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Aviation History
1949
1949 - 0404.PDF
264 FLIGHT MARCH 3RD, 1949 Scribes and Pharisees believe. Quite the opposite, we suspect. Our purely private hunch is that the Bad Boys of the Politburo %re trembling with laughter over the ruinously mounting cost of their pistol-pack- ing peace. Current U.S. defence expenditures call for 14.3 billion dollars ($14,300,000,000,), representing 34 per cent of the national budget. To anyone familiar with the American scene it is interesting to observe how the top newspaper columnists—those pundit-scribes who soften, mould and blud- geon New World, opinion—are now begianing to warn against this other kind of red stop-light. But to come back to the cut-backs. The case of Northrop represents one of the most astonishing high-level policy rever- sals seen in recent years. Contrary to all expectations, this firm which only a few short months ago was reported nego- tiating for a production order ranging from 100 to 500 B-49 Jet-Wing bombers, has now had even its current run of 30 RB-49 jet reconnaissance-bombers abruptly cancelled. ' This was the production batch to be built by Convair under Northrop licence. Northrop will still go ahead (subject to any further whimsical moves on the procurement chess-board!) with the conversion of ten more of the original 15 XB-35 piston-engined flying-wing bombers into jets, as previously reported in Flight of December 30th. Incidentally, these jet conversions will be designated RB-35A, a classification which may eventually cause, some con- fusion with the present YB-49 jet development model, since the latter is likewise a conversion from the same original batch of 15 piston-engined YB-35S. The other YB-49 was destroyed, while the three remaining YB-35S will be used for further experimentation with external windmills—probably with piston-turbo compound and turboprop power plants, in a con- tinued effort to produce a long-range strategical all-wing bomber in the 10,000-mile class. Presumably, the turbopropped version would have to change its windmill dress from back to front. Added to this unkind volte-face concerning the Jet-Wing, came cancellation c*f a recent order for 30 Northrop C-125 Raider assault-transports, leaving, however, an original batch of 23 for completion. (The Raider is the tri-motored military development of the earlier Pioneer cargo-cum-passenger trans- port with which Northrop had planned to challenge the com- mercial backwoods.) To soften the loss of all these valuable chess-pieces, the company has been awarded a new contract for 48 F-89 all-weather jet fighters, which restores its backlog to a large extent. As a matter of fact, the real loss is more a question of technical prestige rather than financial. BODY-LINE BOWLING "DERHAPS even more astonishing than the temporary set- Jt back to the Jet-Wing bomber are the body-line bowling tactics adopted by Convair in statements circulated to the national Press. Seldom has this writer come across a more flagrant example of misleading publicity or misplaced en- thusiasm by the professional blurb-artist. That the Convair "blurbist" has bowled a richochet back onto his own head it; shown by this typical newspaper comment from the Los Angeles Times:— " What's behind the big boom for the B-36? One hundred of the mammoth six-engined ships were ordered originally and there later followed a deal of criticism of the bomber as a ' big crock ' that would be shot down in a matter of minutes over enemy territory. And then for a time it looked like the B-36 programme would be cut way, way back. Then came the B-36B with 21,000 take-off h.p. instead of the original 18,000, and an Air Force announcement that the new version of the big bird would soon meet design maximum by lugging a 10,000 lb bomb load 10,000 miles. "Now the clincher. Northrop's contract for 30 Jet-Wing bombers was cancelled (along with a slash in North Ameri- can's light B-45 jet bomber) and Convair was given the nod for an undisclosed number of additional B-36's. Why? The question has the industry buzzing and there are several interesting ideas. '' In the so-called ' re-appraisal of military plane needs ' the Air Force may have found itself overspending or in danger of overspending. It may have decided, therefore, to build up the plane it feels it would need for global retalia- tion—just in case—and let other projects go by the board for the nonce. "Is there any immediate fear in this rush for conven- tional piston-engined heavies, even if they don't match jet speeds? We hope not—but it's an interesting speculation. In any case, it's a shame to see Jack Northrop's splendid