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Aviation History
1952
1952 - 1894.PDF
42 FLIGHT, II July 1952 RAPIER — not BLUDGEON . . . What a contrast the Rapier technique presents ! A few extremely high-speed luxury aircraft on each mission—fast enough to make interception and useful pursuit unrewarding; the element of surprise to make the attack relatively easy; a few well-placed bombs to do the damage; and then speed to bring the aircraft home with the minimum of casualties. Then, too, it would be comparatively easy to maintain a good reserve of crews in peacetime, ready to fill the vacancies until trainees have passed through a small, efficient, well-oiled training machine. "CIRST it is necessary to consider what is the implication of the *- statement that "The bomber is a rapier and not a bludgeon." The inference is that a bomber force is a precision weapon, that desirable bomber operations involve only small forces, and hence that raids, as executed in the Second World War, should not be considered for the future. Let us therefore examine the history of air bombardment, noting particularly the results achieved in the last war, and to relate this to the future, with the inception of atomic warfare and with the mounting cost and growing com plexity of aircraft. Aerial bombing in the First World War can be discounted, but before 1939 air attacks were used extensively as an instrument of modern warfare in Abyssinia, China and Spain, although in each instance no resistance was possible. In Abyssinia, the abrupt ending of the war in the early months of 1936 was largely attri butable to the terror inspired by air raids. Similarly, Hankow and Canton soon submitted under Japanese bombing. From these experiences, it appeared that a bomber force would succeed as an instrument by breaking the morale of the opposing country. On a different level was the bombing of Guernica, Barcelona, and Madrid in the Spanish Civil War, which was a decisive factor against the Republicans. However successful bombing attacks might be in breaking the morale of primitive peoples, doubt was cast on their efficacy against a highly civilized and organized community. It is apposite to note that, at the same time, the works of General Douhet had a considerable vogue. Douhet wanted armies and navies to be concentrated on defending and holding, while every effort should be expended on building huge fleets of bombers, which would be entirely responsible for offensive operations. An offshoot of this central theme led him to exalt the mass of aircraft against the individual performer—a conception the R.A.F. for tunately declined to accept, preferring to plan a balanced Air Force. Nevertheless, although no attainable force in the Second World War could do what Douhet suggested—completely destroy a large target in a single attack—the cumulative effect of repeated attacks was almost as destructive. Moreover, the thousand- bomber raid, together with the use of concentration in time and space, was surely a part vindication of Douhet's theories of mass assault. This history of aerial bombardment in the last war is now well known. Bombing developed enormously : indeed it is not too much to say that the aeroplane became the master weapon, counter acting to a disturbing extent the established doctrines of sea power, and rendering defence by large and well-equipped ground forces nugatory where these were inadequately supplied with aircraft. Moreover, as was expected, the bombing of open towns became a common feature—the German, Italian, and Japanese commands relied greatly on it as a means of destroying morale. However, it should at this juncture be pointed out that a sober evaluation in the post-war years has revealed that bombing, even when concentrated and sustained, had little effect on morale—save perhaps in the case of the destruction of Hamburg. It is now generally agreed that, before 1943, little damage was wrought in Germany by bombing, owing to a variety of reasons— primitive equipment (both bombing and navigation), lack of all- weather flying aids, inadequate radar, and so forth. However, from this time onward, Germany had to face the thousand-bomber raids, with vastly larger bombs and bomb-loads; and what was in effect mass bombing became accepted. Shattered to their foundations, the 14 principal industrial towns of the Ruhr valley were found by the advancing Allied armies in 1945 to be mere heaps of ashes and rubble. It is estimated that, altogether, Bomber Command had, by the end of March, 1945, rained down 143,000 tons of bombs on these cities, and 39,000 tons on intervening and other targets in the area. This near-obliteration of the Ruhr's war machinery, actual or potential, greatly influenced the later classical double envelopment by the land forces, for the trail of destruction stretching over silenced factories, shattered oil works, smashed armament centres gave the impression that the battle for the industrial Ruhr was as good as won several months