FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1957
1957 - 0014.PDF
14 FLIGHT Three French Sikorsky S-55's, flying in for- mation over the mountainous country of Algeria, carrying troops and supplies on anti-rebel operations. This contribution, from a French correspondent, forms an instructive examination of the helicopter's tactical value in a particular class of military operation, as represented by the French Army's engagements with the rebel forces in North Africa. It is based on official reports and data. HELICOPTERS IN NORTH AFRICA IN order to give its forces a means of speeding up anti-terroristoperations in North Africa, the French Government decidedat the end of 1955 to place large orders for helicopters of all sizes, as had been recommended by the High Command followingexperience of a year of fighting in Algeria. The engagements of 1954-55 had proved to the Army Commandthat only helicopters could regain for the French troops, encum- bered by their heavy equipment and rigid organization, a degreeof mobility sufficient to give them equality with the highly mobile and well-concealed enemy forces. These fellaghas, as the rebels are called, are essentially mobiletroops, their favourite tactics being the avoidance of direct combat. Through their knowledge of the local terrain, and because of theterror in which they hold the populations among which they move, it is easy for them to direct their attacks against any convenientobjectives which are either lightly defended or not defended at all. In other words, they take the operational initiative only when, atthe moment of attack, they are sure of their numerical and tactical superiority. On the other hand, if they chance to meet ground forces ofsuperior strength, they do not open fire; at the most, they maintain contact for just long enough to allow their main body to get clearand disperse rapidly over the countryside. The rebels are also specially favoured by the Algerian topo-graphy, which is ideal for guerilla operations. The relative paucity of roads and tracks hinders the French forces' transport system,though its vehicles may appear excellent to the uninitiated observer. In such circumstances it is not difficult to define the methodswhich must be used to regain the initiative. Above all, any new air equipment must be of a kind which would permit the Frenchto seek the rebels carefully and systematically, continually and everywhere and, after identifying them, not to lose contact. Thegreatest effect would be achieved by being able to attack straight away and to launch a pursuit immediately. From this it is a smallstep to visualize a permanent watch kept by helicopter-transported detachments of troops. It would indeed be the ideal, thoughcostly, solution. A continual search over such extensive territory for an enemywho more often than not cannot be identified by anything such as a uniform would require the setting up of an intelligence netwith a very fine mesh. It would itself be the more effective as contacts between the security forces and the population becomemore numerous. But in the case of the Algerian rebels every piece of information, however definite, has only a transient value,since the band of men it concerns is so mobile. If one takes into account the delay in transmission, the infor-mation allows the enemy's position to be calculated only to the nearest 10 or 20 km; and in order to exploit such an indicationwith reasonable chances of success, a sweeping search operation to cover at least 300 sq km would have to be organized in a matterof hours; and this is an optimistic estimate of the area which would in fact have to be searched. Experience during the first year of fighting in Algeria has shownthe difficulties of this type of operation, because the movement of ground forces required for the sweep is more often than not slowand only too obvious to the enemy, giving him an excellent chance to get away, if not by day, then at least at night. Envelopingmovements, to have the maximum hope of success, must bring about complete encirclement a matter of hours after the rebelband has been discovered by aerial reconnaissance or by direct contact. The helicopter can achieve such an encirclement by the pre-cision, the stealth and above all the speed with which it can be brought into action. It is here that we find the explanation of theGovernment's large orders—orders which, in little over a year, have raised the total of helicopters used by French forces in NorthAfrica from 30 to about 100, half of them operated by the Air Force. In January 1956, the mixed helicopter unit Groupe MixteHelicopteres 57 of the French Air Force counted as its total resources six Bell 47s and eight Sikorsky S-55s. By the beginningof September its strength comprised 28 Bell 47s, 14 S-55s and 18 S-58s, carrying 13 soldiers each. And, in the month ofSeptember alone, 14 Bells flew 482 hours; 14 S-55s, 704 hours; Soldiers and helicopter crews pause offer setting down on a flowery meadow in a mountain valley.
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
