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Aviation History
1950
1950 - 1595.PDF
FLIGHT, 24 August 1950 823 ELEPHANTASIA . ... venated or resurrected air forces, such as those of Belgium and Italy, are certainly 100 per cent different from then- war footing. And, be it remembered, to the purely Russian total must be added the output of vassal states such as Czechoslova- kia. Hence, we can see the point—made with due caution as to the absence of adequate figures—by Sir Richard Fairey in the recent Wilbur Wright lecture, that Com- munist-dominated output " is in the order of at least 25,000 and possibly 40,000 per annum." (Mr. Asher Lee gives the higher figure: but his book has been severely criticized by recognized experts for numerous technical mistakes. He could rapidly dispel some of the criticism by stating bis sources of information ; and since, from a Russian stan- dard, he must be on the spot anyway, it is difficult to see why he does not do more to substantiate his case.) How to explain this enormous peace-time production? Two possible clues exist: one German, one American. The German clue concerns the staff officer who attributed the failure of the attack on Russia in 1941 to a staff mistake —the staff calculated that one German could account for 14 Russians, but actually 17J Russians faced each German in battle. Hence the advantage of numbers—already demonstrated in Korea. Likewise, when the capture of Okinawa was being planned, the logistics experts were asked how many men were needed. Told that there were 80,000 Japs on the island, the Yanks blandly replied they needed 240,001 men to be sure of taking it, thus improving on Napoleon's dictum that the art of War is to have two men where the enemy has one. The fact .is that from the window in Moscow the war would have to be fought not on two fronts (as was the German mistake twice over) but on innumerable fronts with utterly diverse conditions. Hence, an Arctic Air Force, a Temperate Air Force and a Tropical Air Force would divide the effective annual production for any one set of conditions by at least three and possibly six (for example, there might at one time be two tropical air wars, one in the Near East and one in the Far East, Southern Sector). And, on that count, it is clear that 40,000 air- craft a year is nothing like enough to give overwhelming air superiority in quantity—let alone quality. Indeed, we may venture to remind Soviet staff officers in Moscow of a comment made in the German Official His- tory of the War 1914-18; it referred to the " utter impos- sibility" of keeping pace with British aircraft produc- tion in war. That statement would have been even more true of American production in 1942-5, and the only thing for every citizen to do now is to ensure that peace produc- tion does not fall so low that the threat of war becomes possible—and, by a snowball effect, war itself feasible. A 16.000-ft DELAYED DROP TLE advent of very high-speed, high-altitude flight hasproduced more than one problem for the parachutedesigner. If a man bales out at 40,000ft and opens his parachute almost immediately he faces the danger of a long descent in frigid, rarefied air. On the other hand, a long delayed-drop to a reasonably safe altitude might cause uncon- sciousness. Some simple form of automatic parachute-opening obviously seems desirable, even essential. Development of such a device has been continued in several quarters for some years, but the Irving Airchute of Great Britain, Ltd., has probably amassed the greatest practical experience with a barometric automatic parachute-release. Results have been published of a " live " test made on July 31st with the Irving Altimeter Parachute Release Mk 2, in confirmation of data obtained in pressure-chamber experiments at Farnborough. A live body was employed (states the Irving All set: Maj. Willans carried altimeter, stop-watch, two para- chutes and oxygen supply. The barometric release is under his right shoulder. report) to provide a simple and reliable record of operating altitude and to improve the chances of recovering the mechanism for examination if it failed. Major T. W. ("Dumbo") Willans was the experienced "live body" selected to test the Mk 2. (An account of his descent with the larger, heavier Mk 1 automatic release appeared in Flight of November 17th, 1949.) He jumped at 25,000ft over Netheravou from a Lockheed Lodestar, which had climbed to that height in 25 minutes. The pilot and co-pilot were, respectively, Mr. J. Hartzog and Mr. Leslie Irvin; Mr. J. Hatfield, who designed the equipment, acted as observer, made final adjustments to the release and superintended despatching and aiming—by means of a radio compass tuned to a radio beacon. Maj. Willans made his exit with a stop watch strapped to the palm of his left hand, which was held close to the eyes, just above the observer-type reserve parachute. His right hand clasped the left wrist. He fell for the first 15-20 seconds in a constantly changing attitude, and then achieved a back-down position by movement of the legs. Without moving his hands, he was unable to check a clockwise spinning motion—and con- sequently found it difficult to judge height, as the fields appeared blurred. ("I found it more comfortable," reported Maj. Willans, "to look at the watch.") After a fall of approximately 71 seconds, the automatic release "clicked" and the canopy blossomed out almost immediately. In the event of failure, the parachutist had planned to pull the rip-cord by manual over-ride after 90 seconds. Having checked that his height was less than 9,000ft, he removed his oxygen-mask to allay a feeling of sickness. The test ended well with a comfortable landing on grass. Slimming up the experience Maj. Willans offered the follow- ing conclusions: (1) the altimeter release operated satisfac- torily, and within approximately one second of the estimated time; (2) the parachute developed safely, having been auto- matically released with the body spinning and in probably the least favourable position; (3) opening shock of 28-ft canopy developing at 10,000ft at terminal velocity is not necessarily particularly violent; (4) goggles, which were anti-dimmed inside and out, did not mist during fall; (5) clothing worn was probably unnecessarily heavy; (6) thin leather gloves were adequate protection against cold, and did not restrict move- ment of fingers; (7) oxygen mask remained in position during free fall and parachute development; (8) oxygen supply was adequate; (9) parachutist was not so tired physically after jump from 25,000ft with oxygen, as after the previous jump with Mk. 1 release from 15,000ft without oxygen; (10) the free fall, while waiting for the automatic release to operate, was more pleasant than the second part of the descent. Should the parachutist bale out below the height set for baro- metric opening, the pack is, nevertheless, automatically opened after a pre-set delay of a few seconds. V - \ ,:•%
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