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Aviation History
1956
1956 - 0610.PDF
610 FLIGHT, 18 May 1956 PASSING THE MEGABUCK Some Reflections on Airline Corporation Equipment Policy I BELIEVE that many British readers of Flight, especiallythose of us domiciled in the U.S.A., would be interested tohear from your correspondent "Icarus" why the six perfectly sound requirements he enumerates for B.O.A.C. policy on p. 223of your February 24 issue are in any way incompatible with one another. If it be accepted that B.O.A.C. is the property of theBritish taxpayer (who footed the deficits for so many red-ink years), it is clearly die bounden duty of the Corporation to supportthe British aircraft worker and to buttress sterling by cutting down unnecessary dollar imports. More hard-dollar hardware mustinevitably put further inflationary strain upon the Exchequer and so hasten the day of financial reckoning. Cutting through the patois of patriotism as just a side issue,the policy problem (it seems to me) boils down to our very exist- ence as a great mercantile power in our own right, for surely thereal incompatibility in your correspondent's case is his proposi- tion that one can have a prosperous mercantile aviation withoutthe tree having a strong root in British soil on the manufacturing side. The economic parallel may be seen in the British mercantilemarine, where it would be difficult to imagine, say, Cunard or the P. and O. begging for megabucks to place their construction inAmerican shipyards! (The imagination boggles still more at the idea of the U.S. Government placing an order on die Clyde for anAtlantic blue-riband liner!) The cold fact is that unless British airlines do "Buy British," the U.K. aircraft industry might as wellpull out lock, stock and jet barrel, and emigrate en bloc to the U.S.A. This, as I see it, is the logical extension to the ideascanvassed by "Icarus". No doubt he has been encouraged by those Government spokesmen who have recently announced afurther ten-year reprieve for B.O.A.C.'s "Boost American" policy. Atlantic Analogy In his appeal to buy and fly the "best" aircraft irrespective ofdesign origin, "Icarus" and his ilk overlook die sober engineering fact that, in order to develop die design and production skills matlead up to a superior product, the manufacturing side of the indus- try must have working experience—that is, something to practiseon by way of concrete orders for commercial prototypes and development aircraft. After all, long-range planning can onlybe built upon successive short-term accomplishments; and even though the immediate short-term project may turn out to be"second best" (in the international sense) it is still the best national policy in the long run to accept it while pushing ontoward something better. Thus, in the contemporary shipping world, the fact that the United States is a faster (and even hand-somer) ship than die Cunard "Queens" is all the more reason why any future challenger should come from a British shipyard.Indeed, the challenge is a healthy one all round; it continually raises the design standard and it is good for international trade. Now, there is a very close professional kinship between thenaval architect and the aircraft designer, and the flagship position on the Atlantic run points-up the fact that the so-called besttransport vehicle, whether ship or aircraft, may germinate on either shore, depending on the political as well as the technicalcircumstances of die time. This was nicely demonstrated in the case of the United States by the fact that she cost well over$70 million (£25m), to build and was sold back to die shipping line for less than $30 million (£101m), die balance, of course,being footed by die U.S. taxpayer in support of national prestige. Looked at from die American standpoint, this form of Govern-mental subsidization in a so-called "free enterprise" economy makes very good sense, since die wages went into die pockets ofAmerican shipyard workers and die no doubt handsome profit went into die bank accounts of American shareholders. Theobvious point that needs to be hammered home is that the internal economy of die U.S.A., not of some foreign country, benefited. It also tends to be forgotten, I think, that each time B.O.A.C.is permitted to place an order for American aircraft the retro- gressive effect on British aeronautical technique is an algebraicallycumulative one—because, technically speaking, the loser drops back as much as die winner moves up die international "know-how" ladder. Thus, when Sir Miles Thomas, during a recent Press interview in Los Angeles, playfully described B.O.A.C.'sorder for DC-7s as being wordi "about 38 megabucks," in reality it placed some British firm 76 million dollars' or 27 millionpounds' worth of potential working experience behind Douglas in this particular field of