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Aviation History
1957
1957 - 0376.PDF
378 FLIGHT THE PHILOSOPHY OF NAVAL AIR WARFARE... potential in this respect. It is very doubtful indeed if the super-specialized fighter—e.g., the ship-to-air missile—could ever serve this dual purpose. Meantime the Sea Hawk and Sea Venom have proved to besplendid aircraft in the strike role, and the capabilities of their successors, the Scimitar (N.I 13) and Vixen (D.H. 110), in thisrespect will be watched with some interest. The former will be in service this year.Reconnaissance is an important component of striking opera- tions often allowed to lapse in peace time. Unless it is knownprecisely where the target is and how effectively it has been dealt with by previous attacks, launching a strike or re-strike may be awaste of time and effort. There is a saying that "time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted" a dictum as true today as ever.Naval aircraft must, therefore, have this capability particularly in the photographic role. What of ship-borne surface-to-surface guided missiles—thereplacement for the carrier-borne strike aircraft? The American Regulus is the first fruit of this conception. Once again theimportance of the seas is apparent because the launching platform is mobile, perhaps very difficult to locate and even more difficultto attack, particularly if it is submersible. How flexible would such a system be? Could it be used to attack a moving ship-target? Could it be used against targets ashore in a limited type of war or for close support of the Army? If it is used againstshore targets how does one get to know where the target is and if, after launching, the target has been struck? Replacing thehuman piloted aircraft in the strike role is by no means the simple answer to a complicated problem. Against some specified targetsthe missile would be superb—against others useless. He would be a prophet indeed who accurately and convincingly forecast thestate of the art in 2000 A.D. Air Defence.—As mentioned above, there is always a risk ofcarrier task-forces and shipping on trade routes being subjected to air attack. Against what forms of air attack is the Royal Navypreparing to defend itself during the next ten years? At the moment the maritime air threat is a near-sonic one andis represented by high-, medium- and low-flying bombers, scout and reconnaissance aircraft. However, we recognize that the timeis fast approaching when defence will be needed against high- flying bombers capable of speeds up to and which may exceedMach 2. The long-range ballistic rocket which has recently received much publicity in connection with the air defence of denselypopulated areas of the United Kingdom need hardly be con- sidered in a maritime role against a moving target; but we findan almost equally severe threat—the stand-off weapon-carrying bomber which releases its weapon to "go it alone" when stillmany miles from the force which it is attacking. If such weapons are small, can fly fast and are capable of homing themselves withnuclear warheads on to rheir targets, they will represent a severe menace to ships and convoys. Air Defence of the Fleet at the moment is based on front-gunfighter aircraft, with ships' anti-aircraft guns acting as long-stop; the next decade will witness the introduction of air-to-air andsurface-to-air guided weapons. But it must be understood that fighter aircraft will still be required in our carriers to counter theenemy in case he finds it possible to attack from beyond or below the envelope of the Fleet's guided-weapon defences. Here, ofcourse, we are considering the destruction of targets such as the stand-off weapon-carrying bomber or radar-equipped scoutingaircraft, neither of which need ever approach within range of the force's guided weapons. Later, the short- and long-range surface-to-air guided weaponscan be expected to take a major share in air defence; but as has already been pointed out, fighter aircraft will continue to form asmaller but still essential part of the overall system. When referring to the next generation we no longer speak of"a fighter aircraft" but rather of "a fighter weapons-system." Gone are the days when air defence could be established by mount-ing a gun in a fast, high-flying airframe. Future defence levels will depend on the correct functioning of a tiiousand and onecomponents, from engines, to airborne radar, to guided missiles, to airborne communication systems all of which integrated togethercomprise the fighter weapons-system. Typifying mis generation is the Vixen. But what of the third generation, the fighters which will stillbe needed during the heyday of the surface-to-air guided weapons and which will be required to tackle really high-performancetargets? What shape will these be, and how will the inherent limitations imposed on design by carrier-based operation be over-come? Here the solution may still be in the weapons-system fighter, the performance necessary to combat such targets beingvested in the weapons system, the airborne radar and air-to-air missile, rather than in the parent aircraft. There is some reasonto think that the generation-after-next of Fleet fighter pilots may perhaps find themselves flying "slow" fighter weapons-systemswhich could well be termed "fighter battleships." The fighter or fighter weapons-system is only one componentof a vast structure, the overall Fleet