FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1956
1956 - 1132.PDF
278 FLIGHT DOLLAR REFLECTIONS More Thoughts on British v. American Airline Equipment AS I suspected, your correspondent "Icarus" Flight, June T)is thrice confused—politically, economically and, above all,technically—in claiming once more that Britain can have a prosperous mercantile aviation divorced from its manufacturingbase or vice versa. The interdependence of the two may be bunk to him, but the British aircraft worker, from artisan to designer,is going to have a very rough bunk to lie upon if his product has no commercial sales outlet. This is especially true in the case ofB.O.A.C., because, as Sir Miles Thomas has so rightly said, it provides an international shop window for the British product.Perhaps "Icarus" works (and eats) behind the highly protected plate-glass window of the military Services? Politically, it must be obvious that when a British airline "buysAmerican," the repercussion is world-wide (the American publi- cist quite properly sees to that!), for it is tantamount to an admis-sion that the British aircraft industry cannot build the vehicles for its own transport services; from which it follows that it won'thave much chance of success against its keenest competitor in the international field. I have already cited the parallel of Britishships and shipping. A more homely analogy may be studied in the history of British rail transport—bearing in mind that there arestill large areas of the world where the pioneering influence of the British railway and locomotive engineer is apparent. Now thatsteam is giving way to diesel and electric, it would be fantastically silly if British Railways (i.e., the British taxpayer) decided to closedown Swindon, Crewe, Derby and Doncaster in favour of import- ing the latest American types—even though (at the moment) theymay be superior in some respects. The economic reverberations are but the echoes of the political.The past (and forthcoming) financial tribulations of B.O.A.C. as an airline operator cannot be treated as an airtight segment of theBritish economy, dearly as it may wish to show a profit; but making a fast buck from American fares on the operational side is worth-less if megabucks have to be prised out of the Treasury for buying American aircraft, which, be it noted, are still mostly on paper.And, apart from the actual first cost of these aircraft, there are all sorts of incidental dollar expenses incurred for the maintenanceof B.O.A.C. inspection and training personnel in the U.S.A. In view of the continuing Anglo-American trade imbalance—a resultof Icarus-type politico-economic thinking—will he please tell us where these hard dollars are to be found? By-passing the Turboprop On the technical issues, I agree that "Icarus" has more solidcause for confusion-niue, largely, to the overdrawn transitional period between the piston engine and the gas turbine, especiallyin U.S. civil aviation; moreover, the confusion has grown yet more confounded by the conflicting claims of the turboprop andturbojet protagonists, so it is not surprising that many airline operators are still playing cagey at this stage of the game. The factthat B.O.A.C. sponsored and pioneered the world's first jet trans- port will always redound to their credit; but having courageouslyleapfrogged the interim turboprop hurdle, they have now retreated to stumble over it, and meanwhile our American competitors—after considerable vacillation—have by-passed it as a long-range vehicle altogether. Why dawdle along at 400 m.p.h. at 30,000ft,when you can whittle through the stratosphere (without bumps and without prop troubles) at 550 m.p.h.? There can be little doubt, I think, that die recurring deficits ofB.O.A.C. are mainly attributable to the ill-assorted melange of aircraft types, both British and American, collected over the post-war decade. In the way of American types it began by faithfully copycatting the "lead" of PanAm with an unfortunate dead-endtype boldly advertised as stratospheric, notwithstanding it was constrained to cruise in the troposphere—in common with nearlyall piston-prop and turboprop transports. From this unhappy choice of the third-best American type then on the market (especi-ally in terms of operating cost), one is compelled to conclude that the technical development side of B.O.A.C. lacks both imagineer-ing instinct and critical faculty, plodding alongside the aircraft designer instead of prodding him. Worse still, at this writing,there are ominous signs that B.O.A.C.'s technical advisers, once more following the example of PanAm, will soon be ploddingalongside the American designer—which, in our book, would be disastrously retrogressive. The shipbuilding copycatter of Kip-ling's day was only a year and a half behind the leader, whereas the aircraft design copyist of today will be backsliding at least tenyears. One had high hopes that in sponsoring the Comet familyB.O.A.C. had seen a vision of an all-British jet highway, one WE devote this page to a letter received last week from a correspondentin the U.S.A.