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Aviation History
1956
1956 - 1833.PDF
28 December 1956 U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, too few able young men and women comeinto science and technology in Britain and probably in U.S.A. Undoubtedly one of the factors at work, anyway in Britain, is thefeeling that science and technology are "slightly odd." My own view is that there is no particular virtue in being a scientist, butneither is there a virtue in not being one; it is on the latter point that there is controversy, for some people still seem to think thatthere is. Such views should now disappear and science and tech- nology be recognized as neither odd nor particularly virtuous, butas an essential element of modern society, capable of great influ- ence and service. Centres of learning would act wisely by em-bracing them fully rather than, as has regrettably been the case, making them a matter for argument instead of action. It is often interesting, and sometimes moderating, to look backon what has happened before. On doing this in the matter of scientific education and training I find that over one hundred yearsago, in England, there was a great outcry that there would be a disastrous shortage of scientists, and the terms used were verysimilar to those employed in the current argument on the matter. The present position is not new! But it was this outcry of morethan a century ago that made England a considerable pioneer in scientific and technological education, and this effort served herwell. Now many steps are again being taken in Britain, and one of the most interesting is the creation of a fund to which allBritish industry is invited to contribute (and has already done so to the tune of many millions of dollars) for the purpose of creat-ing, in the best schools in England, scientific laboratories and libraries worthy of the place that science should have in schooleducation. There is, I think, one matter which comes out of an examina-tion of the Russian position in aviation that bears on the subject of strength of resources, and on the subject of the next section ofthis paper (Decision and Scientific Criticism). Fig. 5 contains out- line drawings of a variety of Russian aircraft. [Sir Arnold showedthree-view drawings of the Mig-17, Super Farmer, Super Flash- light, Badger, Bison, Bear, and one of the Sukhoi supersonic deltas.These drawings were reproduced—with due acknowledgment— from Flight of Augut 3 last.] Until the point marked "first break"[the delta] Russia has supplied all her military and civil needs on one basic aeronautical formula—sweepback and boundary layerfences—and in addition there has been a considerable consistency in tailplane arrangements. (There are several other Russian types,in addition to those shown, based on the same formula.) This means that the basic data on the configuration, and experiencefrom any aircraft in flight, was readily transferable from one to the other. The economy that this represents is considerable, andgoes some way to account for the rapid growth of Russian air power. When the first break was made, it was presumably be-cause the formula was thought to be exhausted in that the aero- dynamic demands arising from increasing supersonic Mach num-ber had stretched the structural problem far enough to justify turn- ing to the stiffer delta planform; but the tailplane arrangementwas not changed and there was thus some continuity of experience brought into the new formula. To secure the benefits that arise in this way, certain penaltiesmust, no doubt, be incurred. A great burden is placed on the machinery for making the decision because, if it is wrong, theconsequences are severe. But this burden is less than might be supposed to this extent: provided sufficient work has been doneon the fundamentals of the arrangement chosen to eliminate any possibility of a radical difficulty then, given determination, thearrangement can be made to work. It may not be ideal in some circumstances, but departure from ideal is presumably thought tobe justified by the gains in other directions. Decision and Scientific Criticism—Decision must take accountof a good balancing of time and technical risk; must recognize that a good deal of technological information vital to the successof a project cannot be obtained until the project is started because, before that, the need for it is insufficiently pointed; musthave regard for the vital part played by development, and the need to provide a basis from which it can begin. Scientific criticism has become a considerable factor in decisionin recent times, and quite rightly so; but there are dangers that must be recognized. First, the scientist, as he is at presenteducated, is endowed with a technique of analysis which is assumed to be logiral—but he is not necessarily endowed withinitiative, inspiration and courage. There are some who argue that a scientific education of the kind now common has a positivelyadverse effect on these qualities; I doubt if this is so, but it does not do much to encourage them. The point of danger is this.Most scientists are educated in a way that gives them a consider- able faith in the logic of their discipline but little idea of itslimitations and how to overcome them. Belief in its accuracy is right provided the basis from which the deduction starts is full andcomplete but when decision must be reached in a situation of an? difficulty it is rare that a complete basis for subsequentscientific deduction can be stated. Because there are .Jwj.w.mpon- derables, scientific assessment can be misleading unless it ismoderated