FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1955
1955 - 0097.PDF
and AIRCRAFT ENGINEER First Aeronautical Weekly in the World Founded 1909 No. 2401 Vol. 67. FRIDAY, 28 JANUARY 1955 EDITOR MAURICE A. SMITH, D.F.C. and Bar ASSISTANT EDITOR H. F. KING, M.B.E. ART EDITOR JOHN YOXALL Editorial, Advertising and Publishing Offices: DORSET HOUSE, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E.1. Telegrams, Flightpres, Sedist, London. Telephone, Waterloo 3333 (60 lines). Branch Offices: COVENTRY 8-10, Corporation Street. Telegrams, Autocar, Coventry. Telephone, Coventry 5210. BIRMINGHAM, 2 King Edward House, New Street. Telegrams, Autopress, Birmingham. Telephone, Midland 7191 (7 lines). MANCHESTER, 3 260, Deansgate. Telegrams, Iliffe, Manchester. Telephone, Blackfriars 4412 (3 lines). Deansgate 3595 (2 lines). GLASGOW, C.2. 26b, Renfield Street. Telegrams, Iliffe, Glasgow. Telephone, Central 1265 (2 lines). SUBSCRIPTION RATES Home and Overseas: Twelve months £4 10s. U.S.A. and Canada, $14.00. IN THIS ISSUE : Choice of Turboprops - 100 Production Conference- 103 Guns for Fighters - - 105 Russia Reveals the Fighter/Recce. Mig-15 112 Missiles and Projectiles 114 Promoting the Eland - 125 The Future of the R.Aux.A.F. - - - - 128 Rational SecurityI N a democratic country there can be no such thing as absolute secrecy about military matters. There are no peace-time laws or methods adequate for enforcing such security, nor would any be welcomed. Any attempt in this country to withhold all information which could possibly benefit hostile nations would first entail a "re-educa- tion" of the people; and (assuming any such totalitarian measure to be workable) it would inevitably kill public interest in matters of defence. Additionally, it would prevent inter- change of much scientific knowledge, and it would also severely handicap commercial procedures—publicity and the like—essential for the health of industry. And the results would still be negligible, because there would be no control over the people of other nations with whom we were allied or had agreements, and with whom our "secrets," commercial and military, would have to be shared. Little can be achieved beyond making it difficult and costly for an enemy to obtain important specific information about military planning and material in time to make real use of it; and by "specific information" we do not mean superficial knowledge about existing aircraft—for example, of the type we waste much time vainly trying to withhold today. The description "watertight" is frequently, if optimistically, applied to security. Cer- tainly we may regard the pool of knowledge as being contained in a sponge. The fingers of security are pressed into a few of the larger holes, while tit-bits of information trickle and seep out everywhere else—and a number of the fingers in the round holes are, in our opinion, unnecessarily square. There are few decisions calling for more knowledge of the subject, or for better judg- ment, than those concerned with security. Unnecessarily to suppress information about this or that product may seriously affect the prosperity of the firms concerned, and ultimately that of the industry of which they are members. Suppression may lead to duplication of effort and expense, and it may seriously handicap manufacturers in their efforts to sell goods abroad. We have been told recently of one ridiculous example (outside the aircraft industry) in which the law requires certain information to be made public while the provisions of the security regulations forbids such a disclosure. Recently, three lectures to be given before the British Interplanetary Society were completely suppressed on security grounds. As a result, we understand, the same lecture subjects are now likely to be dealt with by foreign scientists with whom for some time there has been an interchange of knowledge on the subject-matter concerned. During the last few years, minor and relatively unimportant but nevertheless un- authorized disclosures have increased slowly but surely in number. On occasions, companies faced with intolerable restrictions according to the letter of the agreements on security (for the "law" is unwritten) have been led to countenance leakages of restricted information as commercial considerations required. Occasionally, the opposite has occurred; information classified as secret, and which companies or Service departments would have preferred to withhold, has been publicly revealed by men in high places as an aid, perhaps, to illustrating a particular point in a debate or report. If this sort of thing does nothing worse, it certainly results in the security agreements being held in even less respect by others. It is our opinion that the only practical course is to keep to the very minimum the subjects to which security regulations are to be applied, and then to insist on their strict observance. At the same time, selection and revisions should be the responsibility of men with authority and with technical knowledge, otherwise the natural reaction will be to play safe and veil everything—much as is the case with guided missiles today. Such action is not only unnecessary, but is unfair to the companies and individuals concerned, and far from encouraging to the taxpayers who are meeting the enormous bills for their defence. Seeing and hearing no results, the public fear that no progress is being made. Unfortunately, security regulations can be misused to cover up inefficiency. Finally, some workable agreement will have to be reached with foreign countries with whom, as we have already stated, it is necessary to share military secrets and details of commercial products which inevitably overlap with military counterparts.
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
