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Aviation History
1951
1951 - 0170.PDF
110 FLIGHT, 25 January 1951 FIGHTER ARMAMENT ... will most certainly not supersede shells or small independentrockets; it is even open to doubt if it at present constitutes a useful means of supplementing existing arrangements of inter-cepter armament. Similar criticisms would seem to apply to the use of guidedmissiles as anti-aircraft defence from the ground. Although General Sir Frederick Pile, in his book Ack-Ack, states categori-cally : " We should once and for all write off the fighter as a means 6f defence," it would be wise, to beware of similar sweep-ing statements, for the next two or three decades at least. For technical reasons alone, " push-button warfare " with controlledprojectiles is still a long way off; for the present, the manned intercepter, i.e., the flying gunner, must remain pre-eminent.Moreover, as the invader has now to be met long before he reaches this country, the distances and areas involved are toogreat to be covered by anything other than the human element, assisted by the best detection and destruction devices that maybe available. It is this human-element air defence which, as in 1940, willbreak the strong arm of the enemy. During the dark hours of greatest danger, early in June, 1940, Mr. Churchill wrote (toField Marshal Smuts): " I see only one way through, to wit, that Hitler should attack this country, and in so doing breakhis air weapon." At that time the R.A.F. had but 25 fighter squadrons left, and with very little if any technical superiorityover the German. It was the human element which decided the issue! It would, therefore, be most unwise to place too much relianceon guided missiles as far as total air defence is concerned. Recent assurances given by Ministers of the Crown* should, hence,be viewed with caution. Also, responsible and well-informed American research workers have recently claimed publicly thatthe present state of Allied technique in guided missiles has not even reached the level the Germans had attained at the time ofsurrender. Guided air-to-air missiles might permit defensive attack overfairly long ranges—five miles is a figure occasionally suggested; two miles is doubtless achievable, provided that the missiles arefast and manoeuvrable enough in the supersonic sense. They might thus compel enemy formations to break up. But thereal question is whether formations of large enemy bombers are likely in future, and if any breaking-up of formations would besufficient to frustrate their mission. Total air defence implies absolute destruction of the attacking force, and not merely apercentage of losses! Possible Alternatives.—Guided missiles for air combat neednot, of course, necessarily be rockets; ramjet propulsion, indeed, offers better prospects at the altitudes now operationally en-visaged. Taking a longer view, there is reason to believe that the small supersonic air-combat rocket might well be supersededby a rocket-cutn-ramjet combination. Also, ramjet-propelled projectiles fired from low-velocity gunsor mortars, and using a solid-fuel composition, may be com- pletely practical for air-combat of the future. This might becomethe final solution of the problem of the large-bore, rapid-firing intercepter gun. There is no reason why drawbacks connectedwith dispersion cannot be overcome. In comparison with the rocket, a weapon having ramjet propulsion might even bepreferable from this point of view, because stable combustion is more easily effected. * E.g. the announcement in the House of Commons made on March 2lst, 1950, by the Secretary of State for Air. Conclusions.—The views put forward in this series of articlesmay, it is felt, be summed-up as follows: — (1) Since the earliest days of air-fighting, armament develop-ment has always lagged behind. This state of affairs persists to- day. (2) Intimate co-operation of the armament expert with theaircraft designer is a necessity: the armament and its charac- teristics define the design of a modern intercepter aircraft, whichis basically nothing but a carrier of the chosen weapon or weapons and the gunner. (3) There is cause for anxiety as to whether, in fighter-arma-ment development, enough is being done to remedy the existing inferiority in equipment. In the event of a future major con-flict, the use of inadequately armed fighter aircraft would prove disastrous for the nation. (4) Certain promising German armament developments, whichcould have been had for the asking, "I• i • i___n_nj 1j.ii»iil mil HI ITT^'disregarded, and for non-techr' A=Air entry B=Non-re Suggested design for (5) Shell-firing guns of substantially larger calibre, hitherto installed in British iin i iTl Hiihi will hi |"i n li il for intercepters; small, simple^sufwSUBic rocket or ramjet missiles, on the other hajjd^Jwrre-"promising possibilities. (6) Automatic computing, ranging, and triggering are a neces- sity. (7) To rely on guided missiles, in lieu of a multitude of aimed small projectiles launched in quick succession or simultaneously, will lead to grave disappointment. (8) There is cause for an impartial enquiry into the position of intercepter armament, and into the policy guiding its future development. Greater emphasis should be laid upon research which relies on established facts and not on opinions or pre- judices. Also, the methods employed to collect and to evaluate scientific intelligence may need overhaul. (9) It is obvious that conventional methods of developing intercepter armament are inadequate so far as this country is concerned; much benefit could be derived from a close study of the former German efforts in this field. Unsponsored and un- fettered air-armament development work ought to be encouraged and acknowledged, and special rewards and/or licence fees should be paid for successful work of this kind. In no circumstances and on no pretexts should armament research and design con- tinue to be fettered, restricted or suppressed; it should, wherever possible, be promoted, even in cases where competition with Government establishments cannot be avoided. (10) Those actually working on research or development in Government establishments should be given more freedom to solve the problems postulated by operational requirements; and the chiefs of such departments should not be reduced to the status of minor executives largely subordinated to Ministerial control. Scientists and engineers on Government work should be adequately paid, selected on the basis of competence and amply rewarded for successful achievements. The administration ought to encourage their initiative and resist attempts, from any quarter, to interfere with it. THE WEB OF HISTORY " The Royal Air Force in the World War," Volume IV, 1940- 45. By Capt. Norman Macmillan. George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., High Holborn, London, W.C.I. Illustrated. 15s.I F you have read the three preceding volumes of Capt. Norman Macmillan's history of the R.A.F. in World War II it will not be necessary to recommend this fourth and last volume. Like them, it is crammed full of first-class stories, facts and figures covering every aspect of the R.A.F.'s achievements in Europe and the Far East from 1940 to 1945. If you have not read the earlier volumes, that is no reason why you should not buy this one, for it is completely self-contained and in many respects the most interesting of the series. Here one can read again of the epic highlights of the air war —Guy Gibson's dam-busting raid, the Bismarck episode, Arn- hem, the arrival of Rudolf Hess, defence against the flying bombs, and so on. But modern campaigns are seldom won by a few outstanding actions, and Capt. Macmillan has ably portrayed the slow, grim war of attrition which made up the other side of the picture. He tells of gallant exploits that earned 32 V.C.s for R.A.F. officers and airmen; but he also recalls the day-to-day, dull, monotonous duties of the humble "erks," nursing services and Royal Observer Corps; the endless but vital sea patrols carried out by Coastal Command; behind-the-scenes research by Intelligence teams and "back-room boys." All these formed essential contributions to victory. Nor is this a mere chronological catalogue of stories, for Capt. Macmillan has attempted to analyse both successes and defeats impartially and objectively. He shows, for example, how the root cause of British defeat in Malaya by the Japs arose from policy decisions made in 1927, and how failure of the Arnhem operation allowed the Russians to reach Berlin first and thus sowed the seeds of post-war problems. He explains why we could not sink the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at Brest, and how they were able to slip through the Channel to safety. Such analysis is more valuable than the mere recording of history, for, provided that past errors are frankly faced, their lessons heeded and applied, they can be more valuable for the future than many successes. J. W. R. T.
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