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Aviation History
1951
1951 - 2143.PDF
532 does not show. Ironically enough^ftm*time the very people* who were lined up against us then are now at least sym- pathetically on our side, and the nation that was on our side last time is pushing trouble for us all over the world. It wag against this insane background that our Government had to plan. How could we buy enough of the right weapons to protect us without bankrupting the country and destroying the very forms we are fighting to preserve ? How could we get enough arms to protect us soon enough without invoking controls ? And if we had controls, how could we avoid a life of scarcity ? And if we had a life of scarcity, where would it all end ? Finally, and most important of all, should we work out a national defence plan along the lines of "Fortress America," or "Troops for Europe," or "Asia First" ? "Not willing to act too quickly and not able to wait inde- finitely for our planners, the nation nevertheless had to take positive action, and there emerged back in the autumn of 1950 the pattern of our air programme today. A middle ground prevailed. The architects of the plan proposed the ' authorization of a 70-group air force, patterned largely after the Troops-for-Europe plan, but with certain diversifying elements. The acceleration was to be moderate but unmis- takably potent. It was, generally, to treble the rate of output in a little over two years; and it was to be done on a 40-hour week. Above all, it was to be laid on top of the output of civilian goods rather than taking precedence over it. WHAT PRICE AIR POWER? WE make no apologies for reproducing in these pagesthe greater portion of the address given by Robert E. Gross, before the American Bankers' Association in Chicago onOctober 2nd. Mr. Gross is president of the Lockheed Air- craft Corporation and is, tnerefore, a man whose publicstatements, especially on so serious a topic as air power, are not to be treated lightly. In the event, Mr. Gross's talkon this particular occasion was of outstanding interest, for it summarized brilliantly not only the present state andintentions of U.S. air power, but also explained lucidly the enormous differences between aircraft as they were inthe last war and as they are today, and gave the back- ground against which the present effort should be judged. HEN, in June last year, the 38th Parallel suddenly became world news, the American aviation industry was plodding along at a fairly steady rate of produc- tion—indifferent though the totals were. The monthly pro- duction of the entire industry, both for the Air Force and for the Navy, was only 200 or 300 aircraft per month. Suddenly the President called for an immediate increase in the number of planes to be built and also asked that the air industry be given make-ready contracts which could ultimately produce 50,000 planes per year. It was strongly reminiscent of that same clarion call that went out from President Roosevelt in the spring of 1940, when he, too, called for 50,000 planes and the industry confidently responded. "This time industry was older, wiser, and it knew the pit- falls. Notwithstanding this, it took the government at its word and with the same determination it showed before. It started in all over again; soon, industry leaders were travelling to Washington for direction. A few orders were placed by the Government but, after some weeks, one thing became patently clear; industry could move faster and more positively than government. Finally, one thing shone through like a light: the call of 1940 was one thing, issued under clear, straightforward circumstances; the call of 1950 was something very different. "In the first place, in 1940 the machines were clear-cut; we knew who our enemy was; there was no doubt about it. Germany was on the march in Europe and Japan soon attacked us frcm the east. The lines were formed quickly; everybody was friend or foe. There was no question of asking whether beef, gasoline had to be rationed. We were at war. "Today all this is different. We are neither at war, full out, nor at peace, full out. We have some stout and declared allies who are ready to stand and to be counted. But the real enemy Some Facts and Figures on United States Air Rearmament, by Lockheed's President: A New- Civil Aircraft and a New Concept of Flight The heading picture shows F-84E Thunderjets on the assembly line at the Farmingdale plant of Republic Aviation. Tie factory is now turning over to swept-wing F-84F production. On the opposite page are seen "cococned" B-29s at Davis-Monthan Field, Tucson. "With the make-ready phase not quite over, we are already steepening the acceleration to equip a 95-group air force with mostly new planes in 1952. Our air force has already activated 87 groups* but this has been done only by using many old planes. This is a long way from the 243 groups we had in World War II, or the 96,000 planes the aircraft industry built in the one year, 1944. "The next questions are obvious: what is this new air force costing, and why does it cost so much? Why all these billions for an air force less than half as big as that which we had in the last war ? Well, as for cost, the currently proposed national budget calls for defence expenditure of around 56 billion dollars. About 20 billion of that will go to the air force. The air force in turn will spend more than 11 billion of its money on air equipment. The Navy will spend over four billion on aviation. Altogether, a total of 15I billion dollars on military procurement for air. Out of every defence dollar earmarked for military procurement 48 cents—almost half- is going to the aircraft industry. "Now the reasons aircraft cost so much more today than e^er before are three: first, all our normal elements of cost are up; second, today's aircraft is different, it is heavier, faster and much more complex; third, we practically stopped building aircraft in 1945, 1946 and 1947. "Ten or fifteen years ago the accent in design of a military aircraft was placed on the airframe, the engine and the pro- peller. They were the big three items and they represented close to 85-90 per cent of the aircraft. They also represemea 85-90 per cent of the cost of the finished fighting weapon. Less than 10-15 Per cent of money and effort was spent on the rest of the plane. A patrol bomber built early in wort" War II was loaded with 103 lb of instrumentation; but to- day's counterpart has 582 lb. A particular plane produce.; in
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