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Aviation History
1955
1955 - 0922.PDF
32 FLIGHT, 1 July 1955 SERVICE AVIATION . . . Exercise Carte Blanche I AST week the most fantastic war game*-> the world can ever have seen was played out on the airfields and in the skiesof Western Germany. Quite apart from the fact that more aircraft than ever beforewere directly involved, and that the techniques of utilizing and controllingthem were more practised than previously, the use of atomic weapons was simulatedon a larger scale than hitherto. Two theoretical highly industrialized nations,represented respectively by 2nd and 4th A.T.A.F.s, were supposed to have come tothe point at which atomic war had been opened—without the formality of adeclaration. At a given signal, one nation's forces, 2nd A.T.A.F., were hurled in fullfury against those of 4th A.T.A.F., with, in this case, the sole object of destroyingits atomic capability; and, though the first attack was unannounced and representeda crushing blow, 4th A.T.A.F. was able to launch an atomic counter-attack. The main object of the exercise was tosimulate the free play of tactical atomic weapons directed almost exclusivelyagainst airfields and major troop concen- trations. Army participation as such wassmall and consisted mainly in giving a background for a certain number ofground-support operations. In the flesh the army was represented principally bythe presence of the staff officers whose place was normally in the combinedtactical operations centres. The main activity of the exercise was therefore the useof, or the attempted annihilation of, atomic capability, and the reconnaissance andair defence operations this involves. For obvious reasons it would have beendesirable and realistic to arrange the opposing sides along an east-west axis butit was stated in Paris that this had been found to be impossible without invitingthe co-operation of the Soviet 24th Air Army; so despite the inconveniences of A "finger four" of the latest Mk 4 Hunters over Jever where the two squadrons recently re-equipped with these machines have been converting. These aircraft, seen through the side window of a Vampire T.ll, were taking part in Carte Blanche. "Flight" photograph the alternative arrangement, it wasdecided to oppose 2nd and 4th A.T.A.F.s on a north-south axis. Thus 2nd A.T.A.F.,including Nos. 83, 2 and 69 Groups (composite British, Belgian and Dutchformations), reinforced by a squadron from AIRNORTH and two all-weathersquadrons from Fighter Command, were opposed to the forces of 4th A.T.A.F.,consisting of the French 1st C.A.TAC., the R.C.A.F. 1st Air Division, the U.S.12th Air Force, and three squadrons from AIRSOUTH. The 4th A.T.A.F. was tobe supported by aircraft from the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean which,with atomic capability, could range well into Northern Germany. External supportand the majority of the airborne nuclear attacks were provided for both sides byaircraft of Strategic Air Command arid the 49th Air Division from the U.K.Bomber and Fighter Commands and the French Air Defence Force were alsoengaged. A few pilots from the three newly- equipped Hunter 4 squadrons were taking part, and the Martin Matador pilotless bombers of 4th A.T.A.F. were dispersed No. 34 Wing's Mobile Field Processing Unit's vehicles hidden in a wood near Giitersloh airfield during Carte Blanche. The unit had already developed and printed some 10,000 photographic prints during the first two days of the exercise. "Flight" photograph on their launching ramps while theirflight was simulated by T-33s, carrying a similar guidance system, but a pilot aswell. All atomic weapons, except Matador warheads were air-dropped bombs andthe atomic cannon were not "in action." The question which immediately arisesin connection with the use of atomic weapons is that of deciding when the firstatomic weapon shall be used; and who thereafter shall judge whether a par-ticular target is worth so deyastating a blow. Until recently the United Statesalone possessed precise information on the effect and capability of tactical atomicweapons; but, following the recent agree- ment, such information will become avail-able to other NATO commanders. During the exercise, however, this wasnot yet the case. Furthermore, complete control of the use of atomic weapons isvested in SACEUR and from this source came most of the decisions to use them.This was done on an arbitrary basis, the airfields affected being notified simplythat an atomic weapon should be con- sidered as having dropped, either dead ontarget, or at a given distance from the desired "ground zero"; and that, accord-ing to the type of fuse employed, a given amount of damage had been caused. Theatom-bombing sorties were actually flown, but, if SACEUR decided that a bombwould drop on a given airfield, no amount of successful interception of theraiding aircraft, be it a B-36, B-47, B-45 or F-84F, would forestall it. If a tactical nuclear weapon was droppedto explode in the ground on an airfield, that airfield would, to all intents and pur-poses, cease to exist. If, on the other hand, an air-burst occurred, then everyaircraft and item of equipment would be destroyed, but the installations wouldremain and would be usable once again in a comparatively short time. To keepthe exercise alive for its allotted six-day span, therefore, the duration of atomiceffect was calculated arbitrarily at any- thing from two to 12 hours. During thattime the units attacked were out of action unless they could immediately be shiftedand operated from another base simulating reserves replacing units destroyed. In theevent, 23 atom bombs were dropped during the first 24 hr and 36 in the first48 hr. At the time of going to press, the exer-cise was still continuing and some air- fields had even been "bombed" twice andreturned to operations.
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