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Aviation History
1954
1954 - 0831.PDF
26 March 1954 375 of Defence and to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who were able to appreciate and guide the tactical role of the Services in the right direction. LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE strongly pressed the need for Service air transport for all three Services, and regretted the present position of Transport Command—"the Cinderella of the R.A.F." According to his information, the Command had some 40 Hastings—of which it was probable that not more than 25 could be made serviceable at any one time—and three squadrons of Valettas. That was a total of some 56 aircraft, of which perhaps 30 were serviceable at any one time. He did not think there was any salvation from this in the independent operators, whose aircraft were small in number, not many of them modern, and none constructed to carry or para chute heavy equipment. Of future prospects, Lord Balfour said that the Beverleys were fine aircraft, but the 20 on order would give only a 300-ton fleet-capacity lift, equal to 20 twenty-five- pounder guns or 120 jeeps at any one time. He understood that a high-speed long-range aircraft had yet to be selected, so it meant a lapse of four or five years before the civil type under develop ment would be in the squadrons. By contrast, the U.S. Army and Air Force counted their transports in hundreds, including more than 500 Stratofreighters, the largest transports in operation. He suggested two possible courses of action. The first was that Service air transport should be lifted above any one Depart ment so far as finance was concerned. There should be a pool of money for all three Services. This would spread the cost of obtaining the load-carriers that the Army must have, and would ensure transport to far-distant Naval bases. Such a fund might in the long run develop into a scheme for assisting private opera tors to obtain and maintain transport aircraft of designs suitable for military use in time of war. Secondly, the Government might devise means of helping private operators to finance purchases of large transports, and put new thought and imagination into new ways of profitable employ ment for civil aircraft, particularly in the Colonial Empire. The Americans and Canadians were opening up territories by using aircraft in ways that had never been thought of before; the same sort of thing might well be copied in the Colonies—for example, in Tanganyika, where there were big brown-coal deposits of immense value. MARSHAL OF THE R.A.F. LORD TEDDER began by drawing attention to the small extent to which aircraft were being used in Malaya and in Kenya, and suggested that the problems should be re-examined with a view to the possibility of adopting proven methods of air control. On the broader question of strategic bombing, he maintained that the bomber force was a vital element in our defence, as had been testified by results in the last war. It seemed to him that apart from any tricks that our scientists and electronic experts might be able to devise, the bomber pro vided the only conceivable defence against rockets. The rocket could be dealt with only at its source—launching points (difficult targets), storage depots, supply lines and factories. After recalling the value of the Peenemunde attack, Lord Tedder emphasized that later the strategic attacks on the enemy's lines of communication were in themselves a potent factor in reducing the scale of attack by V-weapons, simply by inter rupting their supply and maintenance. On whatever count one assessed the problem, now or in the "push-button" days, the bomber force was a vital element in defence. He went on to deal with "so-called push-button warfare," and the idea that it would simplify everything. He thought the contrary was nearer the truth, and wondered how many people really appreciated what a fantastic menagerie of electronic ingenuity the guided projectile was. It was no simple gadget to be made in hundreds of thousands, but an intensely complicated device whose design, production and control were a highly expensive and delicate matter. It was a wonderful job, and could no doubt become more so, but that was no reason why it should be so unanswerable. These electronic brains were remarkable inventions but, as had been shown by that fascinating campaign known as radio counter-measures, some strange things could be made to happen in the electronics field. This country could never be too grateful for the amazing skill, initiative and imagination of our scientists, but he won dered whedier they had offered the Air Staff anything as truly revolutionary in the aircraft field as the jet engine was in the engine field. One heard of supersonic fighters which, he suspected, were not truly supersonic—they could do it at a stretch. But had anybody offered, or had the Air Staff demanded, a truly supersonic bomber? If not, why not? It might well be much more reliable and more economical than a misguided projectile. Lord Tedder then discussed the case for a British strategic bomber force as distinct from the American force. He had found there were strong points in the American make-up which com pensated for corresponding weaknesses in our sort of tempera ment and character. Conversely, he had found there were British qualities which were a valuable offset to certain limita tions in the American character. To put it bluntly, the British tendency was to be very sound in judgment but rather slow in decision and action, whereas the American tended to be very quick on the draw, quick in decision and action, but perhaps not quite so thorough or reliable in his judgment. If ever there was a case for having the best of both worlds it was for mixing British and American together, particularly in the matter of operations involving atomic weapons. LORD DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY, V.C., replying to the debate, stressed that this country could not be made impregnable from air attack in the foreseeable future, and that the long-range strategic bomber force would be not only a powerful part of the deterrent, but, by reducing the scope of attack at its source, also an integral part of the defensive system. These considerations had their bearing on the relationship to be struck between our fighter and bomber forces. In addition there was the problem of phasing-in with the new guided weapons. This was to be done in stages as the latest aircraft types—like the Javelin— came into service. Some would carry guided weapons, of which more than one type was being developed, and also cannon; some would carry only cannon, of a type claimed to be the most powerful of any in service today. Dealing with the manpower situation, the Air Minister said there were now 96 trained men to each front-line aircraft com pared with 176 in 1948. This was very near the target—95 men—set by the Prime Minister in 1952. FRENCH LIGHT JET TRAINER : THE FOUGA CM. 170 MAGISTER The French Government has placed a production order for 100 of these twin-jet (Turbom&ca Marbort) trainers. When this recent photograph of the second prototype was taken, over Toulouse, the Editor was visiting the factory, and his impressions of flying the C.M.170 will shortly be published.
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