by a reasonably full understanding of the processes of 997 application and what can occur in them. Most courses of studyin science—and many in engineering—leave this matter quite out of account. It has been the pose of many academic men whosedisciples are in the humanities that their students are not con- cerned with any vocational aspect of their studies. Yet whatgreater contribution can an educated mind make to life than by application through a vocation and how many do not, in fact,apply it this way? Equally, many teachers of science take the view that their students are concerned only with the purity of aline of scientific thought, untrammelled by considerations of appli- cation. It would be better if the study of a section of the history ofscience and of the history of some engineering developments were regarded as essential in the preparation of any student of science orengineering, and if some study of the methods of application was also seriously made. Anyone who studies the history of sciencewill soon be convinced that its progress, far from being highly logical, has been just the reverse. The reason it appears to belogical is only because it is taught that way; it is convenient to remember only the work that was later seen to fit to the logicalpattern. But an examination of the fine structure of the history of science very quickly shows that scientific evaluation of thenext move does not necessarily get the only, or even the ultimately right, answer. Scientific evaluation is an essential part of the process leadingto decision, but scientific people concerned in it too often take less account of the other parts of the process than they should;they are sometimes under-equipped in their feeling for the ultimate consequences of the influences they have felt themselves forced toneglect. When progress in the acquisition of knowledge is rapid, it is easy to advocate that decision be delayed because somethingnew is about to be found, or that a project be stopped because something better is now possible. It is also easy to state a casefor a large number of variants on any theme. These are serious difficulties which undoubtedly contribute to the length of timetaken to bring scientific possibilities tp practical use. There is no escaping that, unless enormous resources are to be deployed,this position must be firmly controlled by decision that has regard for the great investment in technical effort that eachindividual project represents, and for the necessity, in times when technical superiority matters, for reasonably continuous develop-ment of "hardware" as well as of concepts. If scientists use their formidable techniques of analysis to do no more than delaydecision by arguments on marginal points, and fail to study and take account of the other issues, or if they advocate indiscriminatelytoo many variants on the theme, they do less service than they could or should. The System Concept.—One of the factors that has had anadverse effect on the time taken to achieve aeronautical develop- ments is the "weapon system concept." No reasonable person canthink that a weapon should be other than a system designed to produce the end-result desired; this is just as true in civil applica-tions. But, under the cloak of a term such as "weapon system," project planning can go adrift and I think has done so in more thanone case. There are many elements in any weapon: for example, in a fighter, the airframe, the engine, the radar, the armament—and they must operate together harmoniously. But if a high level of technical risk is taken in the choice of each of these elements,then the burden of the technical work needed to bring them all along to the same end point is very great indeed—if all the babieswere born on one day there would be a shortage of midwives. Yet this is what has sometimes been advocated as necessary to a"weapon system." The practical difficulties soon become almost overwhelming—the designer of the wing wants to know the aero-dynamics and loads of the weapons he must attach but these are not yet fully designed; later the weapon must be changed due todevelopment snags but this means changes in the wing when the jigs are completed and metal committed to them. This situation ismultiplied many times over in a complicated system. If a new project is to come through reasonably quickly it should be so con-ceived initially that the various elements that make it up are not all at the same state in their evolution development. There cannotbe any doubt that to produce a sound product extensive jigging and tooling is necessary, but I am inclined to wonder whetherit is sometimes taken too far. At a time when technical superiority may well be all important, the production engineer ispresented with an opportunity to make what can be a vital con- tribution by achieving the maximum flexibility in his position.The methods adopted in the West and in the U.S.S.R. are in contrast; the Russians appear to use far less jigging and toolingthan the West, and they no doubt pay some penalty in the main- tainability and performance of the product and in the manpowerused to make it, but they probably gain in time and in ability to make change to an extent that justifies this position in their eyes.Research and development is as necessary in production methods as it is on the technical side of the aircraft; the creation of a positionas receptive as possible to the most up-to-date technical require- ment must take a position of importance alongside the achieve-ment of rapid, accurate and cheap output. (To be continued)
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