design and fabrication. Extend thisalegbraic concept to the rest of B.O.A.C's American fleet and one begins to appreciate die home-made head-winds diat the Britishaircraft designer and artisan is forced to buck. vTHIS commentary on a recent controversy in our Correspondence columns (it comes from an Englishman in America) was accompaniedby the compelling plea: "May I request the courtesy of a full page for this full-scale reply to 'Icarus' and others on this vitally importantsubject? We've simply GOT to back up the splendid pioneering work of D.H.s and to stop bashing our brains out (with defeatism) on theYankee chopping-block. I believe that we can still knock the stuffing out of all those podded Yankee-doodles—so long as we don't attemptto copycat them." I have a strong feeling diat die wave of woolly criticism—amounting almost to defeatism—now befogging some quarters of die aeronautical compass at home stems from two major inci-dents: (1) die aftermath of die Comet 1 trial-and-verdict; and (2) die incredible blunder (or cover-up) in cancelling the turbo-jetted Vickers V.1000 and its intended V.C.7 civil variant— easily the most advanced jet transport design yet conceived forthe 1960-70 decade. Such lack of imaginative follow-dirough with die pure jet, coupled widi die decision to fall back upon aturboprop design as a stop-gap expedient, must surely prolong die Comet setback instead of overcoming it with every resourceat our disposal. As things are, the matchless Comet 4, widi its ordeal-tested heritage, is left alone in the bed with cold feet—-justwhen it badly needs a strong companion! The really ironic twist to this technical retreat on our part isthat up to about two years ago die civil side of die U.S. aircraft industry was itself swinging back and fordi like a caged monkeyon the jet-prop pendulum, unable to settle one way or die omer until a suitably powerful jet engine was released by the Pentagonfor the open civil market. The turboprop situation was even more unstable, since a reliable American type was not available for air-line operation. With the introduction of die well-tested Pratt and Whitney J57 in the prototype Boeing 707 came fordi die com-peting sales brochures and the extraordinary spectacle of immensely costly long-range jet airliners being sold on die basis ofrapidly-changing design specifications framed around rapidly- changing higher powered military turbojets still cloaked undermilitary secrecy. Aldiough the globe-trotting salesmen of Boeing and Douglas had difficulty keeping up widi each new edition oftheir own (and the odier chap's) design brochures, it is certainly a high tribute to American brochuremanship diat it seems to havestunned the triple-tiered Civil Service hierarchy of M.o.S., M.T.C.A., and B.O.A.C. into retiring from die long-range jetbattie for anodier ten years or so. The paper darts of Douglas and Boeing are dlus the first intercontinental ballistic missilesto have found dieir target. Which brings us back to die political heart of die matter, themonopolistic structure of the two State-supported airline Cor- porations and die absence of properly regulated competition—asso cogendy pointed out by Mr. John Longhurst in Flight of March 30. It can hardly be denied diat the success of dieAmerican air transport manufacturer is primarily due to his direct design and financial contact widi his client, die airline operator.Now diat bodi national airline Corporations have erased their long-subsidized red-ink stains, the time would seem ripe for amore direct buyer-seller relationship—one in which there are no echelons of cautious civil servants to pass the buck from basketto basket (how well we recall those suave "on die other hand" minutes!), ending up widi anodier Treasury handout of mega-buck proportions. FAVONIUS. CRANFIELD ANNIVERSARY ":il.; AN open day on which members of die public may visit the•College of Aeronautics at Cranfield, Bedfordshire, is to be held on Saturday, June 9. Representatives of industry, theServices and odiers connected widi die work of die College are being invited to a similar function on Thursday, June 7. Theseoccasions will form part of die celebrations, during 1956, of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the College. The presenta-tion of diplomas at die end of diis session will take place on Friday, July 6, and will be followed die same evening by die Students'Society's Presentation Ball. At the sixdi a.g.m. of die Cranfield Society it was decidedto invite Sir Roy Fedden to become president of diat body. Cdr. A. J. Monk, first president of die Students' Society, waselected vice-president. Committee members for the coming year are Mr. Harold Caplan, chairman; Mrs. F. Dixon and Mr. K.Harris, joint hon. secretaries; Mr. Denis Howe, hon. treasurer; and W/C. P. Cleaver.
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