—an Englishman who has lived in that country for the past five years. In it, commenting on recent letters in our Correspondencecolumns, he deplores the prospect of B.O.A.C.'s intending purchase of U.S. jet airliners. Although this view is at variance with our own (seeour leading article last week) we feel nevertheless that his letter will arouse interest. He is perhaps too unkind to B.O.A.C., and he does notmention the fact that the American airline industry has bought British aircraft. His most important omission, perhaps, is the fact that there isa limit to the number of projects which the British industry, because of its relatively small size, can tackle. essentially stratospheric and above the weather. "Icarus" isdeluding himself if he imagines that Britannia is going to rule the air waves with a turboprop airliner. Optimistic dreams of prop-driven aircraft cruising at 500 m.p.h. are so visionary (and un- necessary) that they can be dismissed as wishful thinking. In myview, the M.R.E. specification of 1946 was unimaginative and the progress of a decade has made it still more so. We have to raiseour sights into the N.E. quadrant of the speed-altitude envelope, although I must cheerfully differ from Vickers' George Edwards,who seems to be in favour of spending the next 10-12 years working up a supersonic airliner. Much better to rebuild theV-1000 by refining it into a VC-7B with jet flaps, thus saving a wad of money on airport real estate all over the global map.There is another reported remark of Mr. Edwards which this old expatriate sees in a different light. This is the oft-repeatedthesis that, in comparison with Great Britain, the U.S.A. (and now the U.S.S.R.) are big countries with long distances, ergo theirown domestic market potential gives them the initial impulse for laying down a "break-even" production line. While it would beunrealistic to deny that the British Empire, as such, has shrunk considerably (because of its unique "virtue" in being politicallyself-liquidating!), there is still enough of it left in the Common- wealth of overseas dominions and colonies to offer the idealsituation for long-range routes, and thus the market prospects for operating them with British transport aircraft. The unpalatablefact'that British Dominions, and even Crown Colonies, somehow find the dollars for American aircraft is admittedly a reflection onthe U.K. manufacturer and his design team. We must stop looking inwardly and insularly at the British Isles when designing a Britishproduct. Mr. Edwards, of course, is almost unique among British designers in successfully invading the hard-dollar empire withturboprop hardware that fits into the short-haul domestic route pattern of most countries. Underselling the Comet 4 ? I should also like to proffer a brief retort to another correspon-dent who has joined issue with "Icarus" in your June 22 number. Technically speaking, I believe that Mr. A. S. Richardson is asconfused over the relative merits of turboprop and turbojet as the opposition he is attacking. The current performance figuresfor the Comet 4, be it noted, are firmly based on the Comet 3 hardware, whereas long experience shows that one should be waryof publicity puffsterism. Conversely, and somewhat perversely, de Havillands seem bent on underselling the range performanceof the Comet 4 by introducing a built-in paper headwind of 50 m.p.h., when publicising their Range v. Payload curves. Iknow of no American firm which undersells the operational range (i.e., with all fuel reserves, but with zero wind) of its aircraft bya good ten per cent in this fashion. For one thing, a 50 m.p.h. headwind allowance is insufficient on many routes under certainconditions. Which means to say that the airline operator figures in the headwind to suit each specific route and direction. Further, in advocating that we buy American long-range (andlong take-off) jetliners powered by British engines, Mr. Richardson is as badly off the political and economic beam as "Icarus." Thishalf-baked loaf may look better than no bread, but in fact it adver- tises to all the world that the British airframe industry is an abjectfailure in this business of designing and producing a first-class pure jet transport; moreover, it clearly violates the last sentenceof his letter: "Let us buy the best aircraft for the job, only give British manufacturers the opportunity to prove that they canproduce the best." How? By purchasing and then copycatting those podded military freaks? American jetliners with Britishturbojets for British airlines are as incongruous as would have been British shipyards falling for American hulls when Parsonsinvented the steam turbine towards the end of the nineteenth century. We must knead British dough for baking the full loaf,thereby keeping the dough in British pockets. FAVONIUS.
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