Flying Wing go by the boards. And just as the jet version, the YB-49, was showing astounding performance. "And in this connection we'd like to go on record ;ic being a bit disgusted with the five-page telegram we received from Consolidated-Vultee comparing the B-36 with the B-49 '—the company that got the order slapping at the plant th&t lost out. It appeared to us to be a low blow below the body in an attempt to administer the coupe de grace to a rival. We must admit we don't feel all their subjective comparisons will hold up in the cold light of performance in place: of publicity. "The Convair hand-out brags, lor instance, that: 'Tire B-36 has a proved service ceiling exceeding 40,000ft with combat load,' and that 'the designed ceiling of the Flying Wing is only 30,000ft which, while capable of substantial improvement, still does not assure the same service ceiling proved by repeated flights of the B-36.' Our figures, based on official news releases, show that the B-49 has already ranged from 35,000 io 40,000ft while cruising! '' And then the charge that: ' On extremely short-range missions and with reduced bomb loads the Flying Wing was intended to be somewhat faster than the B-36. However, such limited-range advantage was offset by the B-36's proved superiority in altitude, range and bomb load.' Our book shows that on test flights of 9J hours the B-49 averaged just under 400 m.p.h., while when we were at Convair's Fort Worth plant we were told that the B-36 covered 8,000 miles in 35 hours, an average of about 230 m.p.h. The difference, we would say, is not accurately recorded by the word ' somewhat.' "Convair say, too, that; 'Engineering studies show that the B-36 would be less-costly to build, and with its greater size and striking power is more economical on the basis 01 tons of bombs delivered.' It has been our opinion that nearly any heavy airframe can be built for a fixed cost per lb weight. The B-49 is a comparatively simple structure with spanwise load distribution and no need for husky beef- ing up of cargo or load areas. Furthermore, it carries a useful load far exceeding its own weight empty; that is, 125,000 lb versus 88,000 lb (gross weight 213,000 lb). Can it not, therefore, be expected to deliver a given bomb load at a lower airframe cost than a conventional plane? " Returning to our own thoughts, one possible interpretation of this unfortunate example of Gamesmanship (in the Potter tradition) is that the Convair bowler is aiming at the wrong wicket, for he seems to have confused, either ignorantly "or deliberately, the piston-engined B-35 "Flying Wing" with the B-49 "Jet-Wing." The B-35 was originally planned as a medium-range heavy bomber with a normal design gross weight of 165,000 lb, with potential possibilities as a long-range strategic bomber in much the same class as the B-36 when developed up to the intended overload condition around 220,000 1b. Such a comparison to-day, however, is largely academic in view of the recurrent airscrew problems of the B-35 and the present outstanding performance of the YB-49 jet bomber at a gross weight of 213,000 lb. Our American friends are rightly noted and admired for their cliaracteristic enterprise on the grand scale and for doing things in a really big way, but it is just possible that in back- ing the biggest piston-engined bomber in the world they are also making the biggest blunder of the jet transition era. We shall have more to say on this thesis in our next contribution, for it may well be that British bomber policy can profit from the mistakes as well as the success of the Americans in their search for the best long-range offensive weapon. Because, in England, all our top-grade eggs are now in the turbine basket, it behoves us to concentrate on the right kind of basket to get them to market. ,, (To be concluded) JETS TO RUSSIA "DEPLYING to a question by Mr. Donner, M.P. for Basiiig- -tv stoke, on February 21st, the Minister of Supply, Mr. G. R. Strauss, gave an assurance that no type of British; turbojet would be sold to Russia, or to any other country in Eastern Europe. Mr. Donner had requested an undertaking that, in view of the sale of Nene is and Derwent 5s to the U.S.S.R., the Goblin 2, Goblin 4, Ghost, Avon and Tay turbojets would in no circumstances be sold to Russia or her satellites. The export of gas turbines to Russia took place during 1947^ and has since given rise to considerable criticism. Mr. Strauss^ stated that 25 Nenes and 30 Denvents were sold. It was' officially explained, last December, that refusal of a licence" would have been contrary to export policy at the time.
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