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Aviation History
1955
1955 - 0233.PDF
FLIGHT, 25 February 1955 233 SERVICE AIRCRAFT SUPPLY B The Government White Paper Summarized THE Government White Paper on The Supply of MilitaryAircraft, published* last week, opens with a historicalreview of the aircraft position at the end of the war, when both the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were equipped almost entirely with piston-engined aircraft. As another war in the near future seemed unlikely it wasdecided not to take a major step in re-equipment until about 1957, and meanwhile the Services stated their requirements for theaircraft and armament which they thought would be required by that time. These requirements led to the initiation of the Vulcanand Victor designs in 1947 and that of a swept-wing day fighter and a two-seat all-weather fighter in 1948. "Although," says theWhite Paper, "a swept-wing Nene-engined aircraft comparable in time and performance with the Sabre and the Mig could havebeen developed, it was decided not to proceed with an interim fighter of this type." In a section on research it is stated that, in the light of theknowledge then available, the risks of attempting supersonic flight in manned aircraft were considered unacceptable and thatit was decided that research should at first be conducted by means of air-launched models. "It is easy to be wise after the event,"says the White Paper, "but it is clear now that this decision con- siderably delayed the progress of aeronautical research in theU.K." Economic factors, it is explained, also hampered research. Nevertheless, various research aircraft were ordered. The Paper then goes on to review development of specificaircraft. Mention is made of the successful development of the Canberra, first conceived late in 1944; of such "insurance" typesof aircraft as the Short S.A.4; of Vampires; of advanced marks of the Meteor; and of the development of the Venom. It continues: — "At the same time the question of ordering an operational versionof one of the two swept-wing single-seat research aircraft was con- sidered. It was concluded that this could not be done in either casewithout delaying other projects of a more advanced nature. In 1949 this was considered again but in view of the financial crisis and con-sequent drive for economy, no change was made in the earlier decision. Consequently not even a prototype of an operational swept-wing fighterflew before 1951, and no prototype fully representative of the production aircraft before late 1952." Korea Sounds a Warning In 1950, when war broke out in Korea, the decision to re-equipin 1957 had to be revised. The steps taken were as follows: — "In the fighter field a substantial production order for the swept-wingday-fighter was placed off the drawing board in October 1950, although its first prototype did not fly until nine months later. Several hundredmore were ordered in the early months of 1951. This was later named the Hunter. It was also decided as an insurance to order off the drawingboard an operational version, proposed by the makers, of a research aircraft, the S.535, which it was hoped could get into production beforethe Hunter; prototypes and 100 production aircraft were ordered in November 1950 and the production order was increased by 50 earlyin 1951. This was later named the Swift. Owing to the emergency, production orders for the Hunter and the Swift were placed muchearlier in the development phase than would normally be the case. "In the same way a production order for the Valiant bomber wasplaced early in 1951, before the first prototype had flown. At the same time it was decided to order the Sea Venom as an all-weatherfighter for the Fleet Air Arm, and again a production order was placed before the first prototype had flown. "Clearly the decision to place these orders at this stage meant takingexceptional risks ... on the other hand, it offered a hope that some of the latest aircraft would be available earlier. . . ." In the section headed "Progress 1951-1955" it is remarkedthat Valiant deliveries have started and will continue during the coming year—"development troubles have been remarkably fewfor an aircraft of its size and performance." Of the Vulcan and Victor it is stated that good progress has been made despite set-backs through accidents to prototypes. The Canberra is described as "having proved a successful and versatile aircraft." Among thefighters the Venom fighter bombers and Venom and Meteor night fighters are stated to be "usefully filling the gap until the latestswept-wing aircraft are introduced." The White Paper goes on: "In particular, the two-seater night-fighters with their airborneand ground equipment afford a defence against night attack which we believe is superior to that of any other country." The statement next turns to the Hunter and Swift, in which"serious development troubles" were encountered. It says: — "The decisions of 1950-51 to order many hundreds of these aircraftmeant that while development was still in a very early stage, tooling up and other preparations were rapidly pushed ahead for productionof swept-wing aircraft with a large number of new featu-es, such as axial-flaw engines, power controls, heavier armament, and other more *Cmd. 9388, Her Majesty's Stationery Office; price 6d. complicated equipment. All these had to be introduced and developedtogether. They had to be tested concurrently. Modification to one feature often meant