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Aviation History
1952
1952 - 2033.PDF
FLIGHT, 25 July 1952 99 Airline Operational Responsibility A Plea for the " Flight Dispatch" System AT long last the re-equipment of British airlines with /% aircraft of British design and manufacture is under x -"* way. By and large, B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. have been working on a sound policy—that of operating foreign-built aircraft while awaiting the evolution of really first-class British transports. That policy, it seems, is now about to produce dividends, and the two British Corporations will be first in the two separate fields of turbine transport operation. But, as always, such pre-eminence brings with it certain respon sibilities, and it is essential that both Corporations should realize that they have to prove to a still slightly sceptical world the soundness of their judgment. (Results from other undertakings which have since ordered Comets and Viscounts will not be avail able for a long time, and many airlines now sitting on the fence will jump one way or another according to the indication they receive from the experiences of the two Corporations.) If the Corporations adopt an incorrect or shortsighted policy of operation; if they resolutely refuse to consider any methods but the present ones; if they are not prepared to accept the limitations on current techniques imposed by the limited endurance, weight for weight, of fuel; then the Comet and the Viscount may even yet be relegated to the position of "interesting experiments, but impracticable economically." The situation was admirably summed up by Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, chairman of B.E.A., writing in The Observer:— "If we can find the means to exploit our present technological triumph, we can now capture the skyways of the world. If we fail, the British airlines, having waited for this moment and subordinated the present to the future, are going to have a difficult time holding their own against competition from foreign airlines using American types of aircraft. Nor is the opportunity likely to recur. It is now or never." The basic requirements for the success of this endeavour are also the prime attributes for successful operation—namely, safety, economy, regularity, the utilization of capacity to the full, and reduction of ground time to a minimum. The greatest demand on ground time is made by the requirements for maintenance, and this can only be reduced by sound principles of design; by the insistence of the operator on the utmost simplicity of construction. Mr. Arthur E. Raymond, in the Thirty-ninth Wilbur Wright Memorial Lecture, had some very sound comments to make on the value of simplicity. "Complication is sometimes the path of least resistance for the designer," he said. "It is either the result of lack of knowledge or lack of adequate thought." The jet, at least, cannot be said to be over-encumbered with complications, and it has been confidently forecast that maintenance hours per flying hour will reach a new low level. The effort must therefore be made to effect a reduction of ground time demanded by other requirements—loading, re-fuelling, flight planning; and if it is possible, at the same time, to reduce non-productive flying and dead load, so much the better. If such is possible with jet airliners, then so is it possible with piston and turbo-prop driven machines, and though the saving may be smaller it is still worth while. The advent of the let transport has only served to underline the necessity, to make the requirement more urgent. What is wanted, clearly, is a new operating technique—a new form of administration and control which can give enhanced safety, increased utilization, economy of fuel and flying hours, reduce ground time to a minimum, and offer increased capacity based on flight fuel requirements and the paring down of excessive fuel reserves. British airlines have on the whole a very good safety-record, but this is not to say that it cannot be bettered. As long as accidents occur, in any form of transport, in any form of human activity, then efforts must be made to eliminate the causes. The knowledge that the total elimination of death by misadventure is an unattainable ideal should in no way lead to complacency when the occurrence is reduced to acceptable limits; every accident, fatal or otherwise, somewhere pinpoints a human weakness. It must be admitted that the British airline accident-rate over the past few years has not been so, good as that of the Americans Apologists speak of British weather as the worst in the world; but American carriers nowadays encircle the world and meet every meteorological phenomenon. Certainly the United States is very well provided with radio aids to landing and navigation, but most European countries provide reasonably adequate coverage and American utilization of European aids must be almost as high, 11 By RUPERT H. GILES, D.F.C. not higher, than British. Again, the United States has a finely developed system of air-traffic control, but the prime function of A.T.C. is, to quote from the definition accepted by the United Kingdom, "to prevent collisions between aircraft; to prevent collisions in the manoeuvring area between aircraft and obstruc tions, and to expedite and maintain an orderly flow of air traffic." That control performs this task with a very high level of efficiency, at least in so far as the prevention of collision is concerned, is evidenced by the very few accidents attributable to this cause. There is an unfortunate tendency in this country to imagine that A.T.C. has a wider responsibility than this. Certainly, at Air Traffic Control Centres there are established Flight Information Services, which in effect offer a form of ground-to-air briefing; but beyond that there is nothing. American operators have long realized that something more is needed and have established a system of company operational control which they have invested in an official they designate as a dispatcher. European airlines have generally followed suit, though rather more slowly; a number held back, and Sir William Hildred, before I.A.T.A., told the airlines, "You now have operational control—it is up to you to use it!" The Personal Factor There are now grounds for believing that B.E.A. are introducing a number of senior captains into their operations organization with a view to offering guidance and advice on weather and landing conditions to airborne pilots; and this is a step in the right direc tion. Just how valuable an innovation this will be only time can decide; but the system is not without its weaknesses. So much will depend on the person selected as a flight dispatcher. Certainly, considerable flying experience is an advantage, though, para doxically, it can also be a handicap. Pilots who retire from active airline flying do so for a variety of reasons, but principally en medical grounds or through advancing years. Broadly speaking, however, once a man has embarked on a flying career, he does not cease active flying until he finds that the mental strains and stresses are too great for him, and he realizes that he is losing the clarity of mind necessary to cope with emergencies. Instrument flying becomes more of a strain; self-confidence begins to ebb, and rightly, the pilot decides to retire, or take a desk job and fly only now and again. If retired aircrew are to be made into dispatchers, there is a possibility that they will tend to interpret a situation according to their own reactions, which, though based on considerable experi ence, are coloured by their diminished self-confidence. Added to this are (a) the reputation they have gained within the operating agency, and (b) their seniority, both of Which might tend to sway a more junior airborne colleague against his better judgment. Experience, too, whilst being of immense value as a guide, may in time ossify the mental process into a strait-jacket. The dispatcher, necessarily, must be a person with flying experience; must have self-confidence in his own judgment, with a receptive mind, adaptable and selective; and above all, he must have a thorough knowledge of his job, based on upward progress through the various levels of an operations organization. Experi ence of economic and commercial problems of air transport is also a necessity, so that he will not lose sight of the primary function of any business, be it air transport or what—to make money. A great business asset to any airline is a reputation for safety and regularity—and not only for the safe delivery of passengers at their destination, but for the safe delivery of happy and confident passengers. Economically, it is better to kill a load of passengers than to deliver them badly frightened at their destination. Mr. Peter Masefield has drawn attention to what he calls the "public forget- fulness factor," which allows the depressing effects of a fatal acci dent to be of short duration, but this is dependent to a large extent on the percentage of survival. A badly frightened passenger is a greater menace to sales than is the report of his demise, for in the first case the influence is continuous; and for every fatal accident there are several near misses or disturbingly eventful flights. With the growth of air travel, and the expansion of techni cal knowledge among the public, the average "awareness" of airline passengers is much greater than it was in days gone by; and consequently it is more difficult to assure them that a frighten ing incident is all part of the day's work and that technical advances are such that flight, or landing in conditions recently experienced, can be undertaken with an acceptable safety-margin. It follows, naturally, that if the "near misses" can be substan-
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