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Aviation History
1956
1956 - 0422.PDF
422 FLIGHT THE DE HAVILLAND D.H.9 The first of the three views below shows the pilot's and observer's cockpits of a D.H.9. Note how the pilot's Vickers gun was recessed and fired through a trough. The observer had a Lewis gun. The second picture is of a Hythe camera gun on the Scarft mounting of a D.H.9, and the third depicts a "Nine" with a prototype Napier Lion engine. HISTORIC MILITARY AIRCRAFT No. 12 Part II By J. M. BRUCE, M.A. OUTSIDE the Independent Force, the D.H.9 continued tobe used for tactical bombing. In the early stages of thegreat Amiens offensive of August 1918 the bridges across the Somme provided targets for the D.H.9 squadrons. On August 8th, No. 107 Sqn. participated in the attack on the bridge at Brie; the road and railway bridges at Peronne were bombed by No. 98 Sqn.; the bridge at Bethencourt was attacked by No. 49 Sqn.; and the D.H.4s and D.H.9s of No. 27 Sqn. bombed the bridges at Voyennes, Pithon and Offoy. More attacks were made on the following day, and seven D.H.9s of No. 49 Sqn. acquitted themselves gallantly when attacked by 20 German fighters: although prevented from bombing their target (the bridge at Falvy), they fought their way home without loss, and shot down one of the enemy in flames. An eloquent commentary on the D.H.9's performance as an operational aircraft appears in these words in Vol. VI of The War in the Air (page 454): — "In the four days of intensive fighting, from the 8th to the 1 lth ofAugust inclusive, the D.H.4s of No. 205 Squadron were in the air for a total of 324 hours 13 minutes, and dropped 16 tons of bombs. Everyaeroplane returned from its mission, and no more than one had to be struck off the strength of the squadron. This aeroplane, which hadbeen hit in combat, was too badly damaged to be reconstructed in die squadron and had to be sent to the depot. By way of comparison, atypical D.H.9 squadron flew a total of 115 hours in the same period and dropped four and a half tons of bombs. During the operationsseven of the D.H.9s were lost and two others were wrecked, and ten pilots had to leave formation, without dropping their bombs, throughengine trouble. A further sidelight on the engine question is in the fact that in the same four days pilots of No. 205 Squadron requiredno more than a total of 3i hours in all on test flights while those of the D.H.9 squadron spent 21 hours in the air on similar duties." It should not be forgotten that some squadrons were compelled to exchange their D.H.4s for the inferior D.H.9s. Engine trouble was inseparable from the D.H.9. On August 25th, 1918, 13 D.H.9s of No. 98 Sqn. and 11 of No. 107 set out to bomb the enemy aerodrome at Mont d'Origny. Five of No. 98's machines and three of No. 107's had to turn back with engine trouble. On October 1st, of 29 D.H.9s which took off on a second attempt to bomb the railway junction at Aulnoye, no fewer than 15 were compelled to return with faulty engines. To the end, the D.H.9 lacked die performance necessary to do its job. The unreliability of its engine was not improved by sketchy maintenance in the hectic days of the Allied advance, and the aircraft could seldom climb higher than 13,000ft. At that height it was subject to energetic fighter attacks, and it was not uncommon for whole formations to have to jettison their bombs well short of the target if large numbers of defending fighters appeared. The official historian remarked (The War in the Air, Vol. VI, page 547): —"In summing up it is probably fair to say that to a great extent the energy expended by the D.H.9 squadrons was wasted. Bombs droppedat haphazard, when definite targets are being sought at a vital time, cannot be reckoned of much military account." It was inevitable that an aircraft built on such a large scaleshould be used in other theatres of war. In Palestine, No. 144 Sqn. was fully equipped with D.H.9s by the end of August 1918.The squadron bombed Der'a railway junction on September 16th and 17th, and made two attaqks on the telephone exchange atEl'Aflfule on the 19th. As part of the intensive harassing of the retreating Turks, the D.H.9s of No. 144 Sqn. bombed and gunnedthe enemy forces on the Tul Karm-Nablus road on September 19th, in the Wadi el Far'a on September 21st, and on the EsSalt-'Amman road on September 23rd. The D.H.9s which served with squadrons Nos. 17 and 47 inMacedonia were used more as reconnaissance aircraft than as bombers. Some flights of 300 miles were made, and places asremote as Kyustendil and Radomir were photographed. "A" Flight of No. 47 Sqn. was completely equipped with D.H.9s byAugust 21st, 1918, and No. 17 received a flight during the next month: both units had six D.H.9s at the time of the Armistice.On September 21st, these D.H.9s were employed in their true capacity when they bombed the Bulgarian army in the KosturinoPass. Some D.H.9s went to the R.A.F. units operating from theislands in the Aegean. With a cool disregard for the unreliability of the Puma, the aircraft were used in several attempts to bombConstantinople. The 440-mile flight demanded an endurance
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