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Aviation History
1954
1954 - 2231.PDF
196 FLIGHT U.S. SELF-CRITICISM —and a Vigorous Defence of Britain OUR leading article expresses such views as we think can reasonably be formed on the report released last week by the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee. This has been described by Mr. Harold Stassen, director of the Foreign Operations Administration, as "inaccurate and misinformed"—which, in our view is fair comment. For the text of the report—from which we abstract the following—we are indebted to American Aviation Daily: — Conclusions and Recommendations.—Foreign aid is being used to build up and fortify the productive facilities of other countries to the detriment of United States strategic industries. Specifically, United States taxpayers' money is being used to support, directly or indirectly, the British aircraft industry, which is heavily subsidized by the British Government. The pre eminence which the United States has enjoyed in international civil aviation is based upon the initiative and competition generated by the free-enterprise system. This position of pre eminence and the stability of the aviation industry are of para mount importance to America. They should not be imperilled by contributing to the support of the British aircraft industry. The United States aircraft industry is made up of three component parts, all interdependent upon each other: (1) the engine makers; (2) the airframe builders; (3) the domestic and international airlines. A programme which endangers any one of these elements threatens the well-being of the entire inte grated industry. Thousands of small component manufacturers have a vital interest in the continued stability, prosperity and expansion of the United States aircraft industry operating within the framework of the free-enterprise system. If the United States desire to maintain close relations of mutual esteem and respect with valued allies, they should recog nize the imperative need for frank, realistic, and hard trading in the extension of foreign aid. Any concept that the United States can only exercise world leadership and hold allies by providing money on terms laid down by the recipient nation is unsound and contrary to the best interests of the United States. The effect of the grants in aid to the Royal Air Force was to release British budgetary funds for the continued subsidization of the commercial jet-development programme. A great nation capable of embarking upon a long-range and costly programme largely financed by Government to obtain mastery of the air in commercial transportation should be able to produce without foreign aid the military aircraft necessary for its national defence and the fulfilment of its obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This is especially true since large quantities of dollar foreign exchange are not essential to the production of British aircraft. The administrative judgment exercised by E.C.A., M.S.A. and F.O.A. is open to serious question in connection with: (1) the obligation of funds at the end of the fiscal year for the pro curement of several thousand expensive machine tools without proper screening or end-use checks; (2) a failure to keep track of the distribution, use, and ultimate disposition of the tools for a long period of time after they were delivered to the Ministry of Supply; (3) a failure to inspect the tools at the British factories in which they were allocated; (4) a failure to negotiate any agreement with the British Ministry of Supply regulating the use and distribution of the tools for a matter of nearly three years; (5) a commitment to finance the procurement of British military aircraft that have not been evaluated or approved by the United States Air Force and some of which will be obsolescent when delivered; (6) a commitment to finance sub stantial quantities of a British military aircraft that will have only twelve to eighteen months front line service after delivery before it is scheduled for retirement from the front lines; (7) a com mitment to enter into off-shore procurement contracts for two British military aircraft with the British Ministry of Supply instead of the manufacturers, thus making it impossible to control costs and to impose other essential conditions of produc tion normally required in defence procurement contracts. The programming, procurement, and financing of all aircraft required by the Mutual Security Programme should be decided and managed by the United States Air Force. The appropria tions, if any, for foreign aircraft financing should be included in the funds allocated to military aid and should not be divided between the Department of Defence and Foreign Operations Administration. To get into the business of programming and financing British aircraft independently of the United States Air Force lends itself to the distortion of military aid by civilian policymakers in an effort to attain political and economic objec tives through the use of "defence support" or "direct forces support" funds. The British fighters being financed with United States grant aid as part of the R.A.F. modernization programme are still in the experimental stage and are not yet in full production. None can fly at supersonic or transonic speeds in level flight according to U.S.A.F. standards. The executive agreement reached at Paris in April 1953 regarding future support for the modernization plan of the R.A.F. should have been fully disclosed to Congress when the first appropriations were requested. The formula adopted for seeking the necessary funds was misleading and the manner in which the formula was later carried out was contrary to the intent of Congress to limit the amount of economic aid to the United Kingdom. It had led to confusion, undesirable division of administrative responsibility and decisions the wisdom of which are open to serious question. It is assumed that when the British Government spokesmen advocate "trade not aid" they mean the interplay of free competi tive forces and not a method of obtaining a privileged position through the use of Government subsidies indirectly financed by the United States taxpayers. If high policy decrees that United States grant aid should be continued in support of the British military air budget, it would be desirable to explore with the appropriate technicians and policy-makers the possibilities of supplying the British Government with the airframes of the latest American types of fighters, in which British-made engines could be readily in stalled. This formula, if feasible, would appear to be preferable to the present programme for the following reasons: (1) The combination of United States airframes and British engines should result in truly supersonic fighters far superior to the Javelin, Hunter, and Swift. (2) United States grant aid would not be used to build up production lines in the United Kingdom to turn out planes that are not comparable to the suggested United States-British combination versions. (3) United States taxpayers' money would be used to strengthen the aircraft industry of the U.S.A. and make jobs for American workers instead of con tributing to the British programme for civil jet expansion. Excerpts from the Report.—Nothing in the report is intended to reflect upon the good faith of the British Government. The British officials responsible for the conduct of the Royal Air Force programme have discharged their duties with competence. They planned thoroughly, dealt frankly with their United States opposite numbers, and negotiated the Anglo-American agree ment most skilfully. The outcome was a financial arrangement highly advantageous to the British national interest and of dubious benefit to the United States. As early as 1942 the British began to give attention to the development of civil aviation in die post-war period. They were motivated by a number of factors. First and foremost there was a matter of national pride:and prestige. There was also a desire to obtain a commandingrposifion in the air and to develop an industry that would produfce exportable items in many parts of the world. Inasmuch as ihe British did not feel that they could hope to compete wittf the United States in the type of civil plane which the U.S.A/had developed and produced during the war, they determined? to focus their attention upon the design and development? of aircraft with a new form of propulsion. / The British Government since that time has been extremely active in stimulating anfl financing the initial costs of the de velopment of a number/ of civil jet prototypes. Up to 19- J I| has been estimated by toe Foreign Survey Group of the < <vil Aeronautics Administration that the total amount of Brash Government subsidies to the development of civil jet transprts amounted to approximately $400 million. This estimate, v, icn has been widely circtilated and is included in a report issueooy the group in 1951, his never, so far as can be determined, c ~en seriously challenged/. An effort has been made by the vu Aeronautics Administration and the staff of the Division. oi Investigations to ascertain the amount of subsidies granted by he British Government to civil development between 1950 «• 1954. These attempts have been unsuccessful. British author es have said that it would be impossible to arrive at any true fig- -> inasmuch as the costs of military and civil aviation developm » are inextricably intertwined. However, it has been admitted t J the amount of civil jet subsidies is very considerable. Mr. Stassen's Remarks.-—Apart from describing the rep n as "inaccurate and misinformed," Mr. Stassen said that on^ * the aims of America's aid programme was to strengthen
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