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Aviation History
1955
1955 - 0104.PDF
104 FLIGHT, 28 January 1955 PRODUCTION CONFERENCE . . . in order that we might have a certain number of producible aero-planes to meet our essential needs at the right time. He likened our air effort to a three-legged stool, one leg being the customer,another the industry and the third a supply organization to co-ordinate the other two. Weakness in any leg immediatelyshowed itself in the outcome of our efforts and "because there have been weaknesses in each," our air situation was today farfrom satisfactory. The framing of requirements, particularly in the military field,was an appalling responsibility. If over-ambitious, the problems set to the designer would be of such complexity that he wouldeither be very late or would not achieve production at all; if too easy we might be faced with an enemy or competitor possessingtechnical superiority. He went on: "The specification writers since the war have in myopinion tended to set their sights much too high; they have aimed too far ahead—and no doubt the Industry (in which I include the equip-ment and armament manufacturers who, together with the engine and airframe people, make up the weapons system), must take a grave respon-sibility for being too ready in their promises. We have for instance, underestimated the difficulties of supersonic flight, the time scale of newradar sets, the time to develop new weapons. A somewhat doubtful time scale has perhaps, seemed unimportant in a political backgroundwhich seems to have always put any war possibility a comfortable four to five years ahead! "On the industrial side our gravest fault has been, I think, over-commitment. Too many channels for too little water. Designing and developing an aeroplane today is a tremendous undertaking and itneeds the almost undivided attention of whoever in the firm is the chief design executive, together with all his staff, for a period of fiveto six years—three perhaps for the project work and the design and building of the prototypes, and three thereafter to make them work inassociation with the customer, and to incorporate such modifications as are needed for production. The number of men who combine thequalities of leadership, inventiveness and diplomacy with those of charac- ter necessary for the top design job certainly appear to be no morethan the number of approved aircraft firms today; apart from the leaders there are hardly sufficient sound lieutenants, the people who really domuch of the work, to go round even the good existing teams, and the same is found even more acutely at the level of designers and technicians." It seemed to Air. Petter that there was a tendency for factory managements to seek expansion at all costs and so to demand an ever-increasing flow of prototypes, so that with due allowance forfailure, there would always be an assured large production. This was the dance of death for the designers; fewer new endeavours,carried to fruition, would ensure more, and not fewer, production successes. It also appeared that much could be done to assistproduction by increasing the scope of sub-contracting and also by encouraging production staffs to help more in the developmentstages. Admittedly, more would be foreseen and modifications would be fewer if the British industry were less over-committed,but it would nevertheless be of inestimable help if production people could adopt a more sympathetic attitude to importantmodifications. It might in fact be argued that we should forget all about newproduction techniques until we had overcome the lamentable state of affairs which existed when urgently needed aircraft wentfrom the factory not to the Services, but for weeks or months to Service modification units. A new major aircraft every six yearsor so might not altogether satisfy the younger technical and project designers. The solution was probably to sandwich in researchdesign and flight work, of which much needed to be done and for which contracts could usually be obtained, choosing a subject inaccordance with the firm's interests. Another weakness in the industrial leg of the British tripodwas due to unbalanced organization; too much emphasis was often given to the production and commercial side and a quite inadequateweight to engineering. The top engineer executive should be, as he is in America, at least a Vice-president, Engineering, in nameand in fact. There was still in some firms a tendency "to regard the design head as a back-room boy to be brought out only ongala occasions." Turning to the third leg of the stool—the supply and produc-tion ministry responsible for co-ordination—Mr. Petter said that this had power for good or ill which had not always been realizedor well exercised. It had the pewer of handing out rewards and pains for good or bad industrial performance, and it was thespeaker's opinion that it would only do good if rewards and pains could be magnified. Mr. Petter welcomed the policy of taking shorter steps in designthat now seemed to be finding favour. If one aimed seven years ahead the problem postulated was such that the chances of successof each of the airframe, weapon and guidance equipment was probably not more than one in two. Taking all together, therefore,there was a one in eight chance of success, further reduced by any power plant disappointments—and a one in eight chance which,in fact, probably took ten and not seven years, was not good enough. If a target of only four to five years was taken, the chanceson the aircraft, weapon and guidance should be at least three: four each, so that the overall project should have something betterthan a 27 to 64 chance. What was much more, it was likely to be on or near schedule. It was also less liable to policy changeswhich might render it useless, and the shorter time scale made it easier to anticipate what might be required in the event of a partialfailure of any part of the whole weapons system. "At any rate," said Mr. Petter, "the chances of success in time—and there is no other success in aviation—is about four times as good in the short step as in the long. In fact in this way yourpeople would get something to produce." The paper went on to discuss nationalization or, alternatively,large-scale rationalization—in the author's view, neither offered any hope whatever. For their correct functioning and mutualinterconnection the three complementary supports of our air effort had to be administratively independent. Mr. Petter couldsee nothing but ossification arising from any attempt to put all three under one roof. Comparisons were drawn with the stateof the industry and Ministries before the war, "when an impover- ished industry was increasingly wrapped up in biplanes and redtape by the users and the Ministry." The solution of industrial rationalization was superficially moreattractive, and, for big machines requiring large resources, size- able units were undoubtedly necessary. On the other hand, itwas the author's opinion that the best results should be obtained from units in which the technical and design staffs, excludingthe experimental shops, probably consisted of 100 to 200. For the design team to be of any use its firm had to be a producerand tooler-up of aircraft, since much of the design effort had to be in the creation of light, simple and producible detail, andthis art was quickly forgotten by those no longer associated with production. A VERDICT STILL AWAITED T TNREASONABLY, perhaps, we and a great many others had *-' expected that the result of the Comet Inquiry would by this time have been published. There was, in fact, a rumour that the work would be completed by Christmas. So much depends or is waiting upon the findings that each day's delay is a serious matter,not only for the de Havilland Company and its employees, but also the operators—British, French and Canadian—concerned. Inthe accompanying photograph Series 1 Comets are seen "hiber- nating" at London Airport. There seems to be no doubt that the R.A.F. could make gooduse of any of the existing Comet 2s they might be authorized to purchase and also, for different purposes, of a few Series Is.Transport Command has been seriously neglected so far as new equipment is concerned, and when it eventually receives Vickers1000s, the enormous step from its current types will probably be a difficult one to take. The announcement of R.A.F. purchase of Comets in theexpected event of the findings of the Court of Inquiry leaving the way open for such action would provide not only a much-needed stimulant for R.A.F. transportation, but would also help considerably toward the re-establishment of confidence in Cometsand, later, in their re-introduction to passenger service in one or more of the later versions. The French Services, likewise, might profit by the acquisitionof a few Comet. Is from Air France or U.A.T. In the cold: Comet Is at London Airport, Cocooned and snow-clad, await the results of the Court of Inquiry—as do the later series Comets.
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