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Aviation History
1951
1951 - 1994.PDF
and AIRCRAFT ENGINEER First Aeronautical Weekly in the World Founded 1909 No. 2228 Vol. LX. FRIDAY, 5 OCTOBER 1951 EDITOR MAURICE A. SMITH, D.F.C. ASSISTANT EDITOR H. F. KING, M.B.E. TECHNICAL EDITOR C. B. BAILEY-WATSON, B.A. ART ED/TOR JOHN YOXALL Editorial, Advertising and Publishing Offices: DORSET HOUSE, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E.1. Telegrams, Flightpres, Sedist, London. Telephone, Waterloo 3333 (60 lines). Branch Offices: COVENTRY 8-10, Corporation Street. Telegrams, Autocar, Coventry. Telephone, Coventry 5210. BIRMINGHAM, 2 King Edward House, New Street. Telegrams, Autopress, Birmingham. Telephone, Midland 7191 (7 lines). MANCHESTER, 3 , ... ... ,...-.,.«.; 260, Deangate. ~-1" Telegrams, Iliffe, Manchester. Telephone, blackfriars 4412 (3 lines). Deansgate 3595 (2 lines). GLASGOW, C.2. ^ • I 26b, Renfield Street. Telegrams, Iliffe, Glasgow. Telephone, Central 1265 (2 lines). SUBSCRIPTION RATES Home and Overseas: Twelve months " 3s. Od. U.S.A. and Canada, $10.00 BY AIR: To Canada and U.S.A., six months, $16. IN THIS ISSUE: "Cirrus" and "Pinnacle" 440 Not-so-dark Africa - - 446 The Earth Satellite Vehicle 449 The Throttle Benders - 450 The Vampire's Lair - - 453 hawker P.1067 - - - 454 fygni)' Pantechnicon - 456 Bu'lt-:n Safety .... 462 Fire-PowerO VER the years this journal has made a particular point of keeping track of air- armament development, in the knowledge that a fighting aircraft is only as good as its weapons. Whenever it has seemed timely we have drawn attention to shortcomings and failures in this regard and, when we have considered it to be merited, have accorded recognition to new developments. Thus, in late years we have expressed concern that over-long retention of the4 x 20nun- gun formula for our fighters might bring about a situation similar to that obtaining after the Kaiser's War, when air armament was completely outstripped by airframe and engine design. On the other hand, we have occasionally (but, be it said, all too rarely) been able to applaud British innovations, notably the eight-gun Hurricane/Spitfire formula, though even at the time of that particular departure it was evident that this "whiplash" solution could not endure in face of armour. Now, with very advanced types of fighters in pro- duction or under development for the R.A.F. and Naval Aviation, attention is again directed to the all-important weapons with which these machines must be provided. The successes of U.S.A.F. Sabres (six 0.5m guns) against the heavy-cannon-armed Mig-i5s over Korea are not, it seems, attributable to any superiority in weapons or aircraft performance, but to the excellence of the American gun-sight and to the very high standard of pilot-training. Lately resuscitated arguments between protagonists of the "six 50s" formula and those who—like the R.A.F. and the U.S. Navy—have favoured an armament of four 20 mm guns, are, therefore, only of academic interest. What the protagonists too frequently forget is that the Mig, like other fighters of its class, is a relatively easy proposition for existing guns—assuming, of course, that these weapons can be brought to bear. Britain's new intercepters, we would remind them, are not primarily intended to "dog fight" with their opposite numbers but to knock large, well- protected bombers clean out of the sky before these can attain their targets. Pending the introduction of air-to-air guided missiles, therefore, we must look (as did the Germans, towards the end of the war) to guns of heavier calibre than ^in and 20 mm. It would be disappointing, in fact, if, in terms of destructive power, Britain's new fighters did not prove to be as great an advance on the Meteor and Vampire as were the Hurricane and Spitfire on the Gladiator. In the absence of any official intimation of new fighter armament we can only remark that the four extra-large gun ports on the Supermarine 508 made one of the most reassur- ing sights at Farnborough. The Aim In EuropeT HE chief tactical problem facing the Allied powers in Europe can be stated very simply: it is to resist and contain any aggression. The only aggression which is foreseen as a possibility—if not, as some feel, a probability—is, of course, expected to come from over the ferrous wall and the territorial planning task facing the Allied powers is therefore clear-cut. By far the greatest single element of the air problem is inter-Allied liaison and integra- tion—larger, perhaps, than the matter of obtaining the best aircraft in the shortest time. In practical fact, the essential raison d'etre of the recently concluded air exercises (their forerunners and, no doubt, those still to come) has been to refine the whole machinery of Allied air power in Europe in order finally to achieve a fully integrated entity. To achieve, that is to say, a single air force composed of several national elements all of which are happily and efficiently submerged in a corporate whole. The integration process has been steadily furthered during the past two or three years, and the results of the trials, irritations and distractions which plagued the earlier days are now beginning to appear as dividends. The system can today be regarded as having been firmly established : there remain the predominantly logistic problems of supply —not only of the most modern aircraft, but of the latest radar, guns, radio, rockets and all the myriad things without the support of which the finest flying machine is useless as a fighting medium.
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