modification to many others. This had to bedone under the handicap that only a few prototypes had been ordered. A single intractable aerodynamic problem from time to time monopolizedthe flying time of all the available aircraft or grounded them so that all other development flying, including the flight testing of guns, radar andother equipment, had to be put back. For instance for a long time difficulty was experienced in making the Hunter air-brake slow theaircraft effectively without upsetting the pilot's aim. Meanwhile pro- duction built up rapidly, and although this enabled early productionaircraft to be diverted to assist in development flying, it also meant that increasing numbers of aircraft were coming off the production linewhile some major features of the design were still unsatisfactory. "The first prototype of any mark of Hunter flew in July 1951, thefirst representative prototype in November 1952. The main troubles have been largely overcome, and substantial numbers of Hunters havealready been delivered to the Royal Air Force. There are still certain directions in which the Hunter's performance could be improved; onthese development is proceeding. Apart from these there is a problem with the guns: the firing of the guns causes interference with the flowof air into the engine, and when this happens in the rarefied atmo- sphere encountered at extreme altitude, it may lead to the enginestalling; this trouble, which has been experienced in other countries even with more lightly armed aircraft, affects significantly only certainmarks of Hunters. Measures already taken have effected a substantial improvement and further measures are in hand. . . ." Future of the Swift The Swift, says the report, was based on a research aircraft intended primarily to explore aerodynamic problems: — "Subsequently, in the emergency of 1950, it was decided to turnit into an operational aircraft; in addition to introducing armament and all the rest of the operational equipment required for Service use,it was decided to replace the Nene engine by the larger and more power- ful Avon. The resulting changes from the original design so com-plicated the process of development as to become the basic cause of many of the difficulties which have been encountered. "Production of the first mark with two Aden guns was ordered, ashas been stated in November 1950; the first prototype did not fly until July 1952. The second mark, with four Aden guns, involving import-ant changes to the wing, was ordered in April 1951 but a four-gun aircraft did not fly until May 1953; this was also the first aircraftrepresentative of the Mark 4 which was the mark for which the largest orders were placed for the R.A.F. The aerodynamic performance of allmarks proved disappointing and great efforts have been made by all concerned to get the aircraft right. Meanwhile, as in the case of theHunter, production has been rapidly building up. "After a series of exhaustive tests, it has been decided that the SwiftMarks 1 to 3 cannot be brought to an acceptable operational standard. Within the past few days, certain modifications have been introducedinto the Mark 4. Further tests are taking place to see whether these have produced a sufficient improvement to warrant putting this markinto service with the R.A.F. It will be possible to replace the Mark 4 Swifts by Hunters if necessary. Development is continuing for thetime being of other marks designed for certain specialized functions." The White Paper then goes on to review future R.A.F. andcurrent Naval machines, remarking that the Sea Hawk and Sea Venom are of less advanced design than the R.A.F. swept-wingfighters and their development troubles have therefore been less serious. Being the first military aircraft in the world with a turbo-prop engine, the Wyvern has encountered more than its fair share of development troubles, particularly in regard to the engine andairscrew control system: "Up to date it has not proved successful for its designed purpose as a carrier-borne aircraft, but work is stillproceeding with a view to remedying its defects." Gannet develop- ment and production have proceeded smoothly "apart from somedifficulty with the engine . . . which has been overcome." The publication concludes with an appendix in which variousaspects of research and development are discussed. Explaining the modern conception of an aeroplane as a "weapons system,"it says that since the failure of any one link in the combination could make the weapons system ineffective, the ideal arrange-ment would be for co-ordination of the various components to rest on one individual, the aircraft designer; experience has shownthat this is not completely attainable, but it is the intention to move in this direction as far as practical considerations allow. Discussing the subject of modifications in relation to pro-duction delays, the report cites two classes of modification, (a) those essential for safety and to bring an aircraft to an exceptional opera-tional standard and (b) those intended to extend performance. These present a constant dilemma, for while they can prolongthe useful life of a type, too many may cause major changes in design: "This second class of modification should therefore beintroduced at some convenient point in the production process in order not to delay delivery of earlier versions." The effects of the new policy of ordering prototypes in largernumbers are also explained.
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