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Aviation History
1950
1950 - 0746.PDF
484 FLIGHT, 20 April 1930 LESSONS of "PLAINFARE A. Cdre Merer's R.Ae.S. Lecture on the Berlin Air Lift rr A PAPER entitled The Berlin An Lift was read beforethe Royal Aeronautical Society on April 13th, byA. Cdre. J. W. F. Merer, C.B., who, during the period of the Lift, was A.O.C. No. 46 (Transport) Group, B.A.F.O., and Deputy Commander of the Anglo-American Combined Air Lift Task Force. For his services he was appointed a C.B. in the 1949 Birthday Honours. A. Cdre. Merer, who began to specialize in navigation early in his career, is at present Director of Navigation and Control at the Air Ministry. The original lecture sets out in detail the origin and evo- lution of the Air Lift and the organization and utilization of the forces employed in it. Below we present a digest of A. Cdre. Merer s comments on the operational problems set up by the largest air-transport task ever undertaken. Although formed from a military standpoint, his views on such important questions as high-density traffic-control will be read with interest by Service and civil authorities alike. Outlining plans made early in 1949 for establishing the Air Lift on a long-term basis, A. Cdre. Merer revealed that pro- vision was made for re-equipping Dakota squadrons with Hastings. In addition, work began on extending the six exist- ing airfields in the British zone to enable them to operate up to Go four-engined aircraft each and to prepare a seventh to the same standard. Construction of a third runway at Gatow was also begun. By July, however, the re-opening of surface com- munications between Berlin and the Western zones permitted the beginning of a progressive scaling-down of the British effort. The diversity of types of British aircraft employed added to the R.A.F. s difficulties. In effect, the U.S.A.F. operated only one type, the Skymaster, and carried mainly standard loads of coal; consequently their utilization rate was considerably higher Experience gained with operation of the Freighter and Wayiarer had greatly emphasized the advantage of end- door unloading for intensive freight-carrying operations; load- ing was easier, and the aircraft required a smaller area of hard standing. The use of side-doors required additional space to enable the load-delivering vehicles to approach the aircraft, and the risk of damage, particularly at night, was increased. For ease of loading, the author concluded, an air craft's doors should be as large as possible, and its floor should be horizontal in the loading attitude. Corridor-despatch Systems It was recalled that, by Four-Power agreement, air traffic between Berlin and the Western zones was confined within three corridors, each 20 miles wide, and extending from ground level to 10,000ft. Tl.e three points of entry to the Western zones, and their respective distances from Berlin, were Ham- burg (95 miles), Hanover (117 miles), and Frankfurt (216 miles). No radio or radar navigational aids were available within Russian-occupied territory. When it became necessary for American and British aircialt to use a common corridor, diSerences in navigational tech- nique necessitated modification of the original system of "continuous despatch." The R.A.F. aircraft carried a navi- gator and were equipped to use Gee and M.F. beacons, where as the Skymasters carried no navigator and relied on radio ranges, M.F. beacons and visual-aural ranges. To maintain a continuous flow, therefore, a " time-block " despatch system was devised by which each base was allocated blocks of time over Frohnau. As the C-54 was the heaviest load-carrier, the block was fixed at four, hours—the time taken for a complete C-54 sortie, including unloading in Berlin, loading and refuel- ling at base—to ensure maximum utilization. However, dif- ficulties arose in servicing, loading and turning round the British aircraft with their varying performances and loads; a two-hour block was therefore substituted and finally an hourly despatch system was adopted. The lesson to be derived, said A. Cdre. Merer, was that if circumstances prevented the adoption of continuous despatch —the most efficient system—and the "time-block" system was employed as an alternative, the frequency of the block cycle and the number of aircraft in each block required very careful consideration. Experience gained with G.C.A. landings emphasized trip necessity for two parallel runways, one for take-off and one for landing, at the terminal airfields. A third runway was, in fact,required to allow for the repair and maintenance of one run- way. Traffic control in the Berlin area had presented a complexsituation which ruled out any form of holding or stacking as dangerous and unacceptable. A traffic system was thereforedeveloped by which aircraft checked over the beacons at the Berlin end of the northern and southern corridors, andlet-down on a timed approach pattern. Air-speed, rate of descent and the height over certain points o£ the .pattern werelaid down in the standard flight procedures. Where necessi- tated by the proximity of two traffic streams, turning-pointsin the pattern were marked by radio and radar beacons—as, for example, the point at which Gatow traffic turn from base-leg to finals for landing in an east-west direction. G.CJA. wasemployed for approach and let-down in instrument flight con- ditions, but B.A.B.S. was also installed at both Gatow andTegel tor use by the British aircraft. Gatow traffic-pattern The routine lor Gatow traffic was that each aircraft called approach control—manned by a team of three watch-keeping officers, an approach controller, an airfield controller and a supervisor—20 miles short of Frohnau beacon, and was in- structed to adjust its height to 3,500ft over the beacon. It was then given a runway touch-down time and checked through the various stages in the traffic pattern to the point where it was handed over to the airfield controller or, in instrument flight conditions, to the G.C.A. final controller. Aircraft unabk- to land at their first attempt were not allowed to re-enter the approach pattern, but were required to over-fly the airfield and return to base, except in emergency. One of the major difficulties experienced was the inadequate number of R.T. frequencies in the aircraft. The Berlin approach procedure had necessitated 12 separate frequencies. Some aircraft carried eight frequencies, and the remainder four; a compromise had, therefore, to be adopted in which one frequency could be used for two functions. The pressure of work on air traffic control staffs created its own problems, and responsibility for marshalling of air- craft and the control of M.T. in the loading areas was, at Gatow, delegated to "tarmac officers." Under their super- vision, teams of marshallers, or, alternatively, "lead-in" vehicles, conducted the aircraft to and from their allotted apron position. Discussing the effects of weather. A. Cdre. Merer mentioned that little interference was experienced from snow and ice on the runways, and the measures prepared for dealing with these problems could not be seriously tested. There was, however, severe interference from fog, although flying was continued down to weather minima of 800 yards horizontal visibility and 200ft cloud ceiling. The British aircraft, with their con- ventional tail-wheel undercarriages, were severely handicapped by cross-winds, particularly as the runways at Gatow, Tegel. Fuhlsbuttel and Lubeck were sited in one direction only. The C-54S, with their nosewheel undercarriages, showed a big advantage, not only for cross-wind operation but also in their increased manoeuvrability on the ground, and for added directional control on take-off and landing. Size and Economy One of the most striking object lessons o! the Air Lift was the advantage of economy in operation of the heavy load carriers. The C-54 or the Hastings presented no greater prob- lem than the Dakota in operating along the corridors into Berlin or in loading and unloading, but the load delivered by the Dakotas was approximately one-third that of the others. This disproportion in the load carried was not reflected in the "overheads" in aircrew or servicing personnel, as shown in the following figures for a task of delivering 4,500 tons per day to Berlin for 30 days. No. of Maintenance Fuel Used Trips Crews Aircraft Personnel Gallons) C-54 13,800 465 178 4,674 8,577.600 Dakota 39,706 1,765 889 10,588 14,294,000 These figures, supplied by the U.S.A.F. on experience gained on the Frankfurt corridor, were based on the assumption that payloads of the Dakota and C-54 were, respectively, 3-4 and 9.7 tons, and the maximum flying hours for the crew were 90 per month. At the peak period of the Lift, the British
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