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Aviation History
1953
1953 - 1425.PDF
30 October 1953 579 FORTY SOLDIERS, 32 stretcher cases or three jeeps are typical loads for the Piasecki YH-16 helicopter, seen on its recent first flight at Philadelphia. The world's largest, it is 134ft long (over rotors) and the fuselage measures 78ft overall. It is in the class of Britain's projected "BEA-buses.'' latter fighter has a "lower Mach rating" than the Convair machine. The F-102's wing is very thin and die fin is rather smaller, pro portionately, than that of the Sea Dart; but the J57 is fed from Sea Dart-type dorsal intakes. According to the American Air Force Association, the new intercepter is to be ground-controlled from the end of the runway to within perhaps 20 miles of the target. Then, "when the enemy appears on the intercepter's radar-scope, the pilot will twist a knob . . . control will shift to an autopilot in the aircraft." In conjunction with a Hughes fire-control system, and without assistance from the pilot, this "will fire the plane's guided missiles as the target comes widiin range." The weapon carried has been reported as the Hughes F-98 Falcon. Convair have claimed that design and production of the F-102 at San Diego set a national record for a prototype of such com plexity (it is reported to weigh 40,000 lb). Eighteen months elapsed from the start of design, and the experimental shop carried out the actual construction in five months. This achievement is the more remarkable for, contrary to usual practice, the F-102 proto type has been built on production jigs and with the use of about four times as much tooling as is required for most prototypes. Basic data for Convair F-102: Single-seat automatic intercepter. Pratt and Whitney J57-P-7 turbojet of 15,000-lb thrust. Span, about 40ft; length, about 60ft; weight, about 40,000 lb; design speed, Mach 2. Lords Debate a Unified Air Force T'HE need for economy and efficiency in the organization of out •*• air power was the theme of a debate in the House of Lords on October 22nd, when Lord Trenchard introduced a motion calling on the Government to consider the economies that could be secured by a unification of the air forces, as in 1919, and to appoint an outside committee to consider ways of shortening the time between the design of aircraft and their entry into service. As was to be expected, the first proposal was strongly resisted by protagonists of the Fleet Air Arm, but there was wider agreement on the second. LORD TRENCHARD began by observing that things had so changed since die end of the last war that mistakes made now would come home to roost when it was too late to do anything. He declared his conviction that aircraft flown from carriers were bound to be inferior to shore-based types. It was imperative that the sea lanes be kept open, but mat could not be achieved by aircraft carriers—"the most expensive, vulnerable and dangerous means of defence one could have today." If these carriers went to sea, they were going to sea to be sunk. From this he went on to argue that if diere were no carriers, dien there would not be the slightest justification for a Fleet Air Arm. Dockyard and other maintenance services would be made available for many other purposes. Nor would there be the need for large air staffs; in addition, there would be a saving in flying and mechanical training schools. Dealing with his proposal for an inquiry into the aircraft- delivery time-lag, Lord Trenchard said it was his long experience that there was very little that could not be improved enormously if one set about it in the right way. LORD ALEXANDER OF TUNIS, Minister of Defence, maintained mat experience in the last war had vindicated the decision in 1939 that responsibility for the operation and administration of ship-borne aircraft should be transferred to the Admiralty. He recognized that the next war was likely to be considerably different; but if it should come tomorrow, he did not think it would be very different from the last war, except that this time the atomic bomb would be in the batdefield. He did not think there would be much support for Lord Trenchard's suggestion that shore-based aircraft would suffice. The air threat at sea could not be met and countered by shore- based fighters. It seemed to him quite essential that the fleets should have their own local defence at hand. A major reorganiza tion such as that proposed by Lord Trenchard should not be con sidered until the potentialities of new weapons could be assessed more clearly. Discussing the time-lag in production, Lord Alexander drew attention to the complexity of the technical and engineering prob lems involved. LORD BRABAZON emphasized mat aeronautics was not an exact science. As chairman of the Air Registration Board, he had never seen one machine that was correct and perfect. He thought it would be helpful if the Ministry of Supply, instead of ordering two prototypes at a time, would order more. It might be more expensive, but the experiments and development of them could go along not in series, so to speak, but in parallel. The Americans put their modifications into the machines after they were pro duced, whereas we got our modifications into the production line. It might be valuable to employ "that curious race known in America as production engineers," because in his experience a designer would design a perfect machine, but did not take into consideration ease of production. Lord Brabazon did not welcome the idea of forcing a committee of inquiry upon the manufacturers and the Ministries; it might be taken as radier an insult and resented. LORD TEYNHAM said the Fleet Air Arm was now a very efficient, specialized force, and it would be the height of folly to break it up. LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE said that recent defence exercises had indicated that, even with improved counter-measures, some bombers would still get through. In a future war, therefore, Britain would have to prepare to withstand a harsh period of per haps 24 hours, and would afterwards have to depend upon her aircraft to prevent a repetition of the devastation by going out and raiding the enemy bases in order to prevent their continued use. In that case it seemed to him that the air must have priority for all its essential requirements. LORD DOUGLAS OF KIRTLESIDE said the abolition of aircraft carriers, and thus of the Fleet Air Arm, was a possible solution— but not, at present, the right one. Some carriers were needed, particularly escort carriers. LORD TEDDER supported Lord Trenchard's plea for unification because he felt that the renewed segregation of Naval flying was unnecessary and unwise. It involved an attempt—an attempt fortunately mat failed—to destroy the unity, and thereby reduce the strength, of British air power. One had hoped that bitter experience in the late war would have convinced all mree Services that they were not independent but interdependent, and that self- sufficiency was suicidal. Of aircraft production, he agreed that, too often, attempted short cuts in development only meant extra delay. One way of speeding production was quite simply to give larger orders at the outset; but apart from that he thought an investigation could not but do good, even though it did not yield any spectacular solution. LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY, Secretary of State for Air, replied to the debate. He said that the aim must be to achieve true economy of force and effort. To attempt to be strong everywhere must lead to weakness everywhere. The Government adhered firmly to the view that, in present circumstances, with the existing balance between offensive and defensive power, it was imperative to have a strong offensive arm in the air, and this was to be found in die long-range bomber force. Discussing production, the Minister stressed the importance of exact definition of the various stages involved. In his view it was the total time from the initiation of the development contract to the delivery of the first aircraft to the R.A.F. which really mattered. In the case of the Canberra, the time taken was five years and five months. It was estimated that the Hunter would take five years and nine months and the Valiant six years and five months. It was difficult to give comparable information about produc tion of similar types of aircraft in other countries, but com parisons with the United States were not in the least unflattering to this country. The time of development and production of engines could not be exactly calculated, as difficulties could arise at a very late stage. Lord De L'Isle and Dudley affirmed that super-priority was still proving of value, and cited one instance where it had secured the delivery of 37 items urgently required by a manufacturer of undercarriages and aircraft equipment. Summing up, he said that the extraordinary devices which were justifiable in war were not only not justifiable but positively harmful in present circumstances. In modern times, with all the complexity of armaments, it was selection of our strategy, and selection in the technological field, which was all-important. The motion introduced by Lord Trenchard was withdrawn,
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