air defence system. Certainly the fighter constitutes an important part of that system in present-day operations; but, when discussing air defence, a further essential component of the system is the ship-borne radar. The acquisition of early warning of an approaching enemy air-craft to ensure that the fighter is launched, together with the ability to direct the fighter accurately to an attacking position onits target, are two functions of surface radars, the importance of which cannot be overstressed. The Navy is fortunate in beingabout to introduce a radar set which will cope adequately with the latter function insofar as high and medium altitude targets areconcerned. The problem of detecting low-flying aircraft at a range suffi-cient to effect an interception is a difficult one. The solution is thought to lie in the provision of long endurance aircraft stationedaround, but at some distance from, the fleet and fitted with suit- able all-round-looking radar. The detections thus obtained couldbe passed electronically to the carriers. This system, known as airborne early warning, has been tried with much success. It must be added that the results of recent full-scale air defenceexercises have not been disappointing and have disproved the forebodings of the severest critics. These exercises were carriedout with the present generation of Fleet fighters, the Sea Hawks and Sea Venoms; the position should be even better when thenext generation of aircraft come into service. Anti-submarine Defence.—The submarine threat appears to bean immense force of between 400 and 500 vessels. The factors and reasoning behind the decision to build such a large under-water Navy are not known. It may be that the major motive is to deny the Allies' freedom of action in those sea areas fromwhich the allied naval atomic strikes could be launched. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that the operating areas ofthe strike fleet are geographically limited to the radius of action of their strike aircraft. In effect, the enemy submarine fleet maywell be their counter to the tactical mobility of carriers. However, after the initial nuclear exchange in a major war itwould be vital to bring supplies from the West to ensure the survival of European civilian populations and the Allied armiesin Europe, and later perhaps to build up those armies for offen- sive action. The vast tonnage of shipping required to carry thesesupplies would be exposed during a continuing war to an under- water threat immeasurably greater than ever experienced before.It has been suggested that the aeroplane could replace the cargo ship in an emergency—that essential supplies could be broughtin by air. Investigation has shown that twenty Britannias would be required to lift the same amount of cargo across the Atlanticas a 10,000-ton cargo vessel in one year. Britannias would have to fly 3,000 hours each in that year, whereas the cargo ship wouldmake four or five round trips. Apart from the cost (a new 10,000- ton cargo ship costs around £l-jm while twenty Britannias wouldcost something in the order of £20m) they would require about 65,000-68,000 tons of fuel which would have to be brought toEngland in additional tankers. Logistically, such a method of supply would be quite unsound.In two world wars in which the enemy has employed the sub- marine as his main weapon against our ships, he has been ableto achieve success on a scale that gave cause for anxiety only within those areas where we were unable to put the bulk of our shippinginto convoy with air as well as surface anti-submarine escort. The advent of the atomic bomb in no way detracts from the lessonslearned in those wars, though it has complicated the application of the convoy system, because ships must be dispersed to minimizelosses. Each convoy may have to cover a greater sea area requiring a greater anti-submarine escort effort. This requirement must bemet from Allied naval resources in being at the start of hostilities. The last-war submarines had three major limitations; low under-water speed and endurance, an inability to attack "blind" and a frequent need to surface or snort to charge batteries. These limita-tions have in the last fifteen years been largely overcome, the modern submarine having an underwater speed approaching thatof today's surface escorts, and equipment for detecting surface ships at great ranges and attacking them "blind." One thing iscertain, our A/S forces must be capable, numerically and tech- nically, of doing their job from the outset of a global war. Therewill be no manning of reserve ships or expansion of industry to provide reinforcement once the nuclear bombing has started. Anti-submarine forces consist of a complementary force of A/Sships, carrier-borne aircraft and maritime aircraft to provide defence in depth. This defence works on the principle of an innerdefence of surface escorts strengthened by carrier aircraft operated farther from the Fleet with maritime aircraft providing distantsupport. Today's carrier-borne A/S aircraft are the Gannet and theWestland Whirlwind, the latter being employed to reinforce the surface screen or on comparatively short-range sorties to specifictargets beyond the screen. There are those, however, who believe that with improved performance and equipment the helicoptermay advantageously replace fixed-wing aircraft altogether.
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