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Aviation History
1949
1949 - 1243.PDF
JULY JTH, 1949 FLIGHT Foil" Completed interest were»attacks on B-29 formations, which had been encountered several times, usually at heights below 20,000ft. Several ot the U.S. pilots had prac- tised interception on Superforts in American trials, and favoured near head-on attacks—from ten o'clock or two o'clock—as the safest and most certain way of making lethal contact. Direction to correct alti- tude at a distance of 15 to 20 miles ahead of the target is almost essential for this method, which allows very little time for sighting and firing, but is the best defence against the bomber's guns. From a selection of films exposed during the pre- vious day's combat came proof of the vigour with which the fighters had attacked. The majority of the approaches to B-29 or Wellington formations— seen to have been made from slightly below the bombers' "five, six or seven o'clock " viewpoints— showed excellent,judgment of distance and deflec- tion, although some were perhaps a little too slow. Despite the far higher relative speed, head-on attacks also appeared to have been very capably accomplished. R. J. B. NIGHT DEFENCES Refuelling Gloster Meteor 4s of the visiting Royal Netherlands fighter squadronat Thorney Island. MAXIMUM station resources were put into the air fromWest Mailing, Kent, at the height of the attack on Saturday night. Just before and after midnight the residentnight-fighter squadrons scrambled Mosquitoes in pairs every ten minutes or so until the entire strength was airborne andunder sector control. Until the aircraft had returned, how- ever, it was impossible to discover how, from where or withwhat aircraft the raid was developing. At a general briefing at 2200 hr the weather forecast pro-mised a clear night with about three-eighths cirrus at 26,000ft, freezing level 13,000ft and no icing. It was thought thatsome patchy stratus at low level might affect the coast of East Anglia, so a met-reconnaissance Mosquito was sent offat 2200 while four other aircraft took off for a routine patrol. The met. aircraft returned to report no low cloud, and within12 minutes that machine had again become an offensive weapon, at scramble readiness. The ground crews consisted almost entirely of - NationalService men and their keenness in rearming and refuelling accounted for quick turn-round throughout the night. Tothem, as much as to the others taking part, the exercise repre- sented justification for their months of training and theroutine work of a peacetime R.A.F. station. It was impossible to determine average time for scrambling but, of the severalpairs we timed, aircraft were taxying out about 3J min after receiving the order and were actually airborne within sixminutes. Again the National Servicemen played a very impor- tant part in their despatch. From 2200 hr four aircraft were kept at readiness to scrambleand four others stood by at fifteen minutes' notice. The remainder were called to readiness as required. There waslittle else to do but wait for developments and—but for a brief indication from control that some early aircraft had beenpicked up by night fighter patrols, thought to indicate a raid building-up over the Frisian Islands—we were left completelyin the dark. Presently, as if good enemy intelligence had been at work, intruders appeared over the airfield just as thetwo routine patrols were making ready to take-off at 2300 hr. Several low-level runs were made by what we estimated to besome four or five enemy aircraft. That brief attack also relieved the monotony for members of the Anti-AircraftCommand, whose guns around the airfield and throughout the immediate neighbourhood were fully manned. At 2340 hrthere was every indication of a major raid developing—it was, in tact, the attack described in "Lincoln Night Out" on theprevious page. Two aircraft were scrambled at 2340 hr and within half an hour after midnight, as already mentioned,the whole station strength was airborne. Aircraft from the first routine patrols reported no contacts or directions fortheir first two hours, but from then onwards a number of highly successful interceptions were made, in spite of liberaluse of Window by the bombers. Each fighter was limited to three kills, after which it wasto return to base. The basis of claims was that both bomber and fighter should flash a light as soon as they saw an oppos-ing aircraft, and the aircraft which flashed first was entitled to claim a kill. Claims could be checked, since each bomberpilot was required to acknowledge with his individual code letter as soon as a lighter was seen to fire, and each fighterpilot in his subsequent report was required to give the letter flashed by each bomber attacked and the time and positionof the kill. The bomber pilot had also to give his position at that time, so that the two could be reconciled and theeffectiveness of attacks assessed. One aircraft was vectored on to about 12 Mosquitoes of aPathfinder force, one of which he chased and attacked over the Ipswich area. The pilot returned to his patrol line andmet the main bomber force at about 18,oooft; he "shot down" a Lincoln and a Lancaster and, having made his threekills, returned to base. Another typical report was made by the Wing Commander Flying, who intercepted three airciaft,two over the North Sea and one over the coast. The weather, he said, was perfect for interception and definite visual identi-fication was possible at about 800ft range. It appeared to be the general rule, however, to close right in and make certainvisual identification at about 300ft. Other night-fighter pilots reported perfect interception from patrols at some 20,000ftand nearly all were vectored on to a large bomber stream which they followed across London, shooting, homing, iden-tifying and claiming kills as they went. R. P. R.AFX.A.F. BACK IN FIGHTER COMMAND ON Sunday, July 3rd, the Secretary of State for Air an-nounced at a conference upon the conclusion of Exercise Foil that arrangements are in hand to transfer squadrons of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force back from Reserve Command to their original parent body, Fighter Command. Air Marshal Sir Basil Embry. A.O.C.-in-C, Fighter Command, stated at the same time that nothing could please him more. The reason given for the change was that the Auxiliary •squadrons could more readily be placed where they would be needed for front-line defence in time of war. The status of the squadrons would, however, not be changed, nor was there any intention that they should in any way lose the time- rs 1 honoured identity with their individual counties and cities.The news of this new operational status for the R.Aux.A.F. is, incidentally, of interest in connection with the announce-ment—also received as we go to press—of certain details of the R.Aux.A.F. race which, as one of the National Air Races,lakes place at Elmdon on Sunday, July 31st. One aircraft from each of the six hitherto-existing Reserve Groups, plusR.A.F. Northern Ireland, will compete for a bronze trophy presented by W/C. G. Cooper, M.P. for Middlesbrough West.Meteors, Vampires and Spitfires will take part, flying with all operational equipment except ammunition. Competingaircraft will cover four laps.
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