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Aviation History
1953
1953 - 0221.PDF
FLIGHT, 20 February 1953 219 WEAPONS of AIR DEFENCE Some Thoughts on Operational and Tactical Requirements By KENNETH W. GATLAND THE present revolution in offensive air power, character ized by the greatly improved performance of the bomber and the devastating power of the atomic bomb, has nowhere, least of all in this country, been matched by parallel advances in defence. Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, where an enemy must fly vast distances to reach his objective, Britain is denied the opportunity of organizing defence in depth, by reason of the close proximity of her industrial centres to potential enemy bases on the Continent. Assuredly, the modern bomber—which, in terms of the last war, has already cut the time available for interception by more than half—has made these islands a most vulnerable target. The problem has not arisen overnight. It was apparent as soon as our fighter development programme was laid down in 1946, when one might have assumed that, instead of concentrating exclusively on a linear development of the jet-fighter, attention might also have been given to the rocket-powered intercepter designed expressly for maximum rate-of-climb. In any defence system where the enemy's striking range is short and atomic attack is an ever-present threat, the climb factor must obviously be regarded as a first essential to ensure that the invader is halted as far as possible from his objective. The requirements of atomic defence are "nothing short of 100 per cent effective," and a pilot will receive little honour for a "kill" made after his adversary has turned for home. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to suggest that the Air Staff recognized this need; and, excellent though our new jet fighters undoubtedly are in their own right, the guided missile alone appears to fit the character of the problem. The surface-to- air missile is still several years ahead in practical application, however, and there seems to have been no provision for an interim weapon. The one project that could have led to improvement, the Miles M-52 transonic research aircraft, was abandoned by the Air Ministry in 1946, almost on the eve of success. Less than a year later, this decision was revealed as all the more calamitous when the Bell X-i (a remarkably similar aerodynamic conception) made its first flight in the United States. The reason why the British project was shelved when the detail design was 90 per cent complete, all the assembly jigs finished, component assembly well in hand, and the special Power Jets engine ready to be installed, was difficult to appreciate seven years ago, and today the reason is even more obscure for, despite the official explanation that the move was due to economy, most observers at the time believed that a new project which profited from German experience had displaced the Miles war-time design. Looking back, it is evident now that the substitute project never existed; and, especially in view of America's achievements in supersonic flight with such aircraft as the Bell X-i and the Douglas Skyrocket, the Ministry's decision, far from effecting economies, has proved most costly. A little-known fact is that, apart from the two turbojet variants of the M.52, Miles had proposed a rocket-powered version, using a development of a German motor, and it was this project that would have been the most profitable. Not only would the aircraft have provided useful aerodynamic data at a crucial stage in fighter development and permitted its use as a flying test-bed for new rocket motors, but it might readily have initiated a class of rocket intercepter which could well have cleared away much of the official complacency on defence matters that has frustrated a radical approach, within the industry, to the menace of the "atom bomber." The fact that the Folland "light fighter" had to be a private-venture project is an example of the lack of enthusiasm which the industry meets in return for its initiative. It is sometimes said, in defence of the Ministry of Supply's slowness in taking up the industry's more promising ideas, that development is increasingly expensive and that, in view of Britain's economic difficulties, we could not afford to emulate the United States and "back every horse both ways." Whilst this is obviously true, our development since the war does not appear to have been hampered too greatly by financial considerations. There has, for example, been ample insurance in the bomber programme! Therefore it is not sufficient to say that we lack certain weapons because we cannot afford to develop them; how we choose to spend the money we have is also pertinent. There is no denying that in vital aspects of weapon design it has taken eight years for those responsible for shaping development policy to arrive at conclusions our ex-enemies had reached in 1944* or even earlier. Failure to evaluate the results of German expen- ".-" • .. •. .• • • "The Miles M.52 transonic research aircraft was abandoned by the Air Ministry in 1946, almost on the eve of success. Less than a year later . . . the Bell X-1 (a remarkably similar aerodynamic conception) made its first fight in the United States." The upper views show the X-1. ence in such fields as rocket propulsion, ramp-launched inter- cepters and rocket armament, and to utilize that experience at a sufficiently early date in building a balanced defence system, has left a gulf between the jet fighter and the guided missile which, at this stage, will be difficult to fill. The principal reason why the rocket intercepter has been ignored is undoubtedly because of its high propellent-consumption. Yet correct tactical evaluation would have shown this to be no over riding handicap. With rocket power, it is possible to conceive as a present-day engineering proposition an intercepter having a maxi mum rate-of-climb of 50,000 ft/min, and a top speed in the neighbourhood of Mach 2; a system of "command guidance" (in which bomber and intercepter would be tracked by radar and the latter guided with precision towards its target) would permit the intercepter so be controlled along the most economical "pursuit curve." It would be launched only when interception was tactically possible. The great advantage of ramp-launched aircraft is that they could be operated effectively from mobile launchers, requiring neither an airfield nor any fixed base. Consequently, much importance attaches to the unique possibility of shipboard launching, with recovery on a flexible mattress of the type developed at the R.A.E.; in this, the conventional undercarriage is eliminated and the aircraft, following deck procedure, lands on the mattress with the aid of arrester wires and a trailing hook. Apart from permitting landing to take place in a particularly small area, this scheme has the further advantage of making available valuable space in the aircraft (normally occupied by the retracted wheels) for extra fuel or propellent, a factor of prime importance with rocket-power. Alternatively, one might conceive the intercepter as an aircraft capable of alighting on water, and the Convair "blended-hull/ hydro-ski" configuration appears to offer outstanding possibilities for development as a ramp-launched rocket intercepter. This is an aspect the Navy might well consider, since the design (typified by D
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