lb. In March, 1946, the first flight was made,and the machine was found to suffer from aerodynamic troubles similar to those whichbeset the Tudor I, but to a smaller degree. It was sent to Boscombe Down, but re-turned to the makers before the trials were completed, in order that the improvementsfound desirable after the Nairobi trials of the Tudor I might be incorporated. Thiswork was well advanced when the machine crashed (as a result of a reversal of theaileron controls, and Roy Chadwick and Bill Thorn were among those who lost theirlives). "This unfortunate accident," the report states, "deprived the firm not onlyof the accumulated experience of the two men most closely concerned with the tech-nical development of the Tudor II, but also of the only aircraft then available for testflights." Alterations The report points out that until thesummer of 1946 it was necessary for B-O.A.C. to co-ordinate their requirementswith those of the Commonwealth operators. It was originally decided that all the air-craft should be equipped with convertible d.'v and night accommodation. This neces-sitated an increase of 2ft in fuselage length and an increase in weight. In May, 1945, B.O.A.C. decided not to have sleepingaccommodation on certain routes, and gave priority to the Pullman version, of which20 were wanted. A further increase in fuselage length resulted. In July, 1945, therewas yet another change in layout, and priority reverted to the day-and-night ver-sion. After inspection of a mock-up in September, 1945, B.O.A.C. called for variousalterations. The inevitable delay was accepted by M.C.A., who promised that nofurther modifications would be asked for. , That promise was not kept. In October,1945, a new colour scheme and a rearrange- ment of the dressing rooms were asked forby an industrial designer. This entailed purchase of new materials. Another delayof six months. In December, 1945, B.O.A.C. put forward a request for a newtype of chair convertible into a bunk. Work went on during 1946 on the require-ments put forward by B.O.A.C. and Commonwealth operators. Not untilFebruary, 1947, did B.O.A.C. indicate that only six machines of the sleeper versionwould be required. The report blames the corporation for not taking the opportunityto make a substantial saving in weight by abandoning the heavy convertible arrange-ment. It is interesting to examine how all thesevacillations affected the aircraft. In the original 1943 conception, the fuselage hadan overall length of 95ft, with a maximum diameter of iojft. In its final stage thesefigures grew to io.5|ft and 11ft respectively. The 1943 estimate for tare weight was44,810 lb. In February, 1948, this had grown to 55,417 lb, an increase of nearly24 per cent. An agreed specification in December, 1944, showed a tare weight of47,765 lb, so that the difference between this and the 1948 figure is 7,652 lb. How the Weight Increased A revealing light is thrown on the wayin which these weight increases came about. By the autumn of 1945 it was becomingclear that the gross weight was likely to exceed the original estimate of 76,000 bymore than 4,000 lb. At a conference in November, 1945, Avros put forward sug-gestions which would have saved that weight. A compromise was reached, whichsav«d less than 2,000 lb. One reason was that B.O.A.C. would not accept proposedchanges in accommodation. During the following months, the gross weight againcrept up to 80,000 lb. " The corporation," the report states, "though professedlyanxious about the possible effects of ex- cessive weight, deprecated on a number ofoccasions any proposal to improve matters by economizing in the standards of furnish-ing." As another example of this sort of attitude the report quotes freight spacesunder the cabin floor. It was argued that this large cargo space would have containedS,ooo-8,5oo 1b of carco, which could be used when passenger demand fell off. " Wecannot consider it reasonable," the report comments, " to demand cargo space suffi-cient to absorb about 90 per cent of the maximum payload." In June, 1946, a review showed that sug-gested reduction of range requirements was not feasible. The report states, very per-tinently: "Faced with this conclusion, the corporation might have been expected imme-diately to set about investigating the pos- sibilities of saving weight in interior accom-modation equipment which they had hitherto declined to consider. No such stepwas taken, nor have we been given a satis- factory reason for this omission." A yearlater, when a change of management took place, economies in furnishing amounting toover 2,000 lb were agreed, but no decision was taken to alter the furnishing arrange-ments. Payment for Modifications This sombre picture of muddle is not con-fined to technical matters. On the financial side we find another source of delay. Avroshad proceeded with alterations to the sleeper version as requested by B.O.A.C., some 340requirements being involved. But B.O.A.C. were not prepared to commit themselves topaying for redundant material. The Ministry of Civil Aviation did not feel able toauthorize expenditure on work peculiar to the corporation's requirements unjess givenan assurance that B.O.A.C- would ultimately take over the aircraft and pay full cost,including modifications. The Civil Aircraft Modifications Committee therefore placed anumber of modifications in abeyance and confined approval to such as were essentialfor airworthiness. In October, 1947, B.O.A.C. declined to make a decision untilthey had inspected a complete aircraft, and even then they did not commit themselvesto operation of the aircraft, even if the layout proved acceptable. The Ministry ofCivil Aviation were not prepared to risk expenditure which might prove to benugatory. It was not until January, 1948, that the deadlock was broken by theMinistry of Supply assuming responsibility for authorizing work necessary to bring thefirst production aircraft up to the full B.O.A.C. modification standard. At the same time as the publication ofthe Courtney Report, the Ministry of Supply issued a Press Notice concerning BoscombeDown trials of the Tudor II. The notice- is too brief to be of any value and merelvstates that performance is disappointing and that the aircraft required a take-off distancewhich would preclude commercial operation from certain existing airfields on the Empireroutes, and that its range was less than had been expected. The issue of the noticewas carefully timed to have the greatest effect in supporting the Government'sdecision, but to many it seems a case of kicking a man when he is down
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