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Aviation History
1955
1955 - 1681.PDF
800 FLIGHT, 25 November 1955 MARKET SURVEY Airliners: a Study of Supply and Demand By ROBERT J. BLACKBURN IN recent months it has frequently been pointed out that,where production of civil aircraft is concerned, a large andexpanding home market is essential to a healthy industry. Equally, it is more widely appreciated than ever before that thescale of airline operations under the United States flag is the main reason for America's continued leadership as a supplier ofcivil transport aircraft. Just how large is the American share of world air transportmay not, however, be generally realized. The accompanying diagram, based on statistics published by I.C.A.O., shows theproportions of air-transport production (ton-miles offered for sale on scheduled services) as distributed between North America,Europe, South America, Australia, the Far East, Near East and Africa during 1954. The North American share of 64.5 per cent of all ton-milesoffered does, of course, include the output of Canadian operators. United States airlines alone, however, were responsible for nearly60 per cent of ton-miles offered, 57 per cent of ton-miles sold and 59 per cent of passengers carried on the world's scheduled airservices in 1954. Of the remaining 64 member-states of I.C.A.O., none pro-duced more than 5 per cent of the total. The major producers, listed according to their respective shares of the ton-miles offeredon scheduled services in 1954, were as follows: France (5 per cent); the United Kingdom (4.5); Australia (4); Brazil (3.5); theNetherlands (3); Canada (3); Mexico (2); Scandinavia (2); Colombia (1.5); India (1); and Switzerland (1). Incidentally, the fact that a dozen of the better-developednations accounted for more than 90 per cent of the I.C.A.O. total stresses the relationship between air transport and national pros-perity. It is also significant that international air services represented one-third of world air traffic, whereas United Statesinternational services accounted for only 20 per cent of total U.S. traffic. These figures show beyond doubt that, Russia and Chinaexcluded, the United States is the only part of the world where a large air-travel market and a large manufacturing industry existside by side, united by nationality and geography. Two further advantages enjoyed by the U.S. manufacturers are the indirectassistance of large military contracts and the fact that their com- petitors are widely dispersed and, relatively speaking, poorlysupported in both the civil and military sense. International traffic figures and fleet lists show that more than90 per cent of all scheduled traffic is still carried in aircraft of U.S. design and manufacture—which is hardly surprising, in viewof the factors mentioned above. The effect of these factors can be seen in practical terms by studying the operating statistics ofthe I.A.T.A. airlines in 1954. These airlines carried 85 per cent of scheduled I.C.A.O. traffic. About 50 per cent of I.A.T.A.traffic was carried by five large American operators—A.A., E.A.L., P.A.A., T.W.A. and U.A.L., the remaining 50 per cent beingshared between 65 other I.A.T.A. carriers. The moral of these figures is plain: that U.S.-built aircraft will continue to carry amajority share of traffic until (a) the large American operators look beyond the United States for their equipment or (b) opera-tors using, or intending to use, non-American equipment increase by a handsome margin their present small proportion of worldtraffic. There is at present no evidence to suggest that such drasticdevelopments could take place inside the next ten years. For the past year of so, the West Coast manufacturers have been sellingmore aircraft, at higher prices, than ever before. A decline from this position of strength could not happen overnight, howeverunsuccessful the future efforts of the American manufacturers and however fruitful those of their rivals. Of the scores of aircraft-types in scheduled service today, abouta dozen are carrying the bulk of the traffic. Approx. No. in I.A.T.A. ServiceDec. 1954 Dec. 1957 Douglas DC-3Douglas DC-4 Douglas DC-6/7 seriesLockheed Constellation Lockheed Super ConstellationConvair 240-340-440 series Martin 2-0-2—4-0-4 seriesBoeing Stratocruiser Vickers Viscount V.700-800 series 730260 400180 90 260120 50 40 500200 700180 160 400120 50250 The foregoing approximate figures illustrate the "balance ofpower" between manufacturers as represented by numbers of aircraft in scheduled service with I.A.T.A. airlines. For the sakeof simplicity, totals are given in round numbers, and the esti- mates for 1957 are based on orders announced to date. By 1957, the Viscount will be firmly established in the worldmarket. In view of our preceding remarks on overwhelming size of the American home market and its effects on airliner sales,the significance of the Viscount's success can be appreciated to the full. It proves that the lack of a huge home market need notnecessarily close the door on big overseas sales. The success of the Viscount, however, must be partially offset—so far, at least—against the relative failure of other types of aircraft of non- American manufacture to sell on a large scale. These words are not written either to laud the American indus-try or to decry the efforts of its competitors, British or otherwise. The writer's object is simply to record some under-publicizedfacts about the size of the air-transport market and its sources of supply. Over the past ten years world air traffic has expanded at afaster rate than United States traffic. If this trend continues, as it almost certainly will, the relative size of the U.S. market willdecline or—more positively—the size of the remaining section will increase, improving the sales prospects of Britishmanufacturers. Moreover, the American air-transport system is at a moresophisticated stage of development than in most other areas— i.e., it approaches the ideal of both high frequencies and largevehicles. With the new jet transports, design-for-purpose has reached the stage where the long-haul requirements of the U.S.and overseas markets are not easily reconciled in the one type of aircraft. The DC-8 and the Boeing 707 may well prove too largeand too expensive for many operators, particularly those just beginning to flex newly acquired wings in the international field. To a greater extent than is generally realized, the pattern ofre-equipment programmes is determined more by the designer than the airline operator. The demand for new equipment iscreated largely by existence of that equipment. After all, if design were static, air transport would not die. Operators couldacquire the capacity needed to handle extra traffic simply by buying additional aircraft of a type already in service. Basicreasons why an operator buys a new type of aircraft are: (1) to capture or regain traffic from a competitor; (2) to reducedeficits or increase profits, as the case may be; (3) to handle new routes too long or too short for present equipment; (4) to replaceor supplement a type of aircraft no longer in production. The extent to which an aircraft will sell therefore depends on its Distribution of scheduled air traffic, based on I.C.A.O. statistics.
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