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Aviation History
1957
1957 - 0027.PDF
4 January 1957 27 THE VULCAN ACCIDENT Commons Statement by the Air Minister A FULL statement about the Vulcan accident at London Air-port on October 1 was made to the House of Commons onDecember 20 by Mr. Nigel Birch, the Secretary of Statefor Air. His remarks included references to an inquiry into the operation of the G.C.A. system at London Airport by Dr. A. G.Touch, Director of Electronic Research and Development at the Ministry of Supply. The text of Dr. Touch's report, it was stated,is to be published in full. Mr. Birch said that the Vulcan was returning from a highly successfulflight to Australia and New Zealand. In addition to the pilot, it carried Air Marshal Sir Harry Broadhurst, A.O.C-in-C. Bomber Command, asco-pilot, a crew of three R.A.F. officers, and a representative of A. V. Roe. It had left Aden at 0250 hours G.M.T. and before departure the captainhad been given forecasts of landing weather at London Airport and certain other airfields to which he might need to divert. He obtained laterinformation en route, including further forecasts for London Airport. The last of these was given to him when he was over Epsom. Thisforecast, which indicated broken low cloud, heavy rain and lirde wind, with visibility at 1100 yd, proved an accurate description of the weatheractually experienced. The aircraft had ample fuel to divert, and Air Marshal Broadhurstemphasized to the captain that he should divert if he was dissatisfied with the weather conditions prevailing. The captain decided to makeone attempt to land at London Airport. At about 1004 hours G.M.T., at a height of 1,500ft and about five n.m. from touchdown, and with bothaltimeters correcdy set, the aircraft began its descent under the control of the Talkdown Controller at London Airport. The captain set his"break-off height" at 300ft, that is to say he intended to come down under the talkdown control until his altimeter stood at 300ft and, if he thenfound that it was not possible to make the landing, to over-shoot at that height. The G.C.A. talkdown instructions were followed, with someundulation relative to the glide path and some corrections in azimuth, up to a point about three-quarters of a mile from touchdown, when the pilotwas informed that he was 80ft above the glide path. At this point, the weather was at its worst. The pilot received nofurther information on elevation, and at a point about 1,000 yd from the touchdown point and 700 yd from the threshold of the runway, the aircraftstruck the ground. Both main undercarriage units were removed, and the elevator controls were damaged. Subsequently the aircraft rose sharplyto a height of 200-300ft, when it was found to be out of control. The captain then gave the order to abandon the aircraft and himself usedhis ejector seat. The co-pilot repeated the order and, after trying the controls, also ejected. Within seconds of the order being given thenose and starboard wing of the aircraft dropped and the aircraft crashed to the ground. The remaining three members of the crew and thepassenger were killed instantaneously on impact. Royal Air Force Inquiry The R.A.F. Court of Inquiry, which assembled the following day,found nothing to suggest any technical failure in the aircraft which could have contributed to the accident. They concluded that the captainof the aircraft was justified in deciding to make an attempt to land at London Airport but they considered that, in the circumstances, hemade an error of judgment in setting himself a break-off height of 300ft and also in going below that height. The Court drew attention, how-ever, to the facts that though the G.C.A. controller informed the pilot about seven seconds before the aircraft first hit the ground that he was80ft above the glide path, he did not subsequently advise him that he was below it; and that after the aircraft had hit the ground he continuedhis talkdown as if the approach had been normal. The Court concluded that, since the aircraft was under G.C.A. control, the failure to warn thecaptain that he was going below the glide path was the principal cause of the accident. Mr. Birch then recalled that, on receipt of the report, he had referredthe passages relating to the G.C.A. aspect to the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, who immediately arranged for the inquiry by Dr.Touch. In a report which he submitted, Dr. Touch concluded that there wasno evidence of technical failure or malfunctioning in the G.C.A. equip- ment. His investigation confirmed that the pilot was not warned by theG.C.A. unit of his closeness to the ground, but despite a detailed and exhaustive examination of various possibilities, Dr. Touch was unableto establish the reason with certainty. He thought that the most likely explanation was that throughout the approach the Controller concen-trated too much on azimuth at the expense of information on elevation. He felt, however, that there were extenuating circumstances connectedwith the unusual speed of the aircraft and the number of corrections in azimuth. He also considered that even if a warning had been given inthe final five or six seconds of the ten seconds which, in his opinion, elapsed after the pilot was told that he was 80ft above the glide path,it would have been too late. Mr. Birch said that he and the Minister of Transport and CivilAviation had given most careful consideration to these findings. They were agreed that there was an error of judgment on the