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Aviation History
1957
1957 - 0097.PDF
25 January 1957 97 Supply of Military Aircraft Points from a Critical Official Report PREPARED by the House of Commons Select Committee onEstimates, a report* on the supply of military aircraft waspresented to Parliament on January 18. Its recommenda- tions are set out overleaf and further reference is made in a leading article, which alludes also to aircraft and missile projects of excep- tional interest. Evidence, taken from representatives of the Ministry of Supply, Air Ministry, Admiralty, Society of British Aircraft Constructors, Ministry of Defence and Treasury, occupies over 300 pages. The first session was on February 7, 1956, and the last on July 17, 1956, and the report is divided under these main headings: Air- craft and Equipment Ordered, The Organization of Supply, The Aircraft Industry, Contracts and Remuneration, Conclusion, Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix. The first part is made up of an historical introduction and sections dealing with research aircraft, aircraft which did not go into production, Service aircraft, engines, elec- tronics and guided weapons. The second part considers the Defence Research Policy Committee, the Ministry of Supply and development time; the third covers the size of the aircraft industry and the allocation of contracts; and the fourth deals with research and development, production, profits, contributions to research and development projects, and contract drafting. Special consideration is given to the Vickers V.1000—"the most expensive of all the aircraft which were never produced." The report remarks that 1952 Air Ministry requirements for this long- range transport were very strict. It was intended to fly at the same height and speed as the Valiant, carry a large number of people and take off in a short space under tropical conditions. Development did not proceed as quickly as had been expected; some technical problems proved more intractable than people had first thought; and for these reasons, and because of the urgent need to re-equip Transport Command, the Air Ministry decided it would be best to rely on a civil type, the Britannia, although this did not meet their original requirements. The V.1000 was cancelled in December 1955, before a prototype had ever flown. None the less, the cost to the taxpayer was nearly £4 million. Bombers, Missiles, Fighters The M.o.S. witness was asked whether he did not feel that the Air Ministry could have been pressed to say earlier that it had no further interest in the project; but the only reply was an explana- tion of the reasons why the project had failed. No attempt seemed to have been made at the outset to ensure that the aircraft had a civil use. The M.o.S. representative agreed with another witness that in future the R.A.F., when requiring a transport aircraft, should take the most suitable current civil type and adapt it. The cost of the Sperrin project was £3,500,000, but whether this "less successful interim type" could have been avoided and the Valiant alone produced was a question on which the Committee was not competent to decide. Dealing with a weapon "originally intended for use by both the R.A.F. and the Army," the Commit- tee reports that it was finally decided that the Army could make do with the American Corporal, and the R.A.F. requirement was therefore dropped. The order for the original weapon was then cancelled, but not before £645,000 had been spent. This seems a clear case, says the report, where earner consideration might have avoided waste. Work on a development of the Sturgeon as an "insurance" against Gannet development cost £490,000, and advanced versions of the Swift and Hunter, themselves insurances against failure of the P.I, cost £1,745,000 before being abandoned. Reference is made to a rocket aircraft—"more in the nature of research"—which (as remarked in our leading article) is expected to lead to large production for the R.A.F. The history of the Swift is dealt with in considerable detail. An order for 100 was placed in November 1950, but thenceforth progress was beset with troubles. The first prototype crashed after three hours' flying and not until August 1952 was the first production aircraft flown. Throughout 1953 and 1954 modifica- tions were made both to the aircraft and to the production con- tract. In this connection (it was pointed out to representatives of the Ministry), as the difficulties of the Swift increased so, it appeared, did the number on order. Even by March 1954, when no cure had yet been found to the aircraft's tendency to tighten in turns, nothing had been done to cancel orders. The Ministry's representative replied that tightening in turns affected every air- craft of the same generation as the Swift, and there was no reason *"Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates: TheSupply of Military Aircraft," Her Majesty's Stationery Office, price 16s net. to suppose then that it would not be possible to cure it. But the cure took much longer than expected, and after further trials early in 1955 the Air Ministry decided that the R.A.F. could not accept the Swift, except possibly for certain specialized roles. The strategic situation had changed considerably by this time, and the threat the Swift had been designed to meet was no longer of such importance. In cancelling orders, the M.o.S. found difficulty, as large pro- duction had been set up and some aircraft were so nearly com- pleted that they were more or less already paid for. Others were left on order for the "specialized roles." The total cost of the Swift project was estimated at £33 million. The S.B.A.C. sug- gested that at the time of the Korean war so much time had been spent "chasing the better instead of putting the good into production" that the R.A.F. was not equipped to the standard it could have been if existing aircraft had been accepted. On V-bombers, although Sir Roy Fedden had said, "I am sure you have got to put your eggs in one basket" (the committee considers it significant that both Sir Roy and Mr. W. E. W. Petter would have "gambled" on the Victor), it was argued by Sir Frederick Handley Page that it was essential to have two centres of design as an insurance against one type failing. Sir Frederick advanced this view also on the general grounds that modern aircraft involved so much that was on the verge of the unknown that it was altogether too risky to rely on one design team. Mr. Petter and the Gnat Mr. Petter was asked to outline the history of the Gnat. He claimed that though there was a clearly expressed Service demand for the Gnat, it had not been produced—largely because the M.o.S. disbelieved in the general conception. The Ministry representative denied this criticism. He said the reason why the Gnat was not produced was that, at the time a decision had to be taken, no suitable engine was available. To Mr. Petter's general criticism that fighters are becoming too complicated, and to a particular criticism of the Javelin made by another witness, the M.o.S. representative replied that, while Mr. Petter's concept was an attractive one, especially from the taxpayers' point of view, the only criterion in deciding what fighters to order must be the threat they would have to meet. Undoubtedly fighters were becoming more complicated, but so were the opposing bombers. No defence programme could be justified on the score of economy if it left the country without fighter defence in bad weather, or at night. This defence, on evidence, the Javelin did give. Nevertheless, it was clear that the M.o.S. were by no means satisfied with the fighter programme as it was at present, though on the grounds of delay, not of over-complication. This was shown by their attitude to Mr. Petter's suggestion that the best type of American fighter might be produced in this country under licence. Mr. Petter had put this forward "as the last hope of keeping an air force going when everything else has failed"; but the Ministry representative, while pointing out the difficulties involved in such a revolutionary decision, as for example the expense in dollars, the necessity of relying on American research, and the fitting of the aircraft's equipment, concluded with the words, "Having said all that, that is a policv which has not been excluded." Lord Hives repeatedly stated that, in the present state of knowledge, too many engine projects were being carried on. Broadly speaking, the tendency was for engines to become even more similar. For this reason, he would have expected that economies could be achieved by cutting down the number of projects and by using the same engine for more types of aircraft. As aircraft grew more expensive, complicated and difficult to maintain there would have to be fewer of them. Moreover, the stage was being reached when fighters would no longer provide any protection, at any rate in the United Kingdom, and_ the place of conventional air weapons might be taken by ballistic rockets, for examole, which "would put all the aircraft makers out of business." The Bristol Aeroplane Company took the view that it was still necessary to maintain competition in the aero-engine industry, pointing to the technical controversy between the by-pass and straight-jet engines for aircraft of the V-bomber class. In considering profits, the Committee recommends that a review should take place of the accounting arrangements of the contracts department of the M.o.S. to enable them to obtain accurate and up-to-date figures of the profits made by firms from contracts for research and development and production of military aircraft. [Continued overleaf
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