So it can be seen that the Rapier technique—in peace and war alike—is likely to be the more effective, efficient, and economical. To provide the same measure of security, a very much smaller force of Rapiers is required than of Bludgeons, with consequent savings in material resources and manpower. In Viscount Tren- chard's words : "We cannot afford to squander either manpower or materials on second-best weapons of war, nor can we assume that time will be on our side." The best piloted weapon for strategic bombing is the very high-speed, high-flying, up-to-the-minute bomber equipped with devices of the highest accuracy and efficiency for finding and bombing the target. The Rapier, not the Bludgeon ! before the end of the war in May, 1945. Yet post-war investigation has disclosed that German war potential, despite bombing, was actually increasing until the final stages of the war, when mass bombing—the use of the bludgeon—was operating. We therefore arrive at the conclusion that mass bombing was used and was successful in the Second World War. However, we must not be deceived into assuming that what proved sound policy then will be sound policy also in the future. In future bomber operations, on the contrary, active consideration must be given to the following imponderables: The cost of jet bombers; the economic condition of Great Britain; the inception of atomic weapons. The cost of the modern four-jet bomber is variously quoted as being between £500,000 and £750,000. Additionally, the con comitant cost of airfields large enough to operate such bombers, the provision of full blind-landing aids involving monitoring systems, and the replacement of destroyed electronic equipment must be borne in mind. Obviously, fleets of massed bombers, not necessarily of the Douhet conception, but of that of the Second World War, would cost a staggering amount of money. And the ineluctable fact is that Great Britain is economically almost bankrupt; a condition which it appears will persist for many years to come. It is thus impossible for her, even if mass bombing is accepted as a principle, to mount thousand-bomber raids— especially if the bombers are creations such as the Valiant. Indeed, it is doubtful whether even the vast resources of the United States could stand losses of jet bombers at the casualty rate of the Second World War. We are thus committed to the operation of a small bomber force. Superficially it would appear that the principle of mass bombing— an American principle of war, incidentally—arrived at at the end of the last war is to be set at nought and that, in consequence, results of bombing would be negligible. Let us now examine the reasons for the adoption of this principle. As stated earlier, bombing was severely handicapped in the Second World War because of various limitations—chiefly that of equip ment. Despite the development of such devices as Oboe, Gee, H2S, Rebecca/Eureka/Babs, and the Mark 14 bombsight, it was not possible to guarantee the delivery of the bomb to the right point at the right time and in the right way. All-weather operation was only a partially realized dream. The rapier had a button on its point. These factors led to the use of large numbers of bombers, so that, by a process of elimination, a portion of the total force would be able to ensure destruction of the selected target. The atomic bomb, of course, was not then in use, and destruction was consequently limited in space. Obviously, these factors need not be present in a future war. One must presume—indeed, by virtue of economics, one must insist—that electronic devices are available which will allow a bomber to deliver the bomb precisely at the right point in the right way and in any weather. Moreover, despite the wide destruction created by an atomic bomb, the prohibitive cost of the bomb does demand its reasonably precise delivery. Finally, owing to the operation of a small and highly complex force, only a small number of air crews would be involved and, because of this very fact, errors which crept in during the last war would not be tolerated or expected. So far, the argument has assumed—and rightly—that a bomber force is vital. No attempt has been made to consider the type and scope of the future war, primarily because the argument remains broadly unaffected thereby. Nevertheless, it is desirable quickly to survey this aspect. It is indisputable that interdiction will assume much greater importance in a war with Russia. At the same time, there is no doubt that operations against targets similar to those attacked by Bomber Command in the last war will again be required, the only difference being one of range. A fleet of bomber aircraft operating at great distances over enemy and enemy- occupied territory is liable to sustain wholly unacceptable casual ties. This surely reinforces the argument for a small, highly manoeuvrable, and fast-working force. (Concluded on page 50) By S/L. B. A. COLVIN
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