part of the pilotin selecting a break-off height of 300ft and in going below it; and also that the G.C.A. controller did not give adequate guidance on elevationduring the descent and, in particular, that he was at fault in the concluding stages in not warning the pilot that he was below the glide path andtherefore dangerously close to the ground. Mr. Birch added that the apportionment of responsibility was diffi-cult. He accepted the conclusions of the R.A.F. court, but neither he nor his right honourable friend felt able to define the degree of respon-sibility precisely. He thought it would be unjust to the pilot and co-pilot were he not to make it clear that it was their duty to eject fromthe aircraft when they did. He was satisfied that there could have been no hope of controlling theaircraft after the initial impact. In these circumstances it was the duty of the captain to give the order to abandon the aircraft, and of all thosewho were on board to obey if they were able to do so. Both the pilot and co-pilot realized when they gave their orders that owing to the low altitudethe other occupants had no chance to escape, and they considered that their own chances were negligible. Mr. Birch concluded by saying that the House would wish to joinwith him in expressing regret that so successful a flight should have ended so tragically, and in tendering sympathy to the bereaved. Members' Questions MR. GEOFFREY DB FREITAS (Lab., Lincoln) associated the Oppositionwith these condolences and then asked the following questions:— Was there not a monitor covering the height radar who could saywhether it indicated that the aircraft was below break-off height? How could it be that the controller continued his talk-down after the aircrafthad actually hit the ground? Was there an echo on the screen? If so, what was the explanation of an echo being there in the circumstances?Should we not . . . establish definitely whether [the controller] was responsible? Is it not of the greatest importance to know whether weshould retain confidence in the equipment used at London Airport? Mr. Birch replied that a team of two had been involved, a trackerand a controller, and the talk-down had been recorded; but there was no monitor in the sense of an actual record. On the question of special echo,that matter had been gone into exhaustively by Dr. Touch and he con- cluded that there was no question of that at all. His opinion was that fullconfidence could be placed in the equipment at London Airport. MR. CHARLES ORR-EWING (Cons., Hendon North) asked the Ministerto Consider whether it was wise to bring very heavy and somewhat unusual military aircraft in to land at a busy international airport, andwhether it would be wiser to divert them to aerodromes which were less busy, and where there was more "scope" should a mistake be made.Mr. Orr-Ewing also asked whether the controller on duty had got full information on the optimum glide path of the Vulcan, or whether he wasonly informed of the o.g.p. of the civil aircraft with which he was more normally concerned. Mr. Birch replied that there was nothing very new about militaryaircraft using London Airport. Some hundreds of landings had been made by them since it was opened. But the whole question of policy onthe use of the airport by military aircraft was under review. If a change was decided upon, the House would be informed. On the question of theglide path, the controller knew he was controlling the flight as notice had been given many days before. "Most Unsatisfactory" MR. FRANK BESWICK (Lab., Uxbridge) said that the Minister hadgiven a most unsatisfactory report on what had been a most regrettable accident. He had left the position with regard to the ground controllersomewhat vague. Could the House be assured that a full statement would be given on the inquiry into the ground controller's side of theaccident? Was the Minister aware that in civil aviation, where they had agood deal more experience of G.C.A. approaches than on the military side, they had found it necessary to fix a minimum ceiling below whichthe pilot of any aircraft should not come; and this ceiling was fixed in relation to the experience of the pilot and his familiarity with a particularaircraft type as well as the airport conditions? Mr. Beswick then suggested that the Minister had left out of hisreport the most important factors about the experience of the two pilots concerned. In view of their comparative inexperience of thistype—which was inevitable—was it not an awful tragedy that the deci- sion was taken to go into London Airport in these conditions? Mr. Birch replied that Dr. Touch's report would be published in full.It was perfectly true that the Vulcan had not been in service for a long time, but the pilot had a master green instrument rating, which wasthe highest that could be got. London Airport was being used throughout the period of incident.During the hour before the crash took place there were eight landings, and six during the half-hour succeeding it. He did not think one couldsay that the pilot was wrong in attempting to land. Mr. Birch admitted that the pilot had not done a full G.C.A. landing in a Vulcan, but he haddone them hundreds of times in other types. In reply to MR. GEOFFREY LLOYD (Cons., Sutton Coldfield) he saidthere was no question of Fido at London Airport. He assured MR. A. E. HUNTER (Lab., Feltham) said that the safety record at LondonAirport was extraordinarily good. [Further news